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Soon after Yoweri Museveni's military seizure of power in Uganda in 
1986, an insurgency war broke out in the north-eastern region of Teso. 
After six years of fighting a resolution was mediated by a number of agents 
drawn partly from the Museveni government and partly from local, 
indigenous resources in Teso. Today, despite lingering resentment against 
Museveni, the Teso insurgency is one of the few rare cases in Africa were a 
conflict was resolved by peaceful means.
Taking a lead from Vivienne Jabri's Discourses on Violence the thesis 
seeks to situate the emergence and support of the Teso insurgency within 
the discourse that prevailed in the region at the time. The fighting was 
enabled by an interpretation of the Museveni government as being hostile to 
the people of Teso, yet it was also facilitated by a prevailing culture of 
violence.
Understanding what causes an insurgency provides valuable insights 
into understanding what causes peace. The thesis therefore seeks to situate 
the emergence and support for peace in discourse. I t  discusses the different 
governmental and non-governmental agents that played a role in 
transforming the 'conflict discourse' into a 'peace discourse'.
Reflecting back on the past of the insurgency and looking forward to 
the future, the thesis places the process of reconciliation in Teso between 
past and future. The link between past, present and future is also subject to 
'hermeneutics'. Hermeneutics signifies the way understanding is 
accomplished between, for instance, two parties to a conflict. I t  argues that 
the reflecting back to the past is conditioned by a particular anticipation of 
the future, and vice versa. Although providing a valuable framework to 
analyse the transition from conflict to peace, hermeneutics is problematic in 
the way it confornts the problem of authenticity, and it also fails to account 
for power asymmetries which determine the process of understanding. This 
thesis suggests expanding it to 'critical hermeneutics' as a way of 
responding to the issues.
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I n t r o d u c t io n
People fight. And people reconcile. What lies in-between is the 
subject of the present thesis.
Teso
I arrived in Teso in January 2000. The initial objective of my research 
was to investigate a case of successful conflict resolution. Teso, a land­
locked region in the north-east of Uganda, lent itself as a case study. 
Shortly after the seizure of power by President Museveni in 1986 a fierce 
insurgency war broke out. Six years of fighting between the Iteso and 
Kumam 'boys' and the government army left a sad toll of too many lost 
lives.1
In a rather exceptional manner for the Great Lakes Region of Central 
Africa the Teso insurgency was resolved though the collaborative effort of 
local initiatives, indigenous mediators, churches and not least the 
government of Uganda. Fighting ceased in 1992 and to today the people of 
Teso have no intentions to return 'to the bush'.
And yet, peace in Teso is shallow. While conducting fieldwork the 
discontent of the people of Teso was very apparent. Poverty and destitution 
reign in the region today, people feel neglected and excluded by the present 
government. The period of the fieldwork coincided with the resurgence of 
violent cattle raiding by Karamojong warriors from the neighbouring district, 
which might have blurred the general attitude of the Iteso and Kumam 
towards the central government. In consequence, Teso has so far not 
succeeded in overcoming the paralysis of the post-conflict period and has 
failed to enter into an era of prosperity, security and contentment. 
Development in Teso is poor. Economical as well as social and political 
progress has come to a halt. Education, health care, sanitation and water -
1 Two different ethnic groups, the Kumam and the Iteso, inhabit the Teso region of Uganda.
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especially the rural areas lack the basic material necessities that provide for 
a dignified existence.
This thesis draws a link between the resolution of the violent conflict 
in Teso and the present status quo. I t  illustrates how peace in Teso was 
accomplished, and how this affects people toady. Rather then attempting to 
paint a broad picture, the approach taken is that of focusing on the local, 
Teso specific characteristics of past, present and future. The case study 
information has been compiled through working and living closely with the 
Iteso and Kumam; semi-structured interviews, participatory research, 
workshops and conferences provide the background of the gathered 
knowledge.
Historical Background
When Yoweri Museveni's troops seized power in Uganda in 1986 they 
took over a country with a devastating record of human rights abuses, a 
derelict economy and a past marked by violence and suffering. For more 
than two decades Uganda had been subjected to the ferocious dictatorships 
of Milton Obote and Idi Amin. In 1986 hopes were high that Uganda would 
now finally return to peace. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
implemented a 'no-party system', often referred to as 'the Movement', 
which continues to operate in Uganda today.
However, although the majority of the country supported the NRM 
and Museveni's government in Kampala, rebels in the north as well as in the 
north-east, areas from which Obote and Amin had recruited their soldiers, 
continued to violently resist the change of leadership. The Acholi people in 
the north and the Iteso and Kumam in Teso in the north-east of the country 
were perpetrators as well as victims of atrocious human rights abuses. The 
protracted nature of the conflict manifested itself in extra-judicial killings, 
rape and abduction. The people from the Teso region, which covers the 
districts of Soroti, Kumi and Katakwi, were also subjected to cattle rustling 
by their Karamojong neighbours. Allegations were voiced that the National 
Resistance Army (NRA) was involved in these assaults and soon the 
confidence of the Kumam and Iteso towards the Museveni government and 
its armed forces was thoroughly undermined.
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Transition form Conflict to Peace
This is a thesis about the transition from conflict to peace. With 
reference to the case study, I argue that recent approaches to peace and 
conflict studies -  post-structuralist informed deconstruction and 
Habermasian critical theory -  fail to successfully conceptualise the 
challenging and changing of the circumstance that give rise to violent 
conflicts. Instead, critical hermeneutics, it will be argued, offers a powerful 
alternative for capturing the moment of transition. Consequently, critical 
hermeneutics represents an important framework through which to analyse 
the invention of peace.
What is critical hermeneutics? Critical hermeneutics reflects the 
constitution of shared meaning amongst participants of a conversation -  
such as parties to a conflict in the process of resolving their disputes. This 
meaning is however not based on a metaphysical foundation, it does not 
search for a universal truth about the issue at stake. Rather, it is contingent 
and ever changing. The constitution of shared meaning should hence not be 
considered as directed towards a telos but as a constant process of closing 
and opening up meaning. Nevertheless, the accomplishment of (contingent) 
shared meaning is critical for co-existence because it provides the possibility 
of engagement with the Other, and in our particular case the former enemy. 
Critical hermeneutics avoids the relativism inherent in Derridian 
deconstruction while simultaneously escaping the closure of metaphysics 
inherent in critical theory.
Structure o f the Thesis
The structure of the thesis reflects this tension between relativism and 
metaphysics. Chapter 1 discusses recent approaches to conflict studies 
which draw on deconstruction. Central to the argument of International 
Relations (IR) scholars like David Campbell, Richard Ashley and Robert 
Walker is that deconstruction offers a framework through which to dissent 
from prevailing hegemonic power structures inherent in modern political 
theory and practice. Deconstruction opens hidden truths and meanings 
which have been pushed to the margin of a text, or a discourse. Its
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emancipatory potential is hence to challenge prevailing structures of 
inclusion and exclusion, drawing attention to what has been stifled and 
offering an opportunity for silenced voices and opinions to emerge.
The value of deconstruction for conflict studies is that it allows for the 
dissenting of previously marginalised people -  and thus it offers valuable 
insights into the insurgency in Teso. Here, too, people felt excluded by the 
central government, and started a violent conflict in order to challenge their 
position in the wider Uganda. However, the central argument of this thesis 
is that challenging structures of inclusion and exclusion - as central to 
deconstruction - is not sufficient to improve a marginalised position. Rather, 
this challenging has to lead to the actual changing of the circumstances 
which have given rise to the conflict, leading from exclusion to co-existence. 
The relativism inherent in deconstruction, however, does not allow for 
conceptualising the process of changing essential to the transition from 
dissidence to co-existence.
In response to deconstruction's impossibility to conceptualise change, 
Chapter 2 investigates contemporary approaches to IR theory which seek to 
address the transition from war to peace. The argument takes a lead from 
what Vivienne Jabri has called 'discourse on peace'.2 Jabri argues that
[t]h e  legitimisation of w ar is situated in discursive practices based on 
exclusionist identities.3
And asks:
Is  it therefore possible to conceive of peace as situated in a critical 
discursive process which, rather than reifying exclusion, incorporates 
difference?4
Significant for the present thesis is Jabri's implicit request to change the 
discursive practises of inclusion and exclusion. Since the legitimisation of 
war is situated in discourse, discourse is also the site for legitimising, or 
inventing, peace.
2 Vivienne Jabri (1996): Discourses on Violence. Conflict Analysis Reconsidered. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, ch. 6.
3 Jabri (1996): 157.
4 Jabri (1996): 157.
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The practices leading to a discourse on peace suggested by Jabri, and 
subsequently other scholars, are based on Jurgen Habermas' 'discourse 
ethics'. Yet, discourse ethics has been subjected to fierce criticism because 
it introduces an element of metaphysics into discourse and understanding. 
As such, it dissolves the space for dissidence opened up by deconstruction, 
and consequently infringes on the potential to challenge structures of 
inclusion and exclusion.
In recognition of deconstruction's value of challenging prevailing 
structures of exclusion, and after having refuted discourse ethics as a way 
of changing them, Chapter 3 introduces the notion of critical hermeneutics 
as a framework which does not bring about change, but nevertheless allows 
for its analysis. Critical hermeneutics is based on the work of Martin 
Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Hermeneutics signifies the 'fusion of 
horizons', that is the accomplishment of understanding and meaning in 
communication. The term 'fusion' does however not signify an end-point but 
a process. Horizons are the particular backgrounds in which the participants 
are situated, and which determine the way they understand themselves as 
well as 'the Other'. In the encounter with the Other, in the process of 
understanding, people question, and potentially alter, their horizons and 
consequently their interpretation of Self and Other. Two intertwined 
movements are at play in hermeneutics. Simultaneously, the participants in 
a conversation reach back to their past to evaluate their horizons and they 
cast themselves forward into the future of anticipated meaning, or potential 
reconciliation, with the Other. Our identity is negotiated in the constant 
backwards and forwards movement of the hermeneutic encounter in which 
meaning is accomplished.
Hermeneutics has been subjected to various forms of criticism. Of 
significance for this thesis is the allegation that it searches for truth and 
deeper meaning in communication and hence introduces a sense of closure. 
In response, philosophers such as Gianni Vattimo have suggested a more 
generous understanding of Heidegger's and Gadamer's work which is not 
based on the quest for truth. In the present thesis, I shall refer to it as 
critical hermeneutics to emphasise its constant motion of opening and
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closing meaning, and hence identities.5 Critical hermeneutics is what 
Vattimo has called "the ontology of the actual".6 I t  describes an interactive, 
fluid process, and not the end of a goal-oriented process.
The significant value of hermeneutics for peace and conflict studies is 
its recognition that identities are constituted with reference to past and 
future. The way the parties to a conflict remember their past determines 
how they anticipate their future, and vice versa. Future peace and 
reconciliation is determined by the way the parties interpret what has given 
rise to the conflict. What stories do they tell about the causes of the war?
Remembering the past is reflected In the particular narratives on which 
people draw in order to make sense of their lives. They do so not as 
individuals, rather their memory is determined by their social environment.7 
It  is thus produced by, as well as productive of, a collective identity in the 
present. Hence, remembering is selective: some incidences are chosen to 
be remembered whereas others are chosen to be forgotten. However, if the 
past can selectively be remembered or forgotten it suggests that 
"remembering is not the negative form of forgetting. Remembering is a 
form of forgetting."8 In other words, forgetting is not to fail to remember, it 
is not amnesia, but rather a way of remembering differently.
At a collective level, a change in remembering the past therefore 
manifests itself in re-membering a community, that is re-assembling it in a 
different way. The identity of the community changes in the light of the 
different interpretation of its past. Yet this new way of re-membering is not 
static but subject to constant influences and impulses. Despite introducing a 
sense of closure to a community, it always potentially leaves it open to 
contestation. Re-membering in the hermeneutic encounter simply "arrests 
the flux".9
5 Throughout the thesis I will however simply use the term 'hermeneutics', without the 
adjective 'critical'.
6 Gianni Vattimo (1997): Beyond Interpretation. The Meaning of Hermeneutics for 
Philosophy. Cambridge/Oxford: Polity Press, p. 10.
7 Maurice Halbwachs (1992): On Collective Memory. Chicago/London: University of Chicago 
Press, p. 43.
8 Milan Kundera (1995): Testaments Betrayed. London: Farber and Farber, p. 128.
9 John Caputo (1987): Radical Hermeneutics. Repetition, Deconstruction and the 
Hermeneutic Project. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. 130.
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Compared to deconstruction and discourse ethics, the value of using 
hermeneutics as a framework becomes most apparent in this interplay 
between contingency and closure. Similar to deconstruction hermeneutics 
maintains the openness of structures. However, unlike the relativism 
inherent in deconstruction, and without introducing a new level of 
metaphysics in the way discourse ethics does, hermeneutics allows us also 
to understand how meaning is accomplished and new (contingent) identities 
are formed. I t  enables us to understand change. Analysing conflicts through 
the framework of hermeneutics therefore allows for understanding both the 
challenging and the changing of the exclusive structures that frequently 
give rise to (violent) conflict.
The aim of the thesis is however not to develop a theory, or method, 
of conflict resolution but simply to reflect on 'what causes conflicts', and 
'what causes peace'. To pose these causal questions does not suggest a 
search for deeper meaning but instead to look at the discourses and 
practices which have produced the realities.10 The approach taken in this 
thesis hence replaces 'what' with 'how'.11
I t  is a question of how, in history, meaning is imposed, put to question, 
reinterpreted, and fixed anew. How, am idst the diversity and change of 
texts and signifying practices of a culture, are knowledgeable practices 
normalized and orchestrated, resistance disciplined, and social energies 
focused so that, in history, it becomes possible to effect a narrative  
structuring in which specific modes of subjectivity are constituted both 
as the self-evident sovereign origins of power, on the one hand, and the  
truthful voices of history's objective possibilities and necessary limits on 
the other?"12
With reference to the Teso case the significant questions are: How 
have the antagonistic identities been constituted over time? And how have 
they changed in the process of mediation? As Chapter 4 argues, without 
attempting to make wider claims the approach of this study is to focus on
10 Michael J. Shapiro (1997): Violent Cartographies. Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, p. 31.
11 Richard Ashely (1989): Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War. in: Der 
Derian, James/Shapiro, Michael J. (eds.): International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern 
Readings of World Politics. New York: Lexington Books, p. 283.
12 Ashley (1989): 283.
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the internal Teso dynamics, and in particular how the local interpretation of 
past, present and future 'caused' either peace or conflict.
The analysis of the causes of the insurgency begins in Chapter 5 with 
a rather traditional account of the history of Uganda. I t  seeks to map the 
national political dynamics which have developed over time and constituted 
a Teso/Museveni dichotomy, as well as to provide a background for the 
reader. Beginning with British colonial rule, I shall argue, some parts of 
Uganda have been privileged leading to antagonism and resentment in the 
country. A sequence of violent dictators developed out of these national 
cleavages, and the Teso insurgency was yet another outcome of it.
After having situated the case study in the historical development of 
Uganda, a very different approach towards what led to the insurgency is 
then suggested in Chapter 6. Based on the hermeneutic recognition that 
identities are situated between past and future, and that the interpretation 
of the past is reflected in the narratives people chose when referring to it, a 
selection of different stories about the beginning of the fighting is provided. 
They present the replies offered in response to my frequent question: 'What 
caused the insurgency?'. Significantly, eight years after the end of the 
insurgency one particular narrative is dominating, almost to the exclusion of 
competing accounts. In this version of the beginning of the insurgency, the 
Iteso and Kumam are described as the innocent victims of government 
policies -  an account which allows for a particular ordering, or re­
membering, of the Teso community, as well as for a number of political 
claims towards the present government. Through posing the question 'what 
caused the insurgency' the chapter seeks to illuminate how identities have 
been constructed in the process of remembering - and hence narrating - the 
past in one way, whilst forgetting others.
Chapter 7 provides yet another perspective on the beginning of the 
insurgency. Framed by the Clausewitzian argument that 'war is merely the 
continuation of politics by other means'13 it seeks to illustrate whether
13 Karl von Clausewitz (1993): On War. London: David Campbell Publishers, p. 99.
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politics in Teso in 1986/7 was indeed the main function of violence, or if to 
some extent the resulting insecurity in Teso was also driven by economic 
and personal objectives. In addition, the chapter challenges Clausewitz's 
equation of violence and means and argues that violence is a socially 
situated form of interaction and that in the particular case of Teso at the 
beginning of the insurgency a culture of violence prevailed which rendered 
its application legitimate. Violence is thus a horizon, an aspect of an 
identity, and not an external tool, or means, which can rationally be 
applied.
After having discussed the different 'causes' of the insurgency, the 
thesis turns to look at its resolution when it asks 'what caused the Teso 
peace?'. Chapter 8 sketches the mediation efforts that contributed to the 
settlement. The question that runs through the chapter is how different 
forms of agency worked together to impact on the structures of inclusion 
and exclusion that ran through Uganda at the time. Against the backdrop of 
fusing horizons and accomplishing meaning, different actors shall be 
discussed and their impact assessed. In particular the work of the 
Presidential Commission for Teso, introduced by Museveni in 1991, played a 
significant role in 'bringing the rebels out of the bush'. Through the promise 
of economic development in Teso, the Commission facilitate the people's re- 
evaluation of their initial reasons to take up arms. This re-interpretation of 
their past with a view to future prosperity led the people from Teso to 
accept the government's gesture of peace.
What makes the Teso case significant for my project on hermeneutics 
is that both parties to the conflict, the Museveni government and the people 
from Teso, reached out to each other in order to resolve their violent 
dispute. Peace in Teso did not simply occur due to the overpowering of the 
insurgents by the national army, rather it was the result of a process in 
which various agents challenged the prevailing structures of exclusion and 
animosities. The process of mediation took place in communication, for 
instance through seminars and workshops organised by the Teso 
Commission, and it changed the way people in Teso perceived themselves 
and the Museveni government. The Teso case thus held out the prospect of 
providing valuable insights into the fusion of horizons.
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And yet, in the course of my research it became apparent that peace
was shallow. The mediation which ended the insurgency had been
successful in bringing the insurgents 'out of the bush', but the resentment 
that started the fighting lingers to this day. Teso has peace but without 
reconciliation.14 Today people still feel excluded, and despite the promise of 
development by Museveni the region is prone to famine and poverty. So has 
the relation between Teso and the Museveni government changed as a 
result of the mediation process?
Altering the way of relating to the Other takes place through 
remembering the past in a different way. I t  is here where change occurs, 
and societies re-member as argued above. In Chapter 9, by way of
discussing two examples, the Mukura war memorial and the new cultural
leader, Papa Emorimor, I will illustrate that people in Teso still feel 
antagonistic about the Museveni government. Through analysing how 
people related to their past and future today I shall assess whether there is 
potential for change in the future.
Against the backdrop of prevailing poverty and resentment in Teso, 
the conclusion will ask what went wrong in the process of mediation which 
promised to be so successful at first. With reference to Michel Foucault's 
power relations I shall argue that in the process of fusing horizons the Iteso 
and Kumam failed to dissent from the prevailing exclusive power structures. 
Despite the accomplishment of shared meaning in the process of mediation 
the way the people from Teso and the Museveni government relate to each 
other today has not changed. Rather, it is still marked by the same power 
asymmetries which gave rise to the insurgency. Consequently, as I shall 
argue, in order to not only challenge, but indeed change the status quo it 
requires a process of 'poetic imagination' where the Self alters the way of 
relating to the Other. I t  is here where dissenting from hegemonic power 
structures is successful.
14 This term is borrowed from Peter Heriques (2000): Peace Without Reconciliation. War, 
Peace and Experience Among the Iteso of East Uganda (unpublished doctoral thesis). 
Institute of Anthropology. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen.
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Structural constraints
Based on Anthony Giddens' 'structuration theory7, which has partly 
been developed out of Gadamer's hermeneutics/5 the argument forwarded 
in this thesis is that understanding is constrained by structural properties 
that have developed over space and time. The recognition of this is relevant 
both in terms how it restricts the author from fully understanding the 
developments in Teso, as well as in terms of the Iteso and Kumam fully 
understanding their 'Other', the government of Uganda. The hermeneutic 
process of fusing horizons is thus constrained by an "effective history" -  a 
historical development which limits how we understand the world.16 These 
historical ' long durees' of political and social lives take on the form of 
structures, or rather structural properties as shall be discussed in Chapter 
3, which inform the way we see the world.17 "We understand as we do 
because we exist as we do."18
Two parties to the conflict?
Although the fusion of horizons involves at least two parties it is not 
the objective of this thesis to portray both sides equally. The main focus is 
on the people of Teso, while the Government of Uganda's position is only 
infrequently articulated through speeches by Museveni, government 
publications or the reports of the Teso Commission. Two reasons were 
significant for this one-sided portrayal: one hermeneutic, one practical.
Firstly, from a hermeneutic perspective, one of the central arguments 
of this thesis is that in the hermeneutic process of understanding we always 
bring ourselves in. I t  is through our horizons that we interpret the Other, 
and it is our horizons that change in the process of understanding. The 
subject of this thesis is to illustrate how the horizon of the people of Teso 
changed in the process of understanding the Museveni government. Any 
interpretation of the government therefore has to be considered through
15 For a discussion of hermeneutics as the basis of structuration theory see Anthony Giddens 
(1988): Hermeneutics and Social Science, in: Shapiro, Gary/Sica, Alan (eds.): Hermeneutics. 
Questions and Prospects. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 215-30.
16 The "effective history" of Teso is elaborated in Chapter 5.
17 Vivienne Jabri/Stephen Chan (1996): "An Ontologist Always Rings Twice: Two More Stories 
About Structure and Agency in Reply to Hollis and Smith." Review of International Studies
22, p. 108.
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their lens, and not through that of an external analysts.19 How did they 
understand the government's actions, gestures, initiatives, and failures? 
How did they fuse their horizons?
In this thesis the Museveni government is therefore not considered 
from an outside perspective but rather from the Teso vantagepoint. As a 
result, the thesis does not attempt to criticise the Museveni government 
from an isolated perspective. Although the external analyst is able (to some 
extent) to step back form the events and to form a more critical opinion,20 
the people of Teso remain prisoners of the discourse which defines and 
confines the way they understand Museveni. These constraints are partly 
the result of a long historical process. Chapter 5 recounts how present 
power asymmetries have developed over time and how the Ugandan polity 
has been split along cleavages which established an antagonistic 
relationship between Museveni and the people of Teso. At the beginning of 
the insurgency historically developed structures determined how the Iteso 
and Kumam interpret the Museveni government, and how they constrained, 
yet also enabled, the agency of institutions such as the Teso Commission in 
the process of mediation.
Hence, in this thesis the Museveni government is equally absent and 
present. I t  is absent because its horizons are not discussed explicitly, yet it 
is present by proxy through the way it constitutes the people of Teso in 
opposition to it. Through discussing the Teso identity, which in its 
antagonism is established through difference (as shall be elaborated in 
Chapter 2), the government always remains central to the analysis. The 
interpretation of the mediation process by the Iteso and Kumam is highly 
dependent on this disposition. In this sense, it does not matter what the 
government itself did or does but how the Iteso and Kumam interpret it.
Secondly, from a practical perspective, this thesis can only be a time 
and space restricted project and to add an in-depth analysis of the Ugandan 
government would have exhausted its limits. In addition, an analysis of a
18 John Caputo (1987): Radical Hermeneutics. Repetition, Deconstruction and the 
Hermeneutic Project. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. 61.
19 Admittedly, it is not possible for an external analyst to enter into the horizon of another 
group of people and to fully consider events through their lens. The difficulties of this 
endeavour and the impact for analysis more widely shall be discussed in chapter 4.
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government comes with obstacles such as limited access to information and 
resources. This thesis therefore does not tell the story of Uganda but only of 
Teso.
20 As expressed in Bernhard Tabaire/Susanne Zistel (forthcoming): Does Conflict Prevention 
Work? UK Policy Towards Uganda. London: ISIS Policy Paper.
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chapter i
T he  N eed  f o r  D is s id e n c e  a n d  t h e  
N eed  fo r  R e c o n c il ia t io n
Criticism lives in the space of exile. "[The] ... ruthless and irreverent 
dismantling of the workings of discourse, thought, and existence, is 
therefore the work of a dissident."21 In the notion of exile and dissidence as 
a form of criticism, structures and meanings are constantly put into 
question. I t  challenges prevailing truths and assumptions, and reveals their 
contingent nature.
Inspired by Julia Kristeva's call for dissidence cited above, a number 
of International Relations theorists have given up the safe structures and 
meaning of modern political theory and ventured into various sites of exile. 
For instance, in 1990, with special reference to Kristeva, International 
Studies Quarterly published a Special Issue entitled Speaking the Language 
o f Exile: Dissidence in International Studies.22 Path-breaking for the 
discipline at the time it provides a collection of post-structural essays 
criticising the prevailing, modern framework of international theory and 
practice.
Modern Thought in International Relations
The modern discipline of international politics has since attracted 
fierce criticism:
[P]olitics as a modern discipline rests upon an underlying ontology of 
violence which is in turn derived from the way in which politics as a 
domain of action relies upon a certain understanding of subjectivity: 
nam ely that of an autonomous reasoning subject which is said both to 
be capable of disclosing the character o f politics rationally (an
21 Julia Kristeva (1986): A New Type of Intellectual: The Dissident, in: Moi, Toril (ed.): The 
Kristeva Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 299.
22 International Studies Quarterly (1990), Vol. 34, No.3.
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epistemological claim ), and of constituting politics in reality (an  
ontological c la im ).23
This criticism touches the heart of International Relations. 
Traditionally, subjects take on the form of sovereign entities, like nation­
states, governments and statesmen, and they are predominantly, yet not 
exclusively, couched into a theoretical framework referred to as 'realism'.24 
Espitemologically, realism as a theory
presents its knowledge o f the world in term s of generalized, 
univerzalised and irreducible patterns of human behaviour, which 
reduces global politics to the incessant, anarchical power struggle 
between states, and rational interstate activities to the simple utilitarian  
pursuit of self-in terest.25
Critically it has been argued that because it is deeply embedded in 
modern thought, traditional IR theory fails to account for "the intrinsic 
ambiguity, contestedness, and dependent arbitrary practice of prevailing 
modes of subjectivity, objectivity, and conduct in global life."26 As a 
response, a new generation of IR scholars has begun 'to read' the social 
world as a discursive text, challenging implications of dominant forms of 
'meaning' and 'knowing' and their role in constructing social and political 
realities.27
Against the backdrop of this briefly sketched criticism the present 
chapter discusses two contributions to the critique of positivist IR theory.28 
The first highlights the need to dissent form sovereign bodies of knowledge
23 David Campbell/Michael Dillon (1993): The End of Philosophy and the End of International 
Relations, in: Campbell, David/Dillon, Michael (eds.): The Political Subject of Violence. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 1.
24 Realism, however, has not always been the dominant thought in IR theory. For a 
discussion of the 'Great Debates' see Mark V. Kauppi/Paul R. Viotti (1993): International 
Relations Theory. New York/Toronto: Macmillan.
25 Jim George (1996): Understanding International Relations After the Cold War: Probing 
Beyond the Realist Legacy, in: Shapiro, Michael J./Alker, Hayward R. (eds.): Challenging 
Boundaries. Global Flows, Territorial Identities. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
p. 34.
26 Richard Ashley (1995): The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the 
Domestication of Global Life, in: Der Derian, James (ed.): International Theory. Critical 
Investigations. London: Macmillan, p. 95.
27 George (1996): 58-9.
28 Positivism can be defined with reference to its main assumptions of truth as 
correspondence, the methodological unity of science, and the value free nature of scientific 
knowledge. For a detailed explanations see Mark A. Neufeld (1995): The Restructuring of 
International Relations Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 2.
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like realism; the second, in the same mode, advocates for deconstruction as 
a tool of criticism and engagement. Despite taking their critique and 
dissidence seriously, and appreciating its significance and value, I will argue 
that the need for dissidence is closely intertwined with the need for 
reconciliation -  and that International Relations theory has so far neglected 
this concern.
Need for Dissidence
The early writing of post-positivist IR scholars was marked by a 
jargon commonly associated with violent conflict between and inside of 
nation states. Terms like revolution, violence, dissidence, etc., were 
frequently used. The rationale behind using a language foreign to the 
discipline of IR was to alienate the reader from traditional concepts and 
conceptions with the aim of making contradictions and contingencies 
apparent. Critical reading and writing that focuses on aesthetics, on artistic 
performance, is a strategy which itself dissents from traditional conventions, 
be they about scholarship or IR concepts such as sovereignty or 
boundaries.29
By analogy it is thus inviting to compare the struggle of post­
positivist scholars against traditional IR theory, which makes use of combat 
jargon, with violent conflict between or inside of states.30 Can such a 
comparison be made? And if yes, what lessons can be drawn from the 
analogy between intellectual and physical dissidence?
Reading Dissident/W riting the Discipline
The analogy is best made with regard to individual texts. Richard 
Ashley's and Robert Walker's conclusion in the above mentioned ISQ Special 
Issue 'Reading Dissident/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question o f
29 Richard K. Ashley/R. B. J. Walker (1990): "Reading Dissident/Writing the Discipline: Crisis 
and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies." International Studies Quarterly 
34(3): 367-415.
30 To compare rhetoric with fighting is, of course, not intended to belittle the experience of 
violent conflicts.
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Sovereignty in International Studies',31 which makes reference to Kristeva's 
appeal for dissidence, as well as a further article by Ashley entitled 'Living 
on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and W ar'32 both lend themselves 
to the exercise, for not only do they provide a summary of the main post­
positivist arguments at the time but they have also become widely used 
reference texts for sympathetic and opposing arguments.33 In the following 
discussion, the notion of dissidence, as continuously used by Ashley and 
Walker, is taken in its literal sense and related to political dissidence inside 
of a nation, that is to a group of people that finds itself in opposition to the 
central power that forms the government. The aim is to explore how Ashley 
and Walker conceive of dissidence and at the same time to question the 
fruitfulness of their endeavour in line with their aim -  to encourage the 
critique of sovereignty in the discipline of International Relations and to 
ultimately change the way IR scholars think about politics and policies in the 
international realm.
In Ashley and Walker's article the leitmotif of struggle runs through 
the whole text. From a conflict analytical perspective 'Reading 
Dissidence/Writing the Discipline' differentiates a number of categories. 
Traditional IR theory is set up as the enemy holding a sovereign position of 
power and knowledge. As such it resembles a hegemonic government with 
exclusive rights to power and knowledge. Hegemony, however, is 
threatened by a heterogeneous group of dissidents who find themselves 
pushed to the margin of the discourse. Whether gender conscious, 
dissenting from literary criticism, philosophers, poets or post-Marxists the 
group is united merely by the aspiration to undermine the sovereign body. 
The members do not resemble a "rude band of dissenting intellectuals 
bearing only their deconstructive wits and strange words",34 but rather they 
exhibit "the ethical discipline that enables them creatively to respond to and
31 Ashley/Walker (1990).
32 Richard Ashley (1989): Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War. in: Der 
Derian, James/Shapiro, Michael J. (eds.): International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern 
Readings of World Politics. New York: Lexington Books, 259-322.
33 See for instance Richard T. L. Shapcott (1997): Cosmopolitan Conversations: Philosophical 
Hermeneutics and the Question of Community in International Relations (unpublished 
doctoral thesis). Department of Politics. Bristol: University of Bristol.
34 Ashley/Walker (1990): 376.
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exploit the paradoxical crises" created by the sovereign body.35 Ashley and 
Walker hence draw attention to a time o f'c ris is ' in which the contingency of 
sovereignty has been realised, leading to the challenging of its dominance 
and thus ultimately to the possibility of change through resistance, 
dissidence and struggle.
The Sovereignty Crisis
But what has led to the crisis? Ashley and Walker argue that their 
resistance inside of the discipline of IR has been sparked by the imposition 
of exclusive boundaries that demarcate who are the legitimate contributors 
to the body of IR knowledge, and who are not.36 This imposition requires 
power to discipline the contributors to the discipline to conform to the 
prevailing mode of reasoning.37 The content of the prevailing mode of 
thinking is insignificant; it is not important what particular tradition of 
thought is promoted but simply whether it is exclusive in its claims or if it 
allows for alternative positions and perspectives. I f  the mode of thinking, or 
discourse, inside a community makes exclusive claims to truth it becomes 
hegemonic and imposing -  its omnipotent authority stifles and submerges 
otherness. Exclusive truth claims introduce a sense of closure to the debate, 
they close the debate through the alleged authenticity of the promoted 
knowledge. And this, so Ashley and Walker, is the case in IR.
With reference to insurgency wars, to draw a parallel between the 
dominance of a particular discourse and an oppressive government is close. 
Both stifle opposition, both have exclusive truth claims, both do not allow 
for otherness. In the case of Uganda, as we shall see in the present study, 
after President Museveni came to power in 1986 people in Teso felt that 
there was no place for them. The Iteso and Kumam had the distinct 
sensation that Museveni's Uganda strongly preferred citizens from the 
western region, Museveni's home area, and that they themselves, due to 
their past political alliances with the former regime of Milton Obote, against 
which Museveni's insurgency war was directed, were excluded from being
35 Ashley/Walker (1990): 376.
36 Ashley/Walker (1990): 377.
37 Michel Foucault (1980): Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Things. Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
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appreciated in the new Uganda.38 They felt that the boundaries of belonging 
and not belonging went right through the middle of the country, leaving 
them as well as their neighbours the Acholi and the Langi 'on the margin', 
to use Ashley's and Walker's phrase. The government of Uganda, in the 
eyes of the people form Teso, was a hegemon.
To return to IR, the state of hegemony provokes a crisis, Ashley and 
Walker argue.39 More and more scholars realise that they are not 
represented in the prevailing discourse and although their individual 
interests might be different and diverse they join in their struggle for 
recognition. This struggle is directed towards dissenting from mainstream IR 
theory and to offer alternative interpretations of the world and its people. 
Alternative and yet not superior, Ashley and Walker emphasise, to prevent 
the establishment of a new hegemony under a different rule.
In Teso, the crisis that eventually led to the insurgency was also 
caused by a struggle for recognition. Shortly after Museveni came to power 
the Kumam and Iteso took up their arms in order to violently articulate their 
opposition and to state their difference from Museveni's Uganda. Thus the 
people in Teso experienced a form of exclusion which bears strong 
similarities with the picture painted by Ashley and Walker: they found 
themselves at the margin of the nation where they had little influence. 
However, for the Iteso and Kumam, as will be described throughout this 
thesis, to resist the perceived hegemonic politics by the Museveni 
government through violent struggle was of little success. Armed struggle, 
in the case of Teso, was an unsuccessful tool to dissent from prevailing 
power structures.
At this point it is necessary to pause for a moment and to consider 
the relevance of modern concepts for non-modern societies. So far it has 
been argued that the modern state as a representation of sovereignty does 
not allow for (e.g. ethnic or cultural) diversities and this might lead to
38 The historical development of the antagonism is the subject of Chapter 5.
39 Ashley/Walker (1990): 376-7.
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(violent) dissent.40 Caution is however needed when applying Ashley and 
Walker's critique of modernity to a thesis on Ugandan politics. Modernity is 
a philosophy firm ly situated in Western historical development and thought 
and cannot simply be transferred to a cultural context that does not share 
the same past.41 Yet, modern notions of statecraft have been introduced to 
the African continent through colonial boundary drawing, institution building 
and government structuring so that a comparison is to some extent 
possible. The introduction of the modern art of statecraft and governance 
through colonialism has fused with local knowledges and practices. The 
term colonialism has its origin in the Latin word colere, which translates to 
cultivate and to design, and it has served to organise and to transform non- 
European areas into fundamentally European constructs.42 Today, in a post­
colonial age, Western notions of how to structure governments, how to 
cultivate political systems and how to design national economies are subject 
to (predominantly liberal-modern) donor policies and practices so that the 
external influence is still perpetuated. Dependent on international financial 
assistance the social, economic and political development of most African 
countries is 'cultivated and designed' along Western worldviews manifested 
for instance in the call for multiparty systems, economic privatisation and 
an adherence to international notions of human rights.43 Based on the donor 
communities' modern understanding of nation states, with boundaries that 
demarcate inside/outside, public/civil and domestic/foreign the African 
state, too, resembles a sovereign body in Ashley and Walker's sense.44 
Similar to a modern state-system it strives to secure consensus among the 
well-bounded population and, in doing so, submerges forms of difference - 
it produces a dichotomy of identify/difference.
40 R. B. J. Walker (1993): Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 171.
41 Admittedly, this problem runs through the whole of the thesis. For a discussion of the 
tension between African philosophy and modernity see Peter Amato (1997): African 
Philosophy and Modernity, in: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi (ed.): Postcolonial African 
Philosophy. A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 71-100.
42 V. Y. Mudimbe (1988): The Invention of Africa. Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of 
Knowledge. London: James Curry, p. 1.
43 For an example of a liberal, human rights based critique of Uganda's non-party democracy
see Human Rights Watch (1999): Hostile to Democracy. The Movement System and Political 
Repression in Uganda. NYC/Washington/London/Brussels: Human Rights Watch.
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Resisting Hegemony
What is significant for the discussion of dissidence in this chapter is 
that in Teso the way resistance was practised was in opposition to the 
government, it was against, yet nevertheless inside of, the prevailing order. 
Although the Iteso and Kumam argue that it was not their intention to 
topple the government they still defined themselves in contrast to it and as 
such acted inside of the structures that ordered the society at the time. I f  
successful their insurgency war would have inverted the power relations to 
their advantage, possibility leading to the exclusion and discrimination of 
other communities in Uganda. They themselves might have formed a new 
hegemonic regime, which could have given rise to new exclusion and 
resistance. With reference to Uganda as a whole, a country that has been 
affected by violence since its independence in 1962, this would have meant 
a continuation of aggression and tensions.
However, to dissent from prevailing power structures through trying 
to invert them is not sufficient, as the Teso example shows, to alter the 
social, political and economic reality of the people concerned. Rather, 
dissent has to be conducted in a way that challenges, and ultimately 
changes, the structures, which legitimate exclusion and oppression.45 
Consequently, with violent dissidence in opposition to the government 
merely perpetuating the cycle of conflict, the question becomes pertinent 
whether there are alternative ways, which challenge the structures of 
exclusion and inclusion themselves.
Ways to Dissent?
An alternative way to dissent has been developed with reference to 
post-structuralism. Here dissidence does not aim at inverting structures but 
rather at challenging the way a particular discourse is organised. In 
response to the hegemonic character of the IR discipline Ashley writes:
44 With a sense of humour cross-border smuggling is often described by many Africans as 
legitimate 'African trade' - the trade that would take place if there were no colonial 
boundaries.
45 The notion of power relations and dissidence shall be discussed in the conclusion.
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Poststructuralism cannot claim to offer an alternative position or 
perspective, because there is no alternative ground upon which it might 
be established.46
The position of post-structuralist inquiry is at a non-place, it resides 
on the borderline of inclusion and exclusion.47 From this location the 
dissident investigates how societies or communities operate. She/he asks 
what forces work behind the apparent, how modes of relating to each other 
have been normalised and institutionalised, and how binary oppositions like 
inside/outside, continuity/change, core/periphery, but also friends/enemies 
and NRM/Iteso-Kumam have become realities over time.48 To 'live on the 
borderline' prevents a form of dissidence that merely inverts power 
asymmetries, as attempted by the Teso insurgency. Post-structuralist 
critique is placed outside of the forces that operate within an asymmetry, it 
is voiced from the borderline and therefore challenges the borderline itself. 
It  does not privilege one side over the other but rather addresses the way 
these two parties have come to relate to each other -  it challenges the very 
practice of exclusion/inclusion. As elucidated by Ashley:
Displacing the state, poststructuralism puts this boundary into doubt.
The boundary itself is never simply there, poststructuralism knows. I t  is 
always in the process of being m arked, transgressed, erased, and 
marked again. The question to be asked is: W here is the boundary?
W hat m arks the boundary? ... [T]he sort o f question to be asked is ... 
the how  question. How, by way of w hat practice, by appeal to what 
cultural resources, and in the face of w hat resistance is this boundary 
imposed and ritualized?"49
The role of the dissident in Ashley and Walker is to step out of 
prevailing power structures that organise a society. Here, then, the historic 
forces that have, over space and time, produced a particular environment, 
or truth, can be criticised. This form of critique, the practice of the 
dissident, should however not lead to the establishment of an alternative 
truth. Rather, the task is to refrain from constructing a new, and 'better', 
environment. This approach is radically different form the Teso insurgency
46 Ashley (1989): 278.
47 Ashley (1989): 260.
48 Ashley (1989): 261.
49 Ashley (1989): 311.
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which was not trying to challenge the power structures per se but rather to 
invert them.
In its mode of criticism, hence, poststructuralism requires a radical 
undecidabiHty\ instead of privileging one side of a binary opposition over the 
other what is required is
a respect for this paradox as an opposition in which it is never possible 
to choose one proposition over the other. I t  is an undecidable opposition 
that destabilizes all pretence to secure ground a t the end of history ...
but it is also an opposition that must be respected as an inescapable
feature of the ways through which one m ay think about history. ... I t  is 
to insist that historicity must be taken to the very centre of the practice 
of doing theory .50
At the non-place on the boundary the dissident therefore does not engage 
in writing history herself/himself. The newly unravelled binary oppositions 
are to remain open in a constant flux. The role of the critic is to deconstruct 
historical truths without inventing new ones. With reference to conflicts the 
task is to lay open the spatio-temporal conditions that have given rise to
the antagonism - without developing a new form of co-existence for the
people affected.
Deconstruction as Dissidence
Ashley and Walker's account of dissent bears strong similarities to 
David Campbell's writing on violent conflicts. Campbell's project is also
concerned with analysing how rituals of power have arisen, taken shape,
gained importance and affected politics.51 The tool Campbell uses for his 
investigation is Jacques Derrida's notion of deconstruction.
Deconstruction is best explained through what it is not.52
Deconstruction is not the negative task of demolition, and it is also not a 
simple dismantling of an entity into small parts. Furthermore,
deconstruction is not criticism in a general or Enlightenment sense of 
faultfinding, nor is it a method (alongside other methods) which can be
50 Ashley (1989): 274.
51 David Campbell (1992): Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 6
52 I am here following Simon Critchley's discussion. Simon Critchley (1999): The Ethics of 
Deconstruction. Derrida and Levinas. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 21-22.
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applied to a particular case. For Simon Critchley, deconstruction can be 
explained as the reading of a text in a way that "opens up the blind spots or 
ellipses within the dominant interpretation."53 Generally, texts are written in 
ways that exclude alternative perspectives. Texts make claims to 
authentically reflect a particular reality so that they introduce a sense of 
closure, which stifles alternative interpretations. Deconstruction, then, 
reveals these limits and invites plural, alternative interpretations.
To illustrate the deconstruction of texts Campbell shows how 
narratives about the violent conflict in Bosnia reflect particular accounts of 
Bosnian history which are conditioned by a selective understanding of 
ontological presumptions about ethnicity, nationalism, identity, violence, 
etc.54 Ignorant of their ontological selection the texts introduce closure on a 
multiple interpretation of history through developing a particular truth, or 
meta-narrative, devoid of contestation. The value of deconstruction is to 
force open monopolistic accounts and to reveal their contingent character.
Hence Campbell's use of deconstruction seeks to challenge "the 
relations of power which, in dealing with difference, move from disturbance 
to oppression, from irritation to repression, and ... from contestation to 
eradication."55 He calls for a different configuration of politics in which the 
overriding concern is the 'struggle for alterity', in which eradication is 
replaced by the nourishing and nurturing of antagonism, conflict, and 
plurality.56 I t  is paramount to him to celebrate difference through "the 
proliferation of perspectives, dimensions and approaches to the very real 
dilemmas of global life."57 Campbell's argument thus seeks to "contest the 
drive for a new normative architecture -  especially in form of newly minted 
codes and principles -  as a necessity for responses to the context of 
crisis."58
For Campbell deconstruction consequently turns into an ethical 
project of celebrating difference. And yet, deconstruction has its limits. The
53 Critchley (1999): 23.
54 David Campbell (1998b): National Deconstruction. Violence, Identity, and Justice in 
Bosnia. Minnesota: University Press, p. 23.
55 David Campbell (1998c): "Why Fight: Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-
Structuralism." Millennium 27(3), p. 514.
56 Campbell (1998c): 513.
57 Campbell (1992): 5.
58 Campbell (1998c): 520.
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plurality of perspectives and values, nurtured and encouraged by 
deconstruction, might allow for difference, yet it leads to a state of 
undecidablity which renders consensus and decision-making an impossible 
task. As argued by Critchely
[djeconstruction can certainly be employed as a powerful means of 
political analysis. For exam ple, showing how a certain dom inant political 
regime ... is based on a set of undecidable presuppositions is an 
im portant step in the subversion of the regime's legitimacy. ... But how 
is one to account for the move from undecidablity to the political 
decision to com bat th at domination? I f  deconstruction is the strictest 
possible determ ination of undecidablity in the limitless context of, for 
the lack of the better word, experience, then this entails the suspension 
of the m om ent of decisions. Yet decisions have to be taken. But how?
And in virtue of what? How does one m ake decisions in an undecidable 
terrain?59
The inherent relativism of deconstruction and the impossibility of 
decision making within the framework of deconstruction leads Critchley to 
supplement Derrida with the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, and 
Campbell follows him in this move.60 For the purpose of the present study, 
however, I shall leave their projects here.61 Important for the remainder of 
the thesis is the significant value of Derrida's deconstruction, which allows 
for opening up closed discourses as multiple sites in which difference is not 
stifled but appreciated. As argued by Critchley above, and illustrated by 
Campbell in his work on the war in Bosnia, with reference to hegemonic 
regimes deconstruction enables analysts and people affected to challenge 
the prevailing exclusion. To return to the argument at the beginning of the 
chapter, deconstruction allows for questioning structures and meaning and 
thus for dissent.
And yet, to return to the case of Teso, is challenging structures and 
meaning sufficient in conflict-ridden societies? Once the prevailing power
59 Critchley (1999): 199.
60 Critchley (1999): 236; Campbell (1998b): 184.
61 To draw on the work of Emmanuel Levinas is becoming increasingly popular in 
International Relations theory. Driven by the search for a form of ethics, his accounts of how 
Self and Other relate to each other (and what responsibility for the Other we can derive out 
of this) have proven to be of valuable insights. However, it is not the objective of this thesis 
to discuss ethics, but rather to reflect on a particular body of theory along the lines of a case 
study.
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structures have been contested, maybe even violently, are they to remain 
open? In fact, can they remain open? Can deconstructing structures lead to 
the absence of structures, to an infinite plurality and diversity without any 
certainties? Is living in a constant flux possible, and indeed desirable?
Necessity of Boundaries
To repeat, the projects of Ashley, Walker and Campbell attempt to 
dispense with the security of boundaries and certainties because boundaries 
merely perpetuate the structure of inclusion and exclusion. Rather, they 
attempt to introduce a constant openness of structures allowing for plurality 
to flourish.
Despite recognising that mapping out political aims like post-war 
reconciliation reaffirms the structure of exclusion and thus potentially 
perpetuates closure and the initial cause of the crisis, I would like to 
suggest that Ashley, Walker and Campbell do not pay sufficient attention to 
one of the most crucial features of life. They do not pay attention to the fact 
that people need a sense of identity, a sense of belonging, a sense of limits 
and boundaries. Not for reasons of 'human nature', anthropological 
conditions, or 'human needs',62 but simply because, otherwise, being, inter­
human communication and understanding would be impossible. For social 
interaction to be meaningful shared concepts, or what has been referred to 
as 'language games', are required, and this is of particular importance for 
the time after a violent conflict when a new, peaceful future has to be 
developed.
Wittgenstein's Language Games
Understanding amongst people is central to Ludwig Wittgenstein's 
language games. According to Wittgenstein we can only make sense of the 
world through agreeing on shared concepts. These linguistic concepts 
resemble games in which the participants have agreed upon one particular 
meaning for one particular object, or rather its representation in form of a 
word. Understanding, devoid of any pre-mortal dispositions, occurs on the
62 'Human needs' refers to a concept introduced by John Burton (1990): Conflict: Resolution 
and Provention. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 39. For a discussion see Chapter 8.
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basis of conceptual agreement, and, as the following quote shows, not on 
the basis of an object as such.
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it "beetle". No 
one can look into any one else's box, and everyone says he knows w hat 
a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. - Here it would be quite possible 
for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even  
imagine such a thing constantly changing.-. But suppose the word 
"beetle" had a use in these people's language? - I f  so it would not be 
used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the  
language-gam e at all; not even as something; for the box might even 
be em pty. - no, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it 
cancels itself out, w hatever it is. 63
Thus, according to Wittgenstein, there is a certain consensus 
amongst the members of a community which makes for a conceptual 
compulsion, and which indeed creates concepts.64 As a consequence it is 
only through togetherness that shared concepts are constituted, rules are 
established and hence understanding on a common ground is possible. Only 
inside the boundaries of a community, a culture, or - even more abstractly - 
a discourse, is there a possibility to apply words, or concepts, and hence to 
shape customs, beliefs and laws that provide guidelines for meaningful 
behaviour. As signs, invested with meaning through the communicative 
processes of interaction, they are at the same time medium and outcome -  
yet they provide necessary significance and meaning for social systems of 
co-existence.65 Human knowledgeability, that is the actors knowledge about 
their actions, a knowledge which is itself produced and reproduced through 
these actions, is always bounded by a set of structures that at the same 
time constrain and enable the knowledge.66
To return to the question of criticism and dissidence, Wittgenstein 
suggests that in order to make sense of the world it is important to be a 
member of a community -  only inside of certain boundaries or discourses is 
communication meaningful. For social interaction to be substantial, shared
63 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1993): Philosophical Investigations, (trans. by G.E.M. Ancombe). 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, section 65.
64 Ernest Gellner (1985): Relativism and the Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 169.
65 Anthony Giddens (1984): The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 31.
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concepts and structural systems are necessary. Neither Campbell nor 
Ashley and Walker account for the time after the dissent when some form of 
co-existence has to be established. Yet, post-conflict reconstruction requires 
some form of resolution and re-invention of new structures to prevent a 
new outbreak of violence.
Need for Reconciliation
I f  criticism and dissent marks the beginning of a conflict, how, then, 
does a conflict end? I f  one was to follow Campbell's project then ending 
would be an undesired outcome, for ending would introduce a sense of 
closure on the newly opened debate. And yet, the constant criticism, the 
constant questioning of boundaries, does not allow for people in war-torn 
societies to create shared concepts and to return to peace necessary for 
ease of mind, individual and collective progress and prosperity.
Similarly, the French philosopher Michel Foucault draws our attention 
to where the 'real challenges' of criticism lie:
We have to dig deeply to show how things have been historically 
contingent, for such and such reason intelligible but not necessary. We 
must make the intelligible appear against a background of emptiness, 
and deny its necessity. We must think w hat exists is far from filling all 
possible spaces. To make a truly unavoidable challenge of the question: 
w hat can we make work, w hat new games can we invent?67
The invention of a 'new game', in relation to a violent conflict, resembles 
the transition from war to peace. Similarly, with reference to Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Chris Coker remarks "that wars ... only really end when they are 
transcended, when they ... [go] beyond the traditional currency of victory 
and defeat; when the defeated side ... [accepts] that the victory of its 
enemy ... [is] also its victory as well."68 The transcending of a war, then, 
does not simply result in the new distribution of power; rather, it challenges 
and changes the very power structures themselves. To return to the Teso 
example, as briefly illustrated above, it would not merely invert the power 
asymmetries but rather move the two parties to the conflict to a different
66 Giddens (1984): 27 and 375.
67 Michel Foucault (1989): Friendship as a Way of Life, in: Lotriner, Sylvere (ed.): Foucault 
Live. Interviews 1966-84. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 209.
68 Chris Coker (1997): "How Wars End." Millennium 26 (3 ), p. 621.
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level In which the power structures are newly defined and no longer rely on 
the exclusion of one party at the expenses of the other. Conflict is then 
positive, for it challenges discrimination and boundaries, and it is also 
positively constructive for it leads to a newly invented, more inclusive, way 
of relating to each other.
To move from dissidence, via conflict, to peace, and this is the central 
concern of this thesis, it is not sufficient to deconstruct exclusive power 
structures, leading to plurality and diversity, but it is at the same time also 
necessary to reconcile these differences moving the parties to a new level 
beyond enmity. This transition is critical for co-existence and post-conflict 
reconstruction.
The Case o f Teso
Teso is a very good example to illustrate this argument. The 
insurgency war, as suggested in the previous chapter and illustrated in 
more detail in Chapter 6, was mainly triggered by a feeling of exclusion and 
non-appreciation from the Museveni government. I t  ceased after six years, 
yet the people in Teso, to this day, are full of resentment towards the 
central government. They still feel excluded. At the end of the insurgency in 
Teso social, political and economic relations were left at a loss. The 
previously prevailing Teso identity had been challenged and its role in 
Uganda disputed. New relations with the Museveni government and other 
peoples in Uganda had to be forged in order to secure a more peaceful and 
participatory role for the Kumam and Iteso. This opportunity was missed, 
and as a consequence Teso remains a poor and deprived region. Teso never 
went through a process of internal or external reconciliation, Teso never 
forged new, 'neighbourly7 ties with their former 'enemies'. Teso has peace 
without reconciliation.69
Violent conflicts have different outcomes. No matter whether the 
outcome is victory, defeat or accord, the former parties to the conflict, more 
likely than not, will continue sharing the same territory. Consequently the 
former enemies have to acquire a mode of relating to each other, a mode
69 Heriques (2000).
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which replaces the violence used in the past. In a post-conflict environment, 
in which the relations between different constituencies have been disrupted, 
a new way of co-existence has to develop. To be meaningful social 
interaction has to be situated in a network of shared concepts, as suggested 
by Wittgenstein, and the time after a violent conflict is thus crucial for their 
establishment. I t  is here where the pathways for the future are being laid.
Hence, in the aftermath of a struggle for recognition, be it 
intellectually or physically, some form of'reconciliation' has to take place to 
allow for the future co-existence of the parties to the conflict.70 Peace has to 
be invented. However, this re-conciliation must neither emphasise the prefix 
're', and indicate a re-turn to the previous status quo which has given rise 
to the need to dissent, nor must it, in itself, introduce closure through a 
new, static system, discipline or structure which includes some constituents 
at the expenses of others.
70 For detailed discussions of the term 'reconciliation' see John Paul Lederach (1997): 
Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington: United States 
Institute of Peace; and Andrew Rigby (2001): Justice and Reconciliation. After the Violence. 
London: Lynne Rienner.
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chapter ii
I n v e n t in g  W a r  
a n d  P eace
The importance of post-structuralism for peace studies has been 
questioned by John Vasquez's remark that an analysis based on the 
discursive construction of reality ...
... m aintains by its very logic that, because w ar was invented, it can be 
disinvented by people. 'Knowing' this, however, does not tell us how to 
bring about peace.1
In the present thesis I would like to challenge this rejection of post­
structuralism's value for peace studies. Even if its 'knowledge' does not 
'bring about peace' a post-structuralist perspective nevertheless allows for 
valuable insights into the construction of friend and foe which might lead to 
an alternative understanding of the transition from war to peace. What 
Vasquez is critical of is the relativist tendency imbedded in a 
deconstructivist approach, as discussed in the previous chapter. The 
question is whether it is possible to conceptionalise the invention of peace 
without introducing a new form of hegemonic authenticity, which calls for 
renewed (violent) dissent.
The question is thus how peace can be 'invented'. To this aim the 
present chapter is split into two sections. The first shall discuss the 
'invention of war', and in doing so conceptualise notions of identity and 
difference relevant for the remainder of the thesis. The second section 
focuses on recent approaches in IR theory that discuss how war can be 
'disinvented' by people.
1 John A. Vasquez (1997): "War Endings: What Science and Constructivism Can Tell Us." 
Millennium 26(3): 672.
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Inventing War
The Constitution of Identity
According to Vivienne Jabri, " [id en titie s  are constructed 
representations of the 'self7 in relation to the 'o ther'."2 Implicit in this 
statement are at least two assumptions worth investigating more closely. 
First, Jabri suggests that identities are not realities waiting to be possessed, 
but rather that they are constructed over space and time, and second, she
points to the relations between identity and difference as the locus of
conflict. Let us consider each of these in turn.
Constructed Identities
Central to Jabri's argument is that identities do not derive from 
biological proclivities but rather from being situated in a particular
discourse. This social and historical context provides "a variety of pre­
existing experiences, implicated in human conduct through practical and 
discursive consciousness" out of which the individual actively selects
particular modes of representation.3 I t  is hence not free will that guides the 
selection; rather it is the individual's belonging to a spatio-temporal 
community that defines who she/he is and how she/he acts.
In her argument Jabri borrows heavily from Anthony Giddens' 
structuration theory that suggests that social practice is ordered across 
space and time. Again, social action is not the result of the actor's free will 
but rather derives from her/his situatedness in a particular set of structures, 
or rather structural properties, in the form of "[r]u les and resources, or sets 
of transformation relations, organised as properties of social systems."4 
Giddens suggests the notion of structural properties in which "structure only 
exists internal to ... practice and as memory traces orientating the conduct 
of knowledgeable human agents."5
However, Giddens does not suggest that structural properties 
determine human agency. Rather, social systems, which provide the
2 Jabri (1996): 131.
3 Jabri (1996): 131.
4 Giddens (1984): 25.
5 Giddens (1984): 17.
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structural properties, consist of reproduced relations between actors that 
have been organised as social practices.6 For Giddens, all social life is 
generated in and through social praxis; where social praxis is defined to 
include the nature, conditions, and consequences of historically and spatio- 
temporally situated activities and interactions produced through the agency 
of social actors.7
There is therefore an important circular movement between agency 
and structure which forms the main contention of structuration theory:
Crucial to the idea of structuration is the theorem  of the duality of 
structure ... The constitution of agents and structures are not two  
independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a 
duality. According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural 
properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the  
practices they recursively organize. Structure is not 'external' to 
individuals ... Structure is not to be equated with constraints but is 
always both constraining and enabling.8
In other words the moment of the production of action is 
simultaneously also the moment of the reproduction of structural 
properties, even in times of the most radical change.9 Yet, this is not to 
suggest that structures are merely constructed by action but rather that 
actions reproduce them as conditions, as rules and resources, that makes 
agency possible.
So one important insight that derives from Giddens' structuration 
theory is that structural properties come into existence through agency, 
that is through action, as much as agency, or the agent, is constituted 
through structural properties. And yet, in order to have some impact on 
structural properties one single act is insufficient - only through repeated 
action, over space and time, is the agent able to exercise some influence. 
Repetition is thus central to the creation of being, of the coming into 
existence of thoughts and ideas, the agent's identity, structural properties, 
systems and societies.
6 Giddens (1984): 25.
7 Ira J. Cohen (1989): Structuration Theory. Anthony Giddens and the Structuration of Social 
Life. Basingstoke, Macmillan, p. 2.
8 Giddens (1984): 25.
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As we will see in the course of this thesis, repetition has a significant 
ontological impact.10 Ontology, 'the sciences of the study of being', refers to 
being and the essence of things.11 The essence of agents, that is identity, is 
informed and conditioned by the prevailing structural properties of a 
particular discourse. And yet, since it is agency which shapes the structural 
properties, non-conformist human action might become powerful by 
gradually over time transforming the prevailing 'reality ' into a different one. 
This might happen through constantly judging and acting, that is through 
the permanent provocation of wide-ranging structural practices.12
Returning to Jarbi's notion of identity construction, the argument 
adopted in this thesis is that agents are historically situated and that their 
actions are enabled and constrained by the particular structural properties, 
or discourse to use a synonymous term. This recognition has an impact on 
both the way people invent as well as disinvent war. For the existence of 
belligerence and hatred is considered as a structural property which has 
developed in a community over time, and can potentially be un-made. This, 
however, requires change.
Iden tity/Difference
The second assumption implicit in Jabri's argument is that there is a 
'relation' between the construction of the Self and of the Other. 
Unfortunately, Jabri's text reveals little about this relation. Yet I would like 
to suggest that unravelling identity construction along the line of 
identity/difference provides valuable insights into the enigma of conflicts 
and therefore merits closer attention.
One scholar who has exerted a strong influence on post-structuralist 
writing in the discipline of International Relations is the American political 
theorist William Connolly. According to his profoundly Nietzschean view of 
the world, the importance of the Other for the Self is that the Self simply
9 Giddens (1984): 26.
10 We shall see the importance of repetition illustrated in Chapter 9.
11 Martin Heidegger (1988): Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizitaet. Frankfurt: Vittorio
Klosterman, p. 1.
12 David Campbell (1996): "The Politics of Radical Interdependence: A Rejoinder to Daniel 
Warner." Millennium 25(1): 139.
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would not exist without the Other. Without difference there would be 
nothing to contrast oneself from. In Connolly's words:
An identity is established in relation to a series o f differences th at have 
become socially recognised. These differences are essential to its being.
I f  they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness 
and solidity.13
Difference is hence indispensable for identity. "[T ]he constitution of 
identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to 
demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside', a 'self' from an 'other', a 'domestic' 
from a 'foreign'."14 Social systems are constructed along the line of 
inside/outside where exclusion at each level influences the Other and is 
shaped by it.15 The spatio-temporal representation gives us a particular 
identity since we have to draw lines between where we stand and where 
there is space for somebody else. Here and there, now and then, us and 
them become meaningful in light of this "affective geography" where loyalty 
and allegiance is ascribed to those we associate ourselves w ith.16 Hand in 
hand with this process of identity creation, however, goes the claim for 
legitimacy and the notion of rights for "since we have come to exist we 
believe that we have a right to exist."17 This right to exist can only be 
challenged by somebody who is not a member of my particular identity 
group - it can only be the indispensable Other who has the ability to deprive 
us of our identity.
To sum up, the being of the Self is ultimately linked to the Other. 
Inside the spatio-temporal boundaries, identity is produced and reproduced 
through routinised practice. Human agency is meaningful for it is conducted 
along the lines of collective memory traces which allow for knowledge 
among the members of a discourse. Yet, what influence does the 
construction of the Self have on the constellation between identity and 
difference?
13 William E. Connolly (1991): Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political 
Space. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, p. 64.
14 Campbell (1992): 8.
15 Andrew Linklater (1998): The Transformation of Political Community. Ethical Foundations 
of the Post-Westphalian Era. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 114.
16 Eric Ringmar (1996): Identity, Interest, Action. A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's
Intervention in the Thirty Years War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 78.
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Iden tity  as Basis for Violent Exclusion
In order to explain conflict as being situated in the prevailing 
discursive and institutional continuities of a community Jabri introduces the 
notion of conflict as 'constructed discourse7. Again in accordance with 
Giddens7 structuration theory she suggests that conflicts are not events that 
suddenly occur but rather that they are situated in an discursive 
environment. Pre-existing structural properties supply the necessary 
foundation to justify and legitimise the emergence of and involvement in 
conflicts with the Other. Myths, memories and symbols not only provide the 
ground from which identity is drawn, but they also narrate the tale of the 
Other as enemy and threat.18 And these exclusionist discourses about the 
inside/outside split of community boundaries are likewise embedded in 
discursive and institutional continuities and serve well as a justification for 
the practice and politics of exclusion.19
But where do these exclusive discourses originate from? Why was the 
Other created as an enemy? Is it simply the existence of difference which 
provides the basis for conflicts?
In an attempt to respond to these questions David Campbell argues 
that "[t]h e  problematic of identity/difference contains ... no foundations 
which are prior to, or outside of, its operations....7720 Instead conflict arises 
on the level of the boundaries which are supposed to provide distinctness 
and solidity for the respective identities, and which are not always originally 
clear cut. As Connelly notes " [ if] there is no natural or intrinsic identity, 
power is always inscribed in the relation an exclusive identity bears to the 
difference it constitutes.7721 This power is manifested in turning the 
indispensable Other into the evil Other. "Identity requires difference in order
17 Ringmar (1996): 78.
18 Jabri (1996): 134.
19 Jabri (1996): 130.
20 Campbell (1992): 8.
21 Connolly (1991): 66
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to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own 
self-certainty."22 Connolly hence argues that
the paradoxical elem ent in the relation of identity to difference is that 
we cannot dispense with personal and collective identities, but the  
multiple drives to stamp truth upon those identities function to convert 
difference into otherness and otherness into scapegoats created and 
m aintained to secure the appearance of a true identity. To possess a 
true identity is to be false to difference, while to be true to difference is 
to sacrifice the promise of a true identity .23
Hence, according to Connolly, communities which are uncertain about their 
own identity have a tendency to affirm this identity through increasing the 
difference between members and non-members leading to an exaggeration 
of the differences. Devoid of pre-existing coherent identities, the individual 
or the community is inclined to demarcate itself from the Other.24
The boundary drawing between the Self and the Other is thus central 
to post-positivist conflict analysis. In consequence, as already argued in the 
previous chapter, the promotion of peace has to tackle the prevailing social 
continuity of exclusion by changing the nature of the boundaries between 
inside and outside.
Emergence of and Support for Violent Conflicts
In linguistic terms Jabri locates the support for post Cold War 
conflicts in the 'discourse of origins' where elites "hark back to a distant 
past in order to mobilise a bounded, exclusionist present".25 She argues that 
authorities and elites hold the power to control which discursive and 
institutional practices prevail inside of a community when she writes that
[t]h e  ability to consolidate and reproduce authoritative power is 
dependent on the capacity to m anipulate the m em ory traces of a 
com m unity and control information gathering and dissemination which 
generate and reproduce the discursive and institutional continuities 
which 'bind' societies.26
22 Connolly (1991): 64.
23 Connolly (1991): 67.
24 For a case-study using this mode of reasoning see David Campbell (1993): Politics Without 
Principles. Sovereignty, Ethics and the Narrative of the Gulf War. London: Lynne Rienner.
25 Jabri (1996): 134.
26 Jabri (1996): 132.
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The 'binding7 of societies can be based on a hegemonic discourse which 
does not allow for dissident voices, and it may consist in demonising 
everybody who is not a part of this 'we-group7; a process of boundary 
drawing and demarcation is set in motion. Due to the overlap of 
signification, legitimisation and domination plural communication is no 
longer possible, it is distorted and becomes exclusive. Jabri makes special 
reference to the state, a highly administered social system, as central to 
both the reproduction of war through manipulating the public discourse, as 
well as through institutionalising the war process.27 Yet, the difficulty with 
Jabri7s argument is that it leads easily into an 'elite conspiracy theory7, 
which I shall criticise below.
Jabri's argument resonates with David Keen and Mats Berdal's study 
of recent conflicts in sub-Sahara Africa, according to which a range of elites 
initiate violence in order to deflect political threats.28 They suggest that the 
growing internal and external pressure for democratisation puts the mere 
existence of dictatorial governments in jeopardy, and in order to secure 
their position governments frequently incite violence along ethnic lines. Due 
to a general lack of disciplined and effective counter-insurgency military 
forces, there is a tendency to oppose the flaring-up of rebellion through the 
mobilisation of 'top-down7 violence, "with elites taking advantage of the 
fear, need and greed of ordinary people to recruit civilians.7729 Ethnic 
identities provide a useful vehicle for motivating violent conflict against an 
Other; existing discursive and institutional provisions are deployed to cut a 
gap through a community serving as a "regressive political function77.30
Similar to Jabri's 'conspiracy theory7, in Keen and Berdal's example, 
the authority held by elites provides the necessary power to steer the 
perception, or discourse, of a community into a particular direction. 
However, the frequent occurrences of insurgency wars suggests that there 
are also actors outside of governmental institutions. To solely attribute the
27 Jabri (1996): 173.
28 Mats Berdal/David Keen (1997): Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: 
Implications for Outside Intervention. Paper presented at the Millennium Conference on War 
Endings, 11.09.1997. London: London School of Economics, p. 6.
29 Berdal/Keen (1997): 6.
30 Berdal/Keen (1997): 7.
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potential of manipulating discourses into violence and exclusion to 
governments and elites is thus a reduction of the multiple and diverse 
agents in a social field. Despite elites having the better access to powerful 
and far reaching modes of influence like the national media, one should not 
underestimate the impact small and local initiatives have on the course of a 
conflict. Especially in Africa, social, political and religious organisations 
enjoy a high degree of influence on their constituencies, often with backing 
from the global North, which can manifest itself in both the production of 
hatred as well as the production of peace constituencies.
In addition, it has been suggested that in Sub-Sahara Africa, since 
the 1990s, formerly dictatorial regimes have started to lose control over 
government patronage and violence.31 Political entrepreneurs are 
increasingly relocating their activities outside of the state where they are 
building new centres of power through alternative mechanisms like private 
armies and militias, as well as through economic channels like the trade of 
minerals and other resources. Access to global markets for weapons, as well 
as profit-gaining interests of international security companies and 
businessman/businesswomen, have further opened national boundaries and 
eroded the hermetic character of the African nation state ( if it ever existed), 
so that a totalising discourse has become practically impossible. And this is 
not to mention the vast number of international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), aid agencies and development projects which 
constantly supply alternative interpretations to a hegemonic discourse.
Moreover, not 'anything goes' when it comes to manipulation. Unless 
it is in line with a generally prevailing sentiment in the population, 
propaganda and hate speech incited by individuals does not necessarily lead 
to wide-spread violence. For here, too, agency is constrained (and enabled) 
by structure. The genocide in Rwanda, for instance, an often used example 
to illustrate the degree to which people can be manipulated into committing 
the most horrendous crimes against humanity, was based on ethnic 
polarisation first introduced by the Belgian colonial rulers and then 
politicised after independence. In addition, it was carefully prepared over
31 Robin Luckham/Ismail Ahmed/Robert Muggah/Sarah White (2001): Conflict and Poverty in 
Sub-Sahara Africa: an Assessment of the Issues and Evidence. Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies report, p. 12.
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many years, and it occurred not only in the middle of a civil war and thus 
extreme polarisation, but also in the context of the flawed peace process 
and after a series of smaller 'genocides' and 'counter-genocides'. The action 
of killing was thus situated in a 'long-duree' of fighting and hatred and not 
merely the result of a spontaneous Hutu conspiracy. In addition, on a more 
general note, the motivation of people to engage in combat is often very 
personal, and almost apolitical, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, and not a 
result of elite manipulation.
My disagreement with Jabri's underlying 'elite conspiracy theory' is on 
grounds of it simplifying the diverse social and political forces that 
constitute a discourse. Despite her recognition that discourses are always 
plural,32 her emancipatory project of carving out space for excluded voices 
assumes that at a particular point in time a totalising regime is possible, 
and that its authority is the sole agent to inform a discourse. When Jabri 
refers to the plurality of discourses she thus makes a normative claim, that 
discourses 'ought to be plural', and not a general observation, that they 
always are. In opposition, I would like to argue, that discourses are indeed 
always plural, and not only in relation to a particular issue at stake, but on 
an endless scale which manifests itself, for instance, in a large number of 
motivations to engage in violent conflict. There is, to use Carolyn 
Nordstrom's term, also 'a different kind of war story'33 -  which cannot be 
captured by IR concepts and theories, as we shall see later in the thesis.
So far we have been discussing how war is invented and we now turn 
to the invention of peace.
Inventing Peace
Famously, it has been argued that
Peace is an ontologically suspicious concept, as troubling in its own ways
as war. War's historic opponents -  those who w ant peace -  are inside a
32 Jabri (1996): 158.
33 Carolyn Nordstrom (1997): A Different Kind of War Story. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press.
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fram e with war. ... Peace cannot exist w ithout war, and both are  
problematic notions...34
Despite recognising the importance of suggesting that peace is an 
'ontologically suspicious concept', the focus of this thesis is not on making it 
less so, but to wonder about the processes that bring peace about.35 War 
and peace are closely intertwined, as already suggested by Jean Elshtain, 
and the present study is a further example to sustain this point.
To return to Vasquez' remark at the outset of this chapter the central 
project of this thesis is to wonder about ways to disinvent war and to invent 
peace. As already referred to in the introduction to this thesis the attempt 
at 'inventing peace' is inspired by Jabri's remark, and subsequent question, 
that
[t]h e  legitimation of w ar is situated in discursive practices based on 
exclusionist identities. Is  it therefore possible to conceive of peace as 
situated in a critical discursive process which, rather than reifying 
exclusion, incorporates difference?36
In the following I shall discuss, and ultimately reject, a methodology 
which has recently become popular in conflict resolution, Habermasian 
discourse ethics, in order to then, in the next chapter, proceed with a 
different way of conceptualising the invention of peace.
Situating Peace in Discourse
In Discourses on Violence Vivienne Jabri promotes a 'discourse on 
peace' which "assumes a basis for the transformation of symbolic and 
institutional orders which underpin violent conflict."37 She thus calls for a 
"counter-discourse which seeks to understand the structurated legitimation
34 Jean B. Elshtain (1987): Women and War. Brighton: Harvester Press, p. 253.
35 Nevertheless, in line with the actual case study, I use the term 'peace' in at least in two 
different ways. Peace, on one hand, refers to the cessation of fighting, or what has been 
called 'negative peace' and which I shall occasionally call 'shallow peace' or 'peace without 
reconciliation'. The second understanding of the term peace is more profound, or positive. It 
refers to ideal case scenario of fused horizons, as central to the notion of hermeneutics which 
will be explained in the following chapter, in which both parties agree on the issue at stake. 
Here, peace and reconciliation are synonymous.
36 Jabri (1996): 157.
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of violence and challenges the militarist order and exclusionist identities 
which encompass it."38 In order to provide a theoretical framework to 
conceptualise the effort of situating peace in discourse, Jabri draws on the 
German philosopher Jurgen Habermas and his notion of discourse ethics.39
At the centre of Jabri's project is the intention to reveal, and 
ultimately to eliminate, distorted communication, produced through 
economic and political power asymmetries, which render a potentially 
diverse public sphere into a hegemonic discourse without contestation. In 
order to allow for opposition Jabri therefore advocates reversing the process 
by situating peace in discourse. This, she contends, requires a process of 
unhindered communicative action which involves participation and 
difference.40 Habermasian discourse ethics is promoted as a framework for 
situating peace within the process of discourse.
Discourse Ethics
Discourse ethics is located in a wider philosophical framework, Critical 
Theory, which is concerned with critically investigating the condition of a 
society to find out whether it is constituted by "ideologically frozen relations 
of dependence that can in principle be transformed."41
In order to 'defrost' relations of dependence Habermas has 
introduced the concept of communicative action. The process of 
communication serves at least two purposes: "Speakers simultaneously say 
something (assert a position) and do something (establish a relationship)."42 
In other words, not only does communicative action provide the possibility 
of reaching consensus about an issue, it at the same time transforms the
37 Jabri (1996): 146.
38 Jabri (1996): 146.
39 Since the publication of Discourses on Violence Jabri herself has moved away from 
applying Habermas' discourse ethics towards a mediation of different identities not dissimilar 
to the approach taken in this thesis. See for instance Vivienne Jabri (1999): Explorations of 
Difference in Normative Internationai Relations, in: Jabri, Vivienne/O'Goreman, Eleanor 
(eds.): Women, Culture, and International Relations (eds.). Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 
39-61.
40 Jabri (1996): 161.
41 Jay Rothman (1992): From Confrontation to Co-operation. London/Newbury Park/ New 
Delhi: Sage, p. 72.
42 Nancy Love (1996): What's Left of Marx? in: White, Stephen K. (ed.): The Cambridge 
Companion to Habermas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 53.
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relationship between the participants of the communicative act. I t  leads to 
change.
According to Habermas, interactions are communicative "when the 
participants co-ordinate their plans of action consensually, with the 
agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the 
intersubjective recognition of validity claims."43 In the process of 
communication the participants share their views and, so Habermas argues, 
potentially reach an agreement about the issue at stake. His theory is 
epitomised in his concept of the 'ideal speech situation', which can be 
defined as "intersubjective symmetry in the distribution of assertion and 
dispute, revelation and concealment, prescription and conformity among the 
partners of communication."44 Symmetry is here understood as linguistic 
conceptions of truth (unconstrained consensus), freedom (unimpaired self­
representation), and justice (universal norms).45 When all these elements 
come together communication is undistorted and potentially leads to a 
consensus amongst the interloceurs on the basis on 'the best argument'.
The appealing nature of communicative action for conflict studies 
springs to mind immediately. Critique of existing power asymmetries and 
transformation of structural properties are central to the transition from war 
to peace. For instance, Jay Rothman, practitioner and theorist in the field of 
conflict resolution, derives his Adversarial, Reflexive and Integrative (ARI) 
Conflict Management Framework from Critical Theory.46 In addition, the UN 
War Torn Society Project emphasises the value of Habermas when it 
explicitly refers to
'com m unicative action' ... [in which] actors com m unicate through  
language and are concerned to produce a consensus th at has been 
argued through, participating in making decisions that have been
43 Jurgen Habermas (1990): Discourse Ethics: Notes on Philosophical Justification. Benhabib, 
Seyla/Dallmayr, Fred (eds.): The Communicative Ethics Controversy. Cambridge,
Mass./London: MIT Press, p. 73.
44 Jurgen Habermas (1970): "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence." Inquiry I I ,  
p. 320.
45 Love (1996): 54.
46 Rothman (1992): 73.
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validated by this kind of communication - the approach of WSP from the  
beginning.47
Deiniol Lloyd-Jones uses Critical Theory in order to improve 
international facilitation in violent conflicts.48 Traditional facilitation theories, 
he argues, lack a normative framework for what form of conflict resolution 
should be achieved. They either treat conflict as a form of misunderstanding 
or as the manifestation of frustrated needs, and facilitators merely act to 
set the resolution of the dispute into process.49 To focus on process only, 
and not on outcome, limits the potential to critique power asymmetries and 
reduces the chance of them being addressed and resolved.50 In order to 
provide a means for criticism Lloyed-Jones turns to Critical Theory. 
Habermas' discourse ethics, he reminds us, is oriented towards finding a 
rational consensus through inter-subjective communication. The consensus 
resembles a normative criteria which guides the facilitation process and 
thus the potential outcome. The merit of a critical theory of international 
mediation is that it helps to identify normative criteria, that is it "respects 
rationality and canons of truth without falling into dogmatism."51 This is 
what Lloyd-Jones calls 'Cosmopolitan Mediation'.
Another study of the value of Habermas' discourse ethics for the 
promotion of peace has been conducted by J. Lauren Snyder. Through 
analysing the deficits of problem-solving workshops, such as introduced by 
John Burton, Snyder develops a project of'Critical Theory of Peace Practice'. 
Her key contention is that in order to be successful facilitation has to shift 
its emphasis from mere problem-solving to an approach that takes the 
constitutive potential of language into account. We will return to Burton's 
problem-solving approach and workshops in Chapter 8, yet for now it shall 
suffice to recognise Snyder's attempt to develop a theory for conflict 
resolution on the basis of discourse ethics, which seeks not only to address
47 Lauren Engle (1997): The Challenge of Peace. War Torn Societies web site/UNSRID: 
< http://www.unsrid.org/wsp57cop5/cop5.htm>, 20.05.2000.
48 Deiniol Lloyed-Jones (2000): "Mediation, Conflict Resolution and Critical Theory." Review 
of International Studies 26(4): 645-62.
49 Lloyed-Jones (2000): 657.
50 Deiniol Jones (1999): Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords. 
Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, p. 158.
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the immediate environment of a workshop but wider areas of social and 
political practices.52
The main value of discourse ethics for Snyder is the promise of a 
certain consensus reached between the parties in conflict, which is not 
based on the assumption that conflict simply arises out of misunderstanding 
due to disturbed communication, and that through discussing issues in a 
workshop environment the parties realise that they all share the same 
premises. This becomes obvious in her discussion of Jay Rothman's project, 
which, Snyder argues, despite making explicit reference to Habermas, 
remains profoundly positivistic when it simply uses communicative ethics to 
reveal hidden motivations and emotions so that the true cause for the 
conflict can emerge.53
Despite being generally sympathetic to Snyder's research agenda, I 
am doubtful whether Habermas' discourse ethics provides an insightful 
enough framework for critique and emancipation on one hand, and for the 
conceptualisation of how people in conflict may reach understanding about 
the issues at stake, and how this can then translate into wider social 
change, on the other.
Critique
Discourse ethics has received criticism from different camps, but I 
shall lim it my arguments to what is relevant in the context of the present 
study. Amongst other influences, the work of Habermas has developed out 
of, and in opposition to, Martin Heidegger's and Hans-George Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutics. In what follows I shall briefly criticise 
Habermas' project from a hermeneutics perspective, which shall at the 
same time serve to open the path to the following chapter to which the 
concept of hermeneutics is central.
Habermas' discourse ethics demands that, in order for participants to 
reach rational consensus, communication has to be undisturbed. He fails,
51 Jones (1999): 163.
52 J. Lauren Snyder (2000): A Critical Theory of Peace Practice: Discourse Ethics and 
Facilitated Conflict Resolution (unpublished doctoral thesis). Department of International 
Relations. London: London School of Economics, p. 19.
53 Snyder (2000): 157-8.
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however, to recognise that speech, or language, itself is situated in a 
particular tradition which impacts on the interloceur's 'unimpaired self- 
representation'. Thus, domination and exclusion, the disturbances that 
hinder communication according to Habermas, are not external to language 
but a part of it. The speaker cannot step out of his/her tradition to freely 
perceive and articulate coercion. Habermas has not fully completed the 
linguistic turn but maintains a degree of transcendental metaphysics, 
because for him domination and exclusion happen outside of language, 
behind its back as we shall see in the conclusion of this thesis, so that they 
can be problematised in communication. I t  is however the contention of the 
present study that 'language is the house of being' and not separate from it. 
To step outside of this house in a critical manner is impossible. As already 
established in the previous chapter with reference to Wittgenstein, 
communication is situated in a network of shared concepts, and not against 
a background of intelligibility. In other words, the agent in communicative 
action, in Giddens' terms, is situated in a particular set of structural 
properties which constrain (and enable) her/his perceptions and actions. In 
the environment of a conflict resolving workshop the agent remains 
informed by her/his situatedness which determines how and what she/he 
communicates. To give an example, in a culture where women are not equal 
to men, many women, given the opportunity to participate in a workshop 
based on notions of an ideal speech situation, would very likely not even 
raise questions about the state of their oppression, for they are not aware 
of its unusualness and degree. Since it is a part of their tradition they do 
not challenge the limited freedom but rather accept their position in the 
prevailing structural properties as fair and just. How would they know about 
their exclusion and underprivileged status if it is a part of their identity?
In this sense it has been suggested that Habermas operates with two 
different notions of language.54 On one hand he implies that language is a 
tool of social control, a means to exercise power, which can be revealed and 
criticised. Yet, on the other, he uses language as a means in a dialogic 
process to bring about understanding. Here, social relations are forged
54 Alan How (1995): The Habermas-Gadamer Debate and the Nature of the Social. 
Aldershot: Avebury, p. 215.
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through the use of language. Alan How concludes therefore that the whole 
idea of undisturbed communication is undermined for language cannot at 
the same time be constraint and cohesion.
In addition, as mentioned previously, the present study is based on 
the assumption that identities, be they collective or individual, are 
constructed in a particular environment, or discourse, and that therefore 
our beliefs and perceptions are historically and spatially situated in our 
tradition. Meaning is constituted in a language game which includes some, 
yet not all others, so that different people have a different understanding 
about a particular issues at stake. An alternative way of framing this 
premise is through the notion of 'culture' -  a concept which has recently 
received attention in conflict resolution literature.55 The importance of 
culture is recognised as a scheme of reference shaping the parties' different 
life-forms and local conditions of knowledges, and the subsequent obstacle 
this poses to bringing about understanding between distinct cultures. Yet, 
Habermas' discourse ethics does not take different interpretations based on 
different cultures into account.56
In reference to Habermas' rational consensus in communicative 
action it is thus fair to question whether his emancipatory project is feasible 
in the light of different traditions and cultures. For difference in self- 
understanding and meaning is not necessarily the outcome of disturbed 
communication or ideology, but simply different life forms57 - and they are 
equally valid.
So what is Habermas' value for inventing peace? The point frequently 
emphasised by Jabri and Snyder, and which is also central to the present
55 Tarja Vayrynen (1995a): Going Beyond Similarity: The Role of the Facilitator in Problem- 
Solving Workshop Conflict Resolution. Paradigms, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 71-851; see also Lamont 
Lindstrom (1992): Context Contest: Debatable Statements on Tannu (Vanutu). in: Duranti, 
Alessandro/Goodwill, Charles (eds.): Rethinking Context. Language as an Interactive 
Phenomenon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 101-24; and Luis Arturo Pinzon 
(1996): "The Production of Power and Knowledge in Mediation." Mediation Quarterly 14(1): 
3-20.
56 In his recent writing Habermas discusses the inclusion of difference with reference to 
Europe, statehood and liberal theory. Jurgen Habermas (1996): Die Einbeziehung des 
Anderen. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
57 How (1995): 222.
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study, is the potential to change the attitudes and perceptions of parties to 
a conflict through language and communication. Again, in line with the 
discussion of structuration theory above, language is a medium through 
which both, agent and structure, are informed. Through changing the way 
we talk about, say, our enemy we, over time, alter the wider discursive 
settings that determine the enemy's role in the society at large. Since we do 
not have any other access to the 'reality out there' than through language, 
as we have seen in Wittgenstein's language games, it is here where change 
occurs. As I shall argue throughout the thesis, in order to understand how 
to 'invent peace' we have to investigate how, in the process of 
communication, formerly exclusive conceptions of Self/Other, be they in 
discourse or institutions, are mediated into a relationship devoid of violent 
conflict. Discourse ethics has the potential to situate peace into a wider 
discourse.
Yet, Habermas does not only use language as a means for social 
cohesion, but also as a tool to reveal the hidden forms of domination that 
disturb it. Since language cannot at the same time be a medium of 
constraint and cohesion it is possible to reject Habermas' discourse ethics as 
the basis for a "counter-discourse which seeks to understand the 
structurated legitimation of violence and challenge the militarist order and 
exclusionist identities which encompass it",58 as suggested by Vivienne Jabri 
at the beginning of this section. And I shall now proceed with a different 
conceptualisation of communication which avoids the pitfall of seeking a 
truth through language.
58 Jabri (1996): 146.
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chapter iii
C r it ic a l  H e r m e n e u t ic s
So how does understanding between two parties to a conflict come 
about? In Chapter 1 we concluded that in a post-conflict environment some 
form of resolution and re-invention of new structures has to take place to 
prevent violence from erupting again. Deconstruction, it has been 
suggested, is a valuable way of opening up closed discourses, yet it does 
not allow for new ways of co-existence. Looking at contemporary 
contributions to IR literature, the last chapter discussed, and rejected, 
Habermas7 discourse ethics as a framework for the invention of peace. His 
emancipatory interest of removing domination and exclusion in order to 
promote undisturbed communication was contradicted by his use of 
language as a tool for constructing social relationships.
In order to reconcile the relativism of deconstruction and the meta­
physical aspiration of finding truth behind language, in this chapter I shall 
provide an alternative account of how to conceptualise understanding 
amongst parties to a conflict. Hermeneutics, the art of understanding, is not 
driven by emancipatory concerns, but it promises to bridge the gap between 
the nihilism imbedded in relativism and the conception of meaning 
imbedded in transcendental metaphysics.1 In consequence, it provides a 
valuable framework for the analysis of the transition form conflict to peace.
Gadamer's Hermeneutics
The word hermeneutics has its etymological origin in ancient Greek 
and it signifies translating, interpreting, and making intelligible. 
Hermeneutics is derivative of the messenger Hermes whose task it was to 
dispatch messages between the gods of Greek mythology. The term 
hermeneutics has been in use since the seventeenth century, yet it was the 
German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) who published 
the first significant exegesis on the subject. To him, hermeneutics was the
1 Hugh Silverman (1994): Textualities. Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction. New 
York/London: Routledge, p. 7.
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tool through which to understand the meaning of the Bible as well as legal 
texts. Wilhelm Dilthy (1833-1911), in reference to Schleiermacher's 
approach, developed the term hermeneutic circle, which provoked the 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), and subsequently his 
student Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), to provide an alternative 
account of the 'a rt of understanding7 which Gadamer then labelled 
philosophical hermeneutics.2 Since Heidegger's and Gadamer's departure 
illustrates aspects significant for the present context I shall give a further 
account below.
The Notion of Understanding
Hermeneutic Reflection
In his major work Truth and Method Gadamer lays out the 
fundamental ideas behind his notion of hermeneutics. The somewhat 
misleading title, however, does not introduce the quest for an authentic, 
universal truth and a methodological guideline for action.3 Rather Gadamer 
emphasises that the 'hermeneutic reflection' only serves to lay open 
alternative ways of knowing, i.e. truths which would not have been noticed 
otherwise.4 Hermeneutic reflection refers to the complex process set into 
motion when we encounter something or somebody new and strange which 
we seek to understand, like somebody we find ourselves in conflict w ith.5 
Once understanding has been accomplished the shared meaning about an 
issue at stake is however not more 'true ' then the assumption we had 
before the encounter. Rather, this newly acquired truth is merely different, 
and there is no hierarchy of different truths. As a result, hermeneutics
2 Throughout the study, I shall use the term 'hermeneutics' only when referring to 
Heidegger's and Gadamer's notion.
3 Although Gadamer repeatedly draws attention to the fact that Truth and Method is not 
about truths and methods his readers seem to be reluctant to consider his work from a 
different perspective, as we shall see below. For an explicit rejection of the connection 
between title and content see for instance Hans-Georg Gadamer (1979): "Practical 
Philosophy as a Model of the Human Science." Research in Phenomenology IX , p. 78.
4 Hans-Georg Gadamer (1993g): Replik zu 'Hermeneutik und Ideologienkritik'. in: Wahrheit 
und Methode II .  Ergaenzungen. Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, p. 255.
5 In the context of the present study I would like to emphasis that despite hermeneutics' 
relevance for encountering the new and strange I do not want to suggest that conflict arises 
out of the unfamiliarity of the Other.
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opens the door for a pluralism of interpretation and the competition of 
different truths.
The question which drives Gadamer's philosophy is not the search for 
a normative ethics to tell us what we ought to do, but rather what guides us 
beyond is and ought.6 In the process of understanding a number of 
influential factors are at work which impact on the outcome of the 
encounter. In the following section I shall broadly lay out the central 
arguments.
The Hermeneutic Circle
One of the main contentions of hermeneutics is that a part can only 
be understood in relation to the whole and the whole only in relation to its 
parts. There is thus a circular movement.7 For instance, the interpretation of 
a text invokes a circular movement between its overall interpretation and 
the specific details that a particular reading offers. The new details 
potentially modify the overall interpretation which in turn sheds light on 
new parts significant for understanding. In this process, understanding 
becomes more and more profound.8 For Schleiermacher, who first theorised 
hermeneutics, yet without explicit reference to the term 'hermeneutic 
circle', this suggests that a text can only be understood by the interpreter 
when she/he fuliy grasps what the author had in mind. For him, 
hermeneutic interpretation required the mental retracing of the writer, as 
well as her/his situatedness in a historical context. In this traditional 
conception of hermeneutics, understanding is only possible through the 
reconstruction of the author's subjective and objective circumstances. 
Schleiermacher’s notion of the hermeneutic circle is hence formal and 
methodical; for to him understanding is the reproduction of the initial 
production, and it results in a divine act in which the interpreter is able to 
place h e r - /h im s e lf  entirely into the author, or the Other. Through 
Schleiermacher's, and later Dilthy's, model of hermeneutics a positivist
6 Hans-Georg Gadamer (1993c): Vorwort zur 2. Aufiage. in: Wahrheit und Methode II. 
Ergaenzungen. Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, p. 438.
7 Hans-Georg Gadamer (1993d): Vom Zirkel des Verstehens. in: Wahrheit und Methode II. 
Ergaenzungen. Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, p. 57.
8 Hubert Dreyfus (1988): Beyond Hermeneutics. Interpretation in Late Heidegger and Recent 
Foucault, in: Gary Shapiro/Alan Sica (eds.): Hermeneutics. Questions and Prospects. 
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, p. 73.
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notion of understanding is suggested where the interpreter and the 
interpreted remain distinct entities. Yet, due to a particular understanding of 
subjectivity and rationality, they are able to completely step into the Other's 
position. Methods like psycho-analysis and historical or bibliographical 
research help to produce a true and authentic picture of the text and its 
author.
As mentioned by way of introduction, Gadamer, in following his 
mentor Heidegger, discarded Schleiermacher's formal interpretation of the 
hermeneutic circle.9 In the process of understanding, Gadamer argues, we 
do not place ourselves into the author's mental situation, nor into their 
subjective circumstances, but only into her/his opinion. As for the objective 
circumstances, Gadamer criticises Schleiermacher in that he only recognises 
the author's historical contextualisation, yet disregards the situatedness of 
the interpreter her-/himself. We, as interpreters, always also bring our own 
historical context into the encounter with the text, or the Other, and hence 
every interpretation, and understanding, can ultimately only happen from 
the vantage point of our own situatedness. Understanding is thus 
contingently dependent on both the interpreter's and the text's spatio- 
temporal background.
In his re-interpretation of the hermeneutic circle Gadamer refers to 
Heidegger's notion of hermeneutics as discussed in Being and Time where 
the latter argues that understanding is always determined by the 
interpreter's preconception. In the process of interpretation we do not 
simply try to paint an accurate picture of the author, nor do we try to 
understand the text through the author and the author through the text (as 
subject to the traditional conception the hermeneutic circle) so that 
accomplished understanding dissolves the circle in complete knowledge. 
Rather, completeness can never be achieved; there is a constant interplay 
between the spatio-temporal background of the interpreter and the author, 
that is the Other in which the interpreter understands her-/himself, and vice 
versa. This process is set into motion through comparing commonalties and 
then questioning difference. I will return to this point in more detail below.
9 Hans-Georg Gadamer (1993a): Wahrheit und Methode I. Grundzuege einer philosophischen 
Hermeneutik. Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, p. 277.
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For now it suffices to say that our anticipation of meaning is not guided by a 
form of sublime subjectivity, but rather that when interpreting a text we 
always bring ourselves in. Through firstly recognising what we have in 
common with the Other's tradition, Heidegger emphasises, this 
communality is always under construction. Thus communality is not merely 
a precondition for understanding but it is always produced in the process of 
understanding itself. The hermeneutic circle for Heidegger and Gadamer is 
hence not formal, as it is for traditional approaches, but it describes an 
ontological structural moment of understanding.10 Where for Dilthy and 
Schleiermacher hermeneutics meant the art of understanding, for Heidegger 
and Gadamer it is understanding itself.
The redefinition of the hermeneutic circle by Heidegger and Gadamer 
has significant consequences for ways of approaching otherness, which 
translates to, for instance, the way a researcher conducts investigations and 
understands a situation. I shall return to this aspect in my discussion of 
discourse analysis in the following chapter.
Tradition/Vorurteile
By analogy, when engaged in a dialogue with our 'enemy' we only 
understand an argument, a part, in relation to her or his historical, social, 
geographical etc. background, the whole. Statements and utterances have 
no universal validity which makes them universally intelligible. They are 
invested with meaning due to the speakers spatio-temporal background, or 
what Gadamer calls 'tradition'. Traditions can be understood as an ongoing 
outcome of historical lives, as the representation of meanwhile nameless 
authorities,11 or as the historical environment through which we know 
ourselves. We cannot divest ourselves from tradition. Our understanding of 
the world is thus ultimately linked to our traditions, which exercise a form of 
authority on our being, on our view of the world, and our view of the Other. 
The way we are, the way we understand, the way we relate to our 
environment is conditioned by our past. As a consequence, the individual 
cannot, when making judgements, refer back to some pre-social rationale,
10 Gadamer (1993a): 299.
53
but only to what Gadamer calls prejudices, i.e. judgements that have been 
made before the evaluation of all circumstances. And yet this does not 
necessarily mean that these prejudices are wrong. But rather
[p re ju d ices  are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so th at they  
inevitably distort the truth . In  fact the historicity of our existence entails 
that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial 
directness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of 
our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we 
experience something - whereby w hat we encounter says something to 
us.12
The 'literal sense' of the word Gadamer is referring to derives from 
the German word for prejudice: Vorurteil. Vor-urteil means at the same 
time prejudice and pre-judgement, a judgement we have made previous to 
being more knowledgeable about the circumstances.13 We might have 
strong prejudices against our 'enemy', yet only pre-judgements/prejudices 
enable us to commence evaluating something new and strange. Vorurteile 
are situated in a particular bounded community through which our being 
has been constituted. They are at the same time a limitation and a 
necessity to understanding; they enable and constrain the way we conceive 
of our 'enemy'.
Wirkungsgeschichte
Gadamer's claim, that in the process of understanding our traditions 
always have an effect upon us, leads him to develop the term 
Wirkungsgeschichte, or 'effective history': the operative forces of
traditions.14 Traditions are the materialization of effective history. Effective 
history is thus our own history which has an effect on the way we are. 
Therefore, to think truly historically means to include one's own history, to 
render oneself (as an individual, community, etc.) conscious of the effects 
of the distinct past. In other words, understanding, in its essence, is a 
process of wirkungsgeschichtlichem Bewusstsein, of "effective historical
11 Jacob Samuel (1985): Zwischen Gespraech und Diskurs. Untersuchungen zur
sozialhermeneutischen Begruendung der Agogik anhand einer Gegenueberstellung von Hans- 
Georg Gadamer und Jurgen Habermas. Stuttgart: Paul Haupt, p. 58.
12 Gadamer (1993a): 9. (translation cited in How (1995): 48.)
13 Gadamer (1993a): 275.
14 Gadamer (1993a): 305.
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consciousness" for it requires the revelation and consideration of one's 
history.15 Nevertheless, "[ejffective-historical consciousness is inevitably 
more being (Sein) than consciousness (Bewusstsein)",16 it has strong 
ontological implications.
To exist historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be 
complete for every finite present has its limitation which is represented in 
what Gadamer calls 'horizons'. A "[h]orizon is the range of vision that 
includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point."17 The 
term is used to indicate the limitation of thinking to a finite entity. Yet, as a 
consequence, people are not static but dynamic for they change over space 
and time. In Gadamer's words:
Just as the individual is never simply an individual because he is always 
in understanding with others, so too the closed horizon th at is supposed 
to enclose a culture is an abstraction. The historical m ovem ent of human 
life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one 
standpoint, and hence can never have a tru ly closed horizon. The  
horizon is, rather, something into which we move and th at moves with 
us. Horizons change for a person who is m oving.18
It  is of major importance not to misunderstand Gadamer in this 
aspect. When he suggests that we retrieve our past, and that we question 
our prejudices, he does not suggest that there is a true self which can be 
discovered. Hence, Gadamer's truth is relational, and in the process of 
understanding it is related to the Other and to the anticipation of 
understanding the Other in the future.
In the process of understanding, Gadamer consequently suggests, we 
question our own horizons and interrogate our prejudices and 
prejudgements. In doing so we find out which prejudices about our 'enemy' 
are wrong and which ones are right. At first sight, the categories 'wrong' 
and 'right' suggest some deeper 'tru th ' which calls for uncovering -  like a 
true 'evil spirit' of our 'enemy' which is said to be intrinsic to his/her race, 
ethnicity or genes. However, in Gadamer, truth never gains absolute,
15 Gadamer (1993a): 305.
16 Georgia Warnke (1987): Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 80.
17 Gadamer (1993a): 307.
18 Gadamer (1993a): 309 (translated in Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975): Truth and Method. 
New York: Seabury, p. 304).
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authentic terms but is rather relative to the experience of being confronted 
with the strange and different.19
As we shall see below, Gadamer's truth is situated in an environment 
of shared meaning, or fused horizons, where the issue at stake becomes 
intelligible. Yet "[w ]ha t does 'meaning' signify? ... [M]eaning is that wherein 
the understandability of something maintains itself - even that of something 
which does not come into view explicitly and thematically."20 Meaning is 
thus a shared environment in which interaction is possible and in which it 
makes sense. To agree on something, i.e. to produce 'tru th ', is thus always 
situated in a spatio-temporal context comprised of discursive rules which 
provide a meaningful environment -  and as such it is beyond our grasp. In 
other words, "[w ]e  understand as we do because we exist as we do."21
Backwards and Forwards Movement o f Hermeneutics
When encountering our 'enemy', in the process of reaching 
understanding, as depicted in Gadamer's hermeneutics, simultaneously two 
distinct, yet intertwined, movements take place: one movement is the 
retrieval of the past, the other the casting forward into a future. I t  is fair to 
say that Gadamer is generally more concerned with the first and Heidegger 
with the second movement, yet since the movements form an entity I shall 
discuss them here together.
Firstly, to render oneself conscious of ones own effective history is a 
process of retrieving the past. Assumptions and positions, taken for granted 
and 'naturalised' over time, are questioned. Habits and routines, part of our 
day-to-day conduct, are re-evaluated. More precisely, the way we think 
about our 'enemy', the resentment we harbour, is brought under scrutiny. 
The way we have seen ourselves, thought of ourselves and represented 
ourselves is challenged through excavating our past in the light of the 
'enemy'. From the moment we retrieve our past, and become conscious of 
our effective history, we become aware of the silent influences, Vorurteilef
19 Hans-Georg Gadamer (1993f): Was ist Wahrheit? in: Wahrheit und Methode II. 
Ergaenzungen. Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, p. 47.
20 Martin Heiddeger (1962): Being and Time. New York: Haper & How, p. 370-71.
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that guide us. Once conscious we might consider them as inappropriate and 
unsuitable and discard some of our assumptions or positions, habits or 
routines. In doing so, in discarding features that were intrinsic to our 
identity, we change. Questioning past horizons, evaluating previously 
uncontested features of our tradition and potentially discarding them, alters 
the way we are. Retrieving the past, therefore, has a significant impact on 
the present for it defines who we are now. Our present identity is a product 
of the way we conceive ourselves in the light of our own horizon. Yet, we 
can only interpret the past in the light of today.
The second movement referred to above is to cast oneself forward 
into a future. The way we see ourselves in the future reflects back on how 
we conceive ourselves in the present. To cast oneself into the future means 
for instance to anticipate that an understanding with the 'enemy' will be 
reached, that there will be some form of reconciliation in the time to come. 
Thus, to anticipate the accomplishment of understanding in the future, that 
is the creation of shared meaning, demands a particular attitude in the 
present. At the same time, through reaching out to a future we reflect back 
on our presence. When encountering the alien and strange we are 
confronted with assumptions, positions, habits and routines different from 
our own. I t  is the wish, and therefore the anticipation, of accomplishing 
understanding about the issues that differ that leads us to the self-critical 
process of evaluating our own horizons, that is of retrieving our past as 
mentioned above. Essential to retrieving our past is thus to reach forward 
into the future, to anticipate a certain state of shared understanding with 
the Other - the possibility of future reconciliation.
To illustrate this point with reference to conflict resolution I would like 
to borrow a notion introduced by the peace researcher Johan Galtung.22 
While criticising problem-solving workshops Galtung introduced the notion 
o f'th e  image'. Parties to a conflict, he suggested, despite sitting around a 
negotiation table, have little commitment to 'solve their problems' as long 
as they still consider themselves enemies. What they require is therefore an 
image of a peaceful and better future, that is the wish to reconcile their
21 Caputo (1987): 61.
22 I am here referring to a contribution by Johan Galtung at the Reporting the World 
roundtable discussion at Taplow Court, Taplow, 06.07.2001.
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problems. Devoid of this image violence will remain a possibility as a means 
of resolving the conflict.
I assume, yet do not know, that Galtung's notion o f'th e  image' is not 
based on the study of hermeneutics, and yet there are obvious parallels 
with Gadamer's concept of casting oneself into the future. The image, in 
Galtung's sense, of peaceful co-existence is an incentive to retrieve, or 
reinterpret, the past in a way that allows for this image to materialise. 
Therefore, approaches to conflict studies should not simply concentrate on 
removing problems, so called 'root causes', like access to water, social and 
political inclusion, or whatever else might have been identified as the cause 
of a conflict, but they should encourage the anticipation of a peaceful 
future. The anticipation of a positive and peaceful future might nevertheless 
include the provision of water, social and political inclusion and so on, as 
was the case in the mediation of the Teso insurgency.
To return to Gadamer, it is important to state that both parties, in the 
process of understanding, evaluate their horizons and potentially discard 
particular features. In so doing they alter their horizons, and who they are, 
and eventually fuse their horizons. "Understanding ... is always the fusion of 
horizons which we imagine to exist by themselves."23 In the process of 
fusion we enter into a communion with our 'enemy' in which we do not 
remain who we were, in which we might adopt some of the 'enemy's' views 
as much as the 'enemy' might adopts ours. This is not to suggest that a 
process of unification takes place, which deletes all forms of difference.24 
For example, in the context of discussing religion Gadamer suggests that 
although many non-western cultures have successfully adopted a global, 
western-centred market economy, which entails a very substantial element 
of modernity derived from Judeo-Christian religion, the non-western 
cultures have simultaneously maintained their own forms of religion. They 
have, on the level of global economy, evaluated their traditional 
approaches, realised that they will benefit from adapting to western 
practice, and ultimately altered their routine. Yet only in the field of 
economy -  not in other spheres of their culture.
23 Gadamer (1993a): 311 (translated in Gadamer (1975): 273).
24 Hans-Georg Gadamer (1998): Dialogues in Capri, in: Derrida, Jacques/Vattimo, Gianni 
(eds.): Religion. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 200-11.
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Hence, the fusion of horizons should not be understood as the 
assimilation of difference. Rather, in the process of hermeneutics, as 
depicted by Gadamer, we actually appreciate difference in its purest form 
for we respond to it through questioning ourselves. The communion into 
which we enter with the 'enemy' is as contingent as our previous identity; it 
is not an all-absorbing sameness but a consensus reached about a 
particular issue at stake. Nevertheless, it provides us with meaning and 
(contingent) truth.
To sum up, two movements, two dynamics, are thus at play in 
philosophical hermeneutics. Simultaneously, we reach back to our past to 
evaluate our effective history and we cast ourselves forward into the future 
of anticipated meaning, or potential reconciliation. Our identity is therefore 
negotiated in the constant backwards and forwards movement of how we 
conceive of our history and how we conceive of our future.
To return to the beginning of this section, the backwards and 
forwards movement is what is illustrated in the hermeneutic circle. We 
understand the part in relation to the whole, that is the Self in relation to 
the Other, and the whole in relation to the part, that is the Other in relation 
to our Self. The hermeneutic circle is not a formal template, but rather it 
describes the ontological structural moment of understanding.25 
Hermeneutics symbolises not the art of understanding, rather it is 
understanding itself. Hermeneutics is the ontology of the present, its truth 
or meaning, as much as it is the ontology of the identities involved.
Time and Temporality
Traditionally, time serves as a synonym for a sequence of'now s' that 
disappear into the past where they become 'thens'. However, the backwards 
and forwards movement central to the process of hermeneutic 
understanding challenges this linear direction and has led Heidegger to 
develop the notion of temporality, which was subsequently adopted by
25 Gadamer (1993a): 299.
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Gadamer.26 As explained above, for Heidegger the forward movement of 
time is also always simultaneously a movement backwards, for it retrieves 
and recovers what has been in the past. He therefore suggests a circularity 
where the retrieval of the past conditions what is possible in the future. 
Again, this circular movement is profoundly ontological for it composes the 
very identity of individuals and communities. Their present identity is 
produced through the repetition of narratives about the retrieved history. 
This repetition makes manifest the social, spatio-temporal reality of the 
people -  it produces and re-produces their identity. Thus "repetition is not 
recollection, but posing anew the question of what is significant, and how it 
can be re-manifested in a different historical space."27 However, situated 
between past and future, people not only retrieve their past but at the same 
time they stretch out towards the possible in the future, they cast 
themselves forward into a horizon of existence. In Heidegger's words:
[t]h e  character of 'having been' arises from  the future, and in such a 
way the future which 'has been' (or better, which 'is the process of 
having been') releases itself from the Present. This phenomenon has the  
unity which makes present in the process of having been: we designate 
it as tem porality .28
Being constituted by previous moments the present simultaneously 
constitutes moments-to-come. The 'now' is only shaped in its presence 
through a particular interpretation of our past. And this particular way is 
conditioned by our attitude towards our future. Hence "[t]h is  past, ... 
reaching all the way back into the origin, does not pull back but presses 
forward, and it is, contrary to what one would expect, the future which 
drives us back to the past."29 There is a constant forward and backward 
movement between the horizons of our past and of our future.
26 Heidegger (1988): 35-6.
27 Bruce Janz (1997): Alterity, Dialogue and African Philosophy, in: Eze, Emmanuel 
Chukwudi (ed.): Postcolonial African Philosophy. A Critical Reader. Cambridge, Mass./Oxford: 
Blackwell, p. 235.
28 Heidegger (1993): 326. (translation cited in Stephen Mulhall (1996): Heidegger and Being 
and Time. London: Routledge, p. 145.)
29 Hannah Arendt (1968): Between Past and Future. Eight Essays on Political Thought. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 14.
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Temporality and Conflict Studies
To illustrate the above with regard to parties in conflict, Heidegger's 
temporality suggests that the present identities of parties to a conflict are 
conditioned by the narratives on which they draw to explain their past. And 
yet, these life narratives are selected by the parties with a specific view to 
their future, which might capture them as future combatants, aggressors, 
parties to a peace process or simply as neighbours. Today's tales of 
enemies and friends derive at the same time from the constituent's visions 
of their past and their future, from where they think they come from as well 
as where they want to go to.
A Narrative Approach to Conflict Analysis
One approach which takes Heidegger's rejection of time as being 
linear into account, is narrative theory. The interpretation of our past, 
reflected in the story we chose to refer to it, is conditioned by how we cast 
ourselves into future horizons. The selection of narratives has strong 
political implications essential to both conflict and peace as future 
prospects, as will be illustrated in Chapter 6.
Narrative approaches to conflict studies have gained in interest in 
recent years.30 Based on the assumption that "[t]h e  event is not what 
happens" rather "that which can be narrated"31 the social dynamics which 
privilege one story over another are scrutinised and revealed. The tales told 
about an event are what defines our perception of it, they structure what 
comes to be considered real and true, and thus close off counter-narratives. 
"Narrative closure refers to the autopoetic process through which narratives 
seal off alternative interpretations to themselves."32 As argued in the 
previous chapter, to practice closure is an essential requirement to define 
relationships, socially as well as politically, which have been destroyed by a
30 Campbell (1993); Campbell (1998a/1998b/1998c); Sara Cobb (1994): A Narrative 
Perspective on Mediation. Towards the Materialization of the 'Storyteller' Metaphor, in: 
Folger, Joseph P./Jones, Tricia S. (eds.): New Directions in Mediation. Communication 
Research and Perspectives. Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi: Sage, p. 49-63; John 
Winslade/ Gerald Monk/Alison Cotter (1998): "A Narrative Approach to the Practice of 
Mediation." Negotiation Journal 14(1): 21-41.
31 Campbell (1993): 7.
32 Cobb (1994): 54.
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violent conflict. In a post-war environment they forge the fabric which 
enables people to make sense of their existence, and in particular the 
traumatic experience of the violence and disruption.
There is a dialectic relationship between experience and narrative, 
between the narrating self and the narrated self. As humans, we draw  
on our experience to shape narratives about our lives, but equally, our 
identity and character are shaped by our narratives. People em erge  
from and as the products of their stories about them selves as much as 
their stories em erge from their lives. Through the act of m em ory they  
strive to render their lives in meaningful term s. This entails connecting 
the parts into a more or less unified narrative in which they identify with 
various narrative types -  heroes, survivors, victim , guilty perpetrator, 
etc .33
People make sense out of events by incorporating them into larger 
life narratives.34 Narratives are characterised by their possession of a plot.35 
A sequence of events is 'emploted' through their mediation with time. In 
this process meaning is provided to what would otherwise be a mere 
chronicle of events. Beginning, middle and end structure the sequence of 
events into a story and make it intelligible for both narrator and audience. 
Thus narratives are understood as
discourses with a clear sequential order th a t connects events in a 
meaningful way for a definite audience, and thus offer insights about the 
world and /o r people's experience of it.36
By implications, the represented world does not resemble a clear 
story line and it is only our desire for "coherence, integrity, fullness, and
33 Paul Antze/Michael Lambek (1996): Introduction. Forecasting Memory, in: Antze, 
Paul/Lambek, Michael (eds.): Tense Past. Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory. New York, 
London: Routledge, p. xviii.
34 Wendy Drewery/John Winslade (1997): The Theoretical Story of Narrative Therapy, in: 
Monk, Gerald/Winslade, John/Crocket, Kathie/Epston, David (eds.): Narrative Therapy in 
Practice. The Archaeology of Hope. San Francisco: Josse-Bass Publishers, p. 43.
35 Hayden White (1991): The Metaphysics of Narrativity: Time and Symbol in Ricouer's 
Philosophy of History, in: Wood, David (ed.): On Paul Ricoeur. Narrative and Interpretation. 
London/New York: Routledge, p. 144.
36 Lewis P. Hinchman/Sandra K. Hinchman (1997): Introduction, in: Hinchman, Lewis 
P./Hinchman Sandra K. (eds.): Memory, Identity, Community. Albany: State of New York 
Press, p. xx.
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closure of an image of life" that renders them into discrete and manageable 
entities.37
In the same vein, in The Causes o f War Hidemi Suganami contends 
that causation, explanation and narration of war origins are inextricably 
intertwined.38 Suganami argues that we only understand what caused a war 
when we comprehend the story we are told by way of explanation. The 
search for the cause of a violent conflict is driven by the wish to render its 
occurrence more intelligible -  that is to make sense of it.39 In the process of 
explaining we provide a narrative, a story, about why a war came about. 
Here, then, concepts of causation, explanation and narration collapse into 
the promotion of a particular argument which structures the story. The 
question is not whether the argument is an adequate representation of what 
happened but rather whether it is convincing and intelligible. Only the 
structure of signification in a particular narrative renders an event coherent, 
not the coherence of the event itself.40 "The best we can do by identifying 
the origins of any given war, then, is to construct a coherent and convincing 
narrative on the basis of available knowledge and evidence we have of the 
world" -  there is no way of validating whether one story is the better then 
another.41
Suganami's emphasis on the intelligibility of a structured story 
renders relative approaches that search for a list of conditions that lead to 
the breakout of violence. For instance, Christopher Clapham suggests that 
insurgency wars derive either from blocked political aspirations or from 
reactive desperation.42 The most commonly referred to causes for 
insurgency wars in Africa include:43
• political, social, economic exclusion;
37 Hayden White (1987): The Content of the Form: Narrative Theory and Historical
Representation. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, p. 24.
38 Hidemi Suganami (1996): On the Causes of War. Oxford: Clarendon, p. 150.
39 Suganami (1996): 139.
40 Richard Baumann (1986): Story, Performance, and Event. Contextual Studies of Oral 
Narrative. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 5.
41 Suganami (1996): 208.
42 Christopher Clapham (1998): Analysing African Insurgencies, in: Clapham, Christopher 
(ed.): African Guerrillas. Oxford/Bloomington: James Curry, p. 5.
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• competition for resources;
• tribalism and ethnicism;
• external intervention: colonial legacy of badly distributed territory and 
proxy war during the Cold War;
• political rivalries;
• religious tensions;
• greed and malice of political leaders/political economy of violence.
Often, these causes are referred to as 'root causes' of violent conflict. 
Most of the above categories are also evoked when it comes to explaining 
the cause of the insurgency in Teso. The question remains, why one 
particular story is better then another.
Narrated events and narrative events are characterised by the 
interplay of available resources and patterns of narrative performance on 
one hand, and emergent functions and outcomes of the performance on the 
other.44 In Mikhail Bakhtin's words the narrative and the narrated event 
"take place in different times and in different places, but at the same time 
these two events are indissolubly united."45 They are united through their 
ontological impact situated in temporality as discussed above.
Consequently, a sequence of events might be emploted in various 
ways by various people -  there is more than one story to tell as will be 
illustrated in Chapter 6 through a selection of different narratives on the 
beginning of the Teso insurgency. This recognition calls for suspicion 
towards a narrative which lays claims to be the only representation of 
reality and for interrogating its authenticity.46
Critique o f Authenticity
The accomplishment of shared meaning in the hermeneutic process 
of fusing horizons has been accused of introducing closure by providing an
43 See for instance Adebayo Adedeji (1999): Comprehending African Conflicts. Adedeji, 
Adebayo (ed.): Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. London/New York: ZED, 3- 
21.
44 Baumann (1986): 6.
45 Mikail Bakhtin (1981): The Dialogic Imagination. Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 255.
46 Campbell (1998b): 37.
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authentic story. One of the most pronounced critics of hermeneutics is 
Michel Foucault. In his words hermeneutics
seeks re-apprehension through the m anifest meaning of discourse of 
another meaning at once secondary and prim ary, th a t is, the more 
hidden but also more fundam ental.47
Being an outspoken opponent of metaphysical truths, Foucault 
resents the perspective that hermeneutics conveys the search for a deeper 
and truer truth as the outcome of the process of questioning, and ultimately 
fusing, horizons. His life-long project was to reveal the contingency of 
truths, which he endeavoured to do especially through deploying the 
Nietzschean 'genealogy'. He particularly rejected the existence of 'meaning' 
which allows, as discussed above, for understanding and some form of truth 
about an issue at stake.
Foucault's view that hermeneutics introduces authenticity and closure 
is widely shared, yet nevertheless it has been contested -  and in my view 
successfully. In an essay entitled 'On the Transcendality of Hermeneutics', 
Richard Palmer seeks to rescue hermeneutics from its bad reputation and 
provides an alternative interpretation.48 Almost from the moment of its 
birth, philosophical hermeneutics was discredited as a method aiming at the 
establishment of a profound truth. Even Heidegger, who in his early work 
Being and Time developed the notion of hermeneutics as a process of self­
interpretation and understanding, a process in which we unconceal - and 
realise - our cultural situatedness, later rejected this form of 
'metaunderstanding' to which the process of hermeneutics allegedly 
ultimately leads. In Being and Time Heidegger tried to show that the 
hermeneutic relation was the essence of reality which "was supposed to be 
revealed to each human being in an ever-present but ever-repressed sense
47 Michel Foucault (1973): The Order of Things. New York: Vintage Books.
48 This essay was written in response to a text by Hubert Dreyfus who, although generally an 
advocate of hermeneutics, in the same edited publication makes a number of critical remarks 
similar to Foucault's argument above. Richard E. Palmer (1988): On the Transcendentally of 
Hermeneutics. A Response to Dreyfus, in: Shapiro, Gary/Sica, Alan (eds.): Hermeneutics. 
Questions and Prospects. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 84-95. A similar point 
is made by Gary B. Madison (1991): Beyond Seriousness and Frivolity: A Gadamerian 
Response to Deconstruction, in: Silverman, Hugh J. (ed.): Gadamer and Hermeneutics. New 
York/London: Routledge, 119-36.
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of anxiety" about the anti-foundational character of existence.49 The 
transcendental truth immanent in each human being, as established in 
Being and Time, which initially provided the criterion of success for 
hermeneutic interpretation, was later discarded by Heidegger.50
And yet, Palmer argues that Heidegger maintained, albeit only 
implicitly, the use of hermeneutics in his own work. Hermeneutics, however, 
is here not understood in the narrow definition Heidegger himself 
established in Being and Time, that is a form of 'metaunderstanding', but it 
rather makes reference to the simple act of interpretation. Here, 
understanding is still accomplished in the process of fusing horizons, yet 
without any preconception of what the understood is supposed to look like. 
This use of hermeneutics, Palmer contends, would then include Heidegger 
himself as a scholar who, although he had explicitly turned his back on the 
concept, has a hermeneutic approach to reasoning when he, for instance, 
makes reference to ancient Greece. Hermeneutics, simply understood as 
interpretation, would then include all efforts to explain the present through 
the past or the Self through the Other. I t  would still seek to produce 
meaning, but a conditional and contingent one.
Palmer draws our attention to this way of using the term 
hermeneutics -  a way which merely points at the act of interpretation or 
understanding without seeking to establish metaunderstanding. This 
generously defined use of the term, he suggests, would then also include 
philosophers like Derrida when he uses, for example, The Postcard to reflect 
on ancient Greek philosophy and Freudian Psychoanalysis.51 When drawing 
attention to Derrida's "preoccupation with text, writing, and phenomena", 
which Palmer considers to be a "continuation of the history of reflection and 
interpretation", he nevertheless recognises that they are centred on 
interpretation yet at the same time they are "intertextual".52 Derrida thus
49 Dreyfus (1988): 74.
50 Dreyfus (1988): 75.
51 Palmer (1988): 95. The text I am referring to is Jacques Derrida (1987): The Postcard. 
From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. Gianni 
Vattimo, in his re-definition of hermeneutics, also includes Derrida, as well as Foucault, as 
writing in the hermeneutic tradition. Gianni Vattimo (1988): "Hermeneutic as a Koine." 
Theory, Culture & Society 5 (2 -3 ), p. 400.
52 Palmer (1988): 95.
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has developed a new way of applying hermeneutics, a transcendental, 
antimetaphysical way, or what Palmer refers to as 'deconstructionist 
hermeneutics'.53
Seen in this light, Foucault's use of Nietzsche's genealogy could be 
considered as a hermeneutic practice, too. Despite his outspoken critique of 
hermeneutics, Foucault's approach, which draws partially on Husserl's 
phenomenology, seeks to combine the idea of horizons in which every 
action and utterance is situated and is thus meaningful and which can be 
interpreted, while at the same time making apparent that these horizons 
are merely historical constructs.54 This becomes apparent in the following 
quote:
The analysis of statem ents, then, is a historical analysis, but one that 
avoids all interpretation: it does not question things said as to w hat they  
are doing, w hat they are 'really ' saying, in spite of them selves, the  
unspoken elem ent they contain ...;  but, on the contrary, it questions 
them  as to their mode of existence, ... w hat it means for them  to have 
appeared when and where they did - they and no others.55
The genealogical interpretation of a discourse is simply a process of 
understanding the particular horizon, that is the meaning that prevails at a 
certain time and place, and that makes particular truths possible.
Understanding of horizons and meaning does therefore not allow for 
better, deeper or more profound, and thus 'truer', but merely different 
interpretation. I t  simply permits an (or several) alternative view of a so far 
uncontested narrative. Hermeneutics, like genealogy, does not appeal to 
'tru th ' or 'correctness', but it can "attend to the text and allow for a plurality 
of interpretations."56 The text still limits to some extent the scope of the 
interpretation, and thus prevents unmitigated relativism without denying
53 Palmer (1988): 95.
54 Hubert Dreyfus/Paul Rabinow (1982): Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics. Brighton: Harvester Press, p. 52.
55 Michel Foucault (1972): The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Harper Colophon, p. 
121. It  is important to note that Foucault in his writing went through various different phases 
and that the views he held in The Archaeology of Knowledge differ from his later work.
56 Alan D. Schrift (1990): Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation. Between 
Hermeneutics and Deconstruction. New York/London: Routledge, p. 171. Italics in original 
text.
67
that there is always a different story to tell. And this is key to both 
hermeneutics and genealogy.
Hence, Gadamer's hermeneutics does not, as frequently suggested by 
scholars like Foucault, search for something original which is hidden in the 
past. The past is only of importance because it speaks to us in the language 
of the present. The past is therefore not a truth we discover through 
constant questioning of our horizons, but it only has significance in light of 
the today -  it is here where past and present fuse their horizons.57 To 
return to Foucault's quote above, hermeneutics does not seek for something 
more true or more profound but merely for meaning in the light of a 
particular past in conjunction with a particular present. The established 
meaning is merely circumstantial.
Hermeneutics - the Ontology of the Actual
Palmer attempts to rescue hermeneutics from its bad reputation not 
simply on grounds of intellectual disagreement. Rather, he promotes a 
particular project of re-fashioning hermeneutics. His closing lines are 
therefore worth quoting at length:
I t  m ay take some adjustm ent to think of herm eneutics in a way that is 
free of the ideological connotation th at some persons would like to 
associate with it, but I  think th at to move in this direction is a logical 
continuation of the developments in the thinking of both Heidegger and 
Gadam er. I see no particular need to equate hermeneutics with onto- 
theology, even if there is a m arkedly onto-theological dimension in 
hermeneutics to which some people would like to call attention. Rather, 
I  th ink popular usage already is moving in this direction with term s like 
'deconstructionist hermeneutics' -  which, if we were to accept 
hermeneutics as the kind of thing Foucault 'defines and rejects', would 
be a contradiction in term s. Manifestly it is not and I  have hopes that a 
broader, more general sense of the term  will prevail.58
57 Gadamer hints at this when rejecting the practice of etymology. He argues that what a 
word meant in its original sense is insignificant today for it only speaks to us against the 
backdrop of the present. Gadamer (1998): 210.
58 Palmer (1988): 95.
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Gianni Vattimo's Hermeneutics
A 'more general sense of the term ' hermeneutics is also promoted by 
Gianni Vattimo to whom hermeneutics depicts the 'ontology of the actual'.59 
Vattimo argues that Heidegger's intention in Being and Time was not to 
establish a new and better meaning of Being because all other philosophical 
approaches were insufficient, although he recognises, like Palmer, that one 
could, and may, interpret his text in this way. Yet, if one follows the course 
Heidegger took after Being and Time, Vattimo contends, the striving for a 
deeper meaning would be revealed as contradictory.60 In Heidegger's 
writing the positivist notion of 'truth as correspondence' is not simply 
rejected due to some inadequacy, which needs correction. His project is far 
more ambitious. For Heidegger, 'Being is event', although Heidegger himself 
never explicitly makes use of this notion.61 Thus Heidegger is driven by the 
motivation not only to deconstruct truth as correspondence and to propose 
a more adequate conception, but he also aims "to 'respond' to the meaning 
of Being as event."62
When conceiving of Being and truth as an event as opposed to a 
category which corresponds to an authentic reality it is important to 
differentiate truth as opening and truth as correspondence.63 The post­
positivist critique of truth as correspondence is directed to the sense of 
closure it entails. Truth as correspondence is an ultimate truth, it is 
authenticity beyond contestation, as discussed in Chapter 1.
For Gadamer (and Heidegger), however, 'tru th as correspondence' 
refers to a truth as opening in terms of "a historico-cultural horizon shared 
by a community that speaks the same language, and within which specific 
rules of verification and validation are in force...".64 Truth as opening is then 
not true because it conforms to certain criteria but it is truly "original" for it 
summons the horizons which provide the backdrop for all verification and 
falsification.65 The question in hermeneutics is not simply related to
59 Vattimo (1997)
60 Vattimo (1997)
61 Vattimo (1997)
62 Vattimo (1997)
63 Vattimo (1997)
64 Vattimo (1997)
65 Vattimo (1997)
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encountering the unknown, but it simultaneously questions the taken-for- 
granted and what has become a habit. As such, it opens up horizons in 
order to keep them open.66 The 'hermeneutic experience of opening' is 
consequently an aesthetic event, a poetic creation.67 Vattimo concludes that 
therefore
... the truth of the opening can ... only be thought on the basis of the  
m etaphor of dwelling. ... I  can do epistem ology, I  can form ulate  
propositions that rate valid according to certain rules, only on the 
condition th at I  dwell in a determ inate linguistic universe or paradigm. I t  
is 'dwelling' that is the first condition of me saying the truth . But I 
cannot describe it to a universal structural and stable condition.68
Truth as opening understood as dwelling resembles Gadamer's notion 
of belonging to, and being imbedded in, a particular tradition (like 
Wittgenstein's language games discussed Chapter 1) for it is only then that 
we share certain concepts, or even words, and understanding occurs. I t  is 
here where we can speak the 'truth '. Yet Vattimo emphasises that this does 
not mean being passively subjected to a particular system or structure, but 
rather that "[d]welling implies ... an interpretative belonging which involves 
both consensus and the possibility o f critical activity."69 This is similar to 
Gadamer constantly referring to the ability to question one's own horizon.
The rejection of an accommodation of truth in a deeper origin is what 
leads Vattimo to coin the phrase 'the nihilistic vocation of hermeneutics'.70 
Hermeneutics, as the locus of dwelling, turns into the ontology of the locus 
and its population. I t  turns into the 'ontology of the actual'.71 A particular 
identity prevails at a particular time and place. Not forever, not everywhere, 
but nonetheless there. Hermeneutics is the arresting of the flux, the fragile 
existence of something which ceases to be in the very moment of its 
origin.72
66 Hermann Braun (1970): Zum Verhaeltnis von Hermeneutik und Ontologie. in: Bubner, 
Ruediger/Cramer, Konrad/Wiehl, Reiner (eds.): Hermeneutik und Dialektik. Aufsaetze II. 
Tuebingen: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), p. 203.
67 Vattimo (1997): 81.
68 Vattimo (1997): 82.
69 Vattimo (1997): 82. Emphasis added.
70 So the title of a chapter in Vattimo (1997).
71 Vattimo (1997): 10.
72 Caputo (1987): 130.
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To sum up, in order to understand each other, and this is what 
hermeneutics stands for, it is necessary to have a shared notion of truth. 
This is not only a prime requirement for co-existence but even for simple 
communication. Some form of boundedness is necessary to make sense of 
the world.
And yet, being bounded does not mean being confined. 
Understanding merely suggest dwelling in a here and now, for a spur of a 
moment - before again drifting apart. In philosophical terms the truth which 
is brought about in the process of a hermeneutic encounter, in the process 
of fusing horizons, is at the same time always contested from outside and 
inside alike. I t  is never there to stay for it is itself not the representation of 
an authentic origin. Rather, it is contingent in its existence -  and in its 
disappearance.
To illustrate this point with reference to the Teso case study, for the 
Iteso and Kumam this means that, on a day to day basis, they re-evaluate 
and re-negotiate their boundaries and their identity. Despite the present 
interpretation of their past and future introducing a sense of closure, 
potentially the Kumam and Iteso can alter the way they see the world.
The com m unity, for it's part, is not something closed and isolated in a 
point of space or a m om ent of history. Like the horizon, it moves with 
us. In  this way, the integration of individual experiences in the horizon 
that sustains them  is never concluded. In terpretative  mediation has no 
limits, any more than the traducibility and commensurability of 
cultures.73
Regarding the insurgency, the 'interpretative mediation' of the Kumam 
and Iteso, of course, is also highly dependent on the interpretation of their 
Other, that is the Museveni government. The 'ontology of the actual' is not 
retrieved in isolation but, as the present study tries to illustrate, in relation 
to the Other. And yet, to understand the Other can never be based on an 
effort to truly understand all intentions and motivations, as I have discussed 
above with reference to the hermeneutic circle of Dilthy and Schleiermacher 
versus Heidegger and Gadamer. The Other, here the Museveni government,
73 Vattimo (1997): 38.
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is interpreted in a discourse which does not reflect authentically the 
Museveni government's actions but the way people in Teso interpret them, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 6. In the process of understanding we 
always bring ourselves in. This is not to say that the government's actions 
do not matter but simply (as we have seen with Wittgenstein's 'beetle in the 
box' analogy in Chapter 1) that discourses are informed by the 'world out 
there' to which we do not have access except through language. The 'world 
out there', e.g. the government of Uganda, constitutes discourses, yet at 
the same time these discourses have a significant impact on the constitution 
of how this world, i.e. the government, relates to the people form Teso.
Collective Remembering and Collective Identity
Identities emerge where the flux is arrested, and this arresting, as 
discussed above, results from retrieving the past and casting oneself 
forward into the future. As for the backwards movement
[t]h e  core meaning of any individual or group identity, nam ely a sense 
of sameness over tim e and space, is sustained by rem em bering; and 
w hat is rem em bered is defined by the assumed identity .74
In a community, for instance through the act of performing 
remembrance with the aid of a memorial as shall be illustrated in Chapter 9, 
a particular truth about the past is created which translates into shared 
meaning about the past. Commemoration through memorials thus assists in 
the production of a particular language game which binds a community. 
Identities are consolidated in reference to a collective biography channelled 
through the symbol of the site.
Halbwachs' Collective Identity
The correlation between memory and collective identity is central to 
the writing of the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. According to him, 
individual memory seems to answer expectations we assume from our
74 John R. Gillis (1994): Memory and Identity. The History of a Relationship, in: Gillis, John 
R. (ed.): Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity. Princeton: New Jersey, p. 3.
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environment so that the way we remember is already framed by the answer 
we seek to give in response to this environment.75 Halbwachs draws our 
attention to the importance of language as constituted by and constitutive 
of social coexistence, that is the 'house of being' in Gadamer's words, which 
provides memory with intelligibility. Language offers both recollection and 
the language in which we recall. In accordance with Wittgenstein's language 
games Halbwachs therefore argues that language is a system of social 
conventions "that makes our own past possible".76 Memory depends on 
social environments77 - memory is always collective. By the same token, 
forgetting is not necessarily an individual failure, but rather the deformation 
of recollections.78 When forgetting, societies modify their language games, 
and thus the way they remember according to their present circumstances 
and needs. We shall return to the issue of forgetting again later in this 
chapter.
The important contribution of Halbwachs for the understanding of 
memory is his argument that "even at the moment of reproducing the past 
our imagination remains under the influence of the present social milieu."79 
If  memory is determined by the present collective, it is at the same time 
also ideological, for remembering and forgetting are selected according to 
the present ideological patterns of a community. At the same time however, 
memory also produces ideology for it allows for commemoration and/or 
silencing in support of a particular ideological orientation. I t  thus reproduces 
power relations.80
A word of caution is necessary at this point. The above section 
discusses the notion of identity as applied in European and American 
scholarship. However, different cultures strive for different forms of 
communities and societies, and cultures outside of Europe and North
75 Liliane Weissberg (1999): Introduction. In: Ben-Amos, Dan/Weissberg, Liliane (eds.): 
Cultural Memory and the Construction of Identity. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, p. 
14.
76 Weissberg (1999): 14.
77 Halbwachs (1992): 43.
78 Weissberg (1999): 15.
79 Halbwachs (1992): 49.
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America might be more contingent in their boundaries.81 Similar to the 
notions of sovereignty and nation states, as discussed in Chapter 1, the 
modern notion of finite entities of Self and Other, with clear demarcations, 
derives from the particular historical experiences in Europe and North 
America, and from the particular school of thought which has developed out 
of circumstances like the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, or today's 
'Globalisation'. This is not to deny the impact colonialism had on, for 
instance, the production of collective identities on the basis of ethnicity.82 
Nevertheless, in places like Teso, despite strong influence through 
missionaries, colonialism and now international communication networks, 
concepts like identity and boundaries are not mere copies of those used in 
Anglo-Saxon discourse. The difficulty that arises for the European 
researcher like myself is thus to expand my horizon beyond my own spatio- 
temporal situatedness -  an almost impossible endeavour.83
In addition, questions have to be raised as to how collective a 
collective identity can be. With reference to Teso, the interpretation of a 
particular historical event produces a collective identity -  but geographically 
it probably reaches not much further than beyond the area directly affected. 
Due to very bad infrastructure, almost no means of communication and 
therefore no way of sharing narratives, the discourse about an event 
remains confined to the people who were affected and who live in the 
immediate environment. For example in Teso, people all over the region 
have stories to tell about their suffering during the insurgency, yet their 
accounts may differ in scope and intensity.84 When I use the term 'collective
80 Michel Billing (1990): Collective Memory, Ideology and the Royal Family, in: Middleton, 
David/Edwards, Derek (eds.): Collective Remembering. London/Newbury Park/New Delhi: 
Sage, p. 65.
81 Elisabeth Tonkin (1992): Narrating Our Past. The Social Construction of Oral History. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 126; and Richard Handler (1994): Is "Identity" a 
Useful Cross-Cultural Concept? in: Gillis, John R. (ed.): Commemorations. The Politics of 
National Identity. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 33.
82 Terence Ranger (2000): The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa, in: Hobsbawm, 
Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds.): The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 249.
83 Due to space constrains this point cannot be discussed in detail. For a discussion see 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak(1993): Can the Subaltern Speak? in: Williams, Patrick/Chrisman, 
Laura (eds.): Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory. New York/London: 
Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 66-111.
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The regional differences are very apparent in recent studies on the Teso region. Apart 
from myself, two other PhD students have written their thesis on post-conflict Teso: Joanna 
de Berry and Peter Heriques, both of whom are anthropologists. Each of us was based in a
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identity' I am therefore referring to a very local terrain. Also, I do not want 
to go as far as using the argument made in Benedict Anderson's Imagined 
Communities suggesting that part of the imagination of, in his case a 
nation, is an imagined 'we-feeling' amongst a group of people who might 
never meet each other.85 In Teso, it seems to me, people are far too 
remote, diverse, and deeply immersed in their own lives, including the day- 
to-day struggles which go along with this, to be interested in their fellow 
Iteso or Kumam. Community spirit seems in the first instance to be 
localised at a clan level.86
On Remembering
After ethnic wars, both sides end up trapped in collective identities.87 
Victors may collectively 'suffer' from amnesia and forgetting of atrocities 
committed, while victims might refuse to accept defeat through constant 
reference to the injustice endured at the hands of the victors. These fates 
shape memory and reality, and Teso is a good example to illustrate this 
point. But here we might ask: what does it mean to remember some things 
and not others? What is the reality of the future?
Remembering and Forgetting
Remembering is traditionally associated with securing past 
experiences.88 The past is understood as a former reality to which we have 
unhindered access so that it appears in our mind in the same manner as we 
experienced it originally. The memory of a moment is an identical copy of 
the moment itself.
More recent academic scholarship questions this assumption when it 
suggests that "the present moment is nothing like the memory of it".89 An
different region in Teso, de Berry (1996-8) in a very remote village in Katakwi district, close 
to the Karamoja border, Heriques (1995-6) in a small village close to Kumi town, and myself 
in Soroti town and neighbouring villages. The differences in the information we received from 
our informants were striking.
85 Benedict Anderson (1991): Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism. London/New York: Verso, p. 6.
86 A similar point has been made by Tonkin (1992): 125.
87 Michael Ignatieff (1998): The Warrior's Honor. Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. 
London: Chatto & Windus, p. 178.
88 Frank Kermonde (2001): "Places of Memory." Index on Censorship 30 (1 ), p. 87.
89 Kundera (1995): 128.
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ever-growing body of literature is available which investigates memory 
either from a psychological or sociological perspective. To begin I shall start 
from the viewpoint of philosophy.
One of the first philosophers to introduce an alternative vision of 
memory, and history, was Friedrich Nietzsche. In an essay entitled On the 
Uses and Disadvantages o f History for Life, he challenges the way we 
remember the past. The past as in
a m om ent, now here and then gone, nothing before it cam e, again  
nothing after it has gone, nevertheless returns as a ghost and disturbs 
the peace of a later m om ent.90
For Nietzsche the act of historicising, the rendering conscious of the 
past, leads to a "degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of the historical 
sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal to the living thing, whether this 
living thing be a man, or a people or a cu lture/791 Not to be able to forget, 
that is to "feel unhistorical", prevents people from happiness.92 Nietzsche 
therefore encourages one to liberate oneself from these past pressures 
which encumber one's steps as dark, invisible burdens: "the unhistorical 
and the historical are necessary in equal measures for the health of an 
individual, of a people and of a culture/793
The importance of being unhistorical, or forgetting, becomes 
apparent in Nietzsche's discussion of horizons. He suggests that humans 
need to be rounded up and enclosed by horizons since for him it is a 
universal law that "living beings can be healthy, strong and fruitful only 
when bounded by a horizon.7794 The line of the horizon is drawn through 
remembering and forgetting the past, through enclosing some moments 
into the horizon while leaving out others.
90 Friedrich Nietzsche (1983): On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, in: 
Untimely Meditations. Cambridge: University Press, p. 61.
91 Nietzsche (1983): 62.
92 Nietzsche (1983):62.
93 Nietzsche (1983): 63.
94 Nietzsche (1983): 63.
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Although the use of the term 'horizon' immediately brings to mind 
Gadamer's use of the term in hermeneutics, it is of salient importance to 
differentiate the application of the term. Nietzsche's horizons differ from 
Gadamer's in so far as the former seems to promote rather fixed and 
impermeable boundaries. The difference becomes apparent in Nietzsche's 
comparison of an ignorant dweller in the Alps, who might have a limited 
horizon but be very vital and healthy, to an intellectual who is full of 
knowledge (referring here to memory) and who collapses because "the lines 
of his horizon are always relentlessly changing" and for whom it is thus 
difficult to make a decision and to have an opinion.95 Having too many 
different influences, in Nietzsche's cynical view, undermines happiness.
For Gadamer, on the other hand, horizons are by definition ever 
changing entities. When he writes that "[h]orizons change for a person who 
is moving",96 as quoted above, he refers to what he considers to be the 
most important aspect of human life. Moving horizons are vital and a most 
rewarding endeavour. The more we encounter the alien and strange, the 
more advantageous for our own horizon. Forgetting in Nietzsche hence 
signifies a break with a particular historical consciousness, a break 
necessary to leave behind painful experiences which prevent us from 
overcoming present deadlocks.
I f  one follows Nietzsche's advice, one could argue that the shared, 
collective knowledge of a community's past includes remembered as well as 
forgotten aspects. Remembering and forgetting are constitutive of an 
identity. The present as well as the absence of the past binds people 
together. As described by Ernest Renan in his famous essay What is a 
Nation: "The essence of nations is that all individuals have many things in 
common, and also that they have forgotten many things."97
At first sight, since the subject of the present thesis is to consider the 
transition from conflict to peace, Nietzsche's forgetting seems both, useful
95 Nietzsche (1983): 63.
96 Gadamer (1993a): 309 (translated Gadamer (1975): 304).
97 Quoted in Joseph R. Llobera (1996): The Role of Historical Memory in (Ethno)Nation- 
Building. London: Goldsmith College, p. 5.
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and necessary. Does forgetting past atrocities open up new prospects for a 
peaceful future?
Despite recognising that forgetting is necessary for 'happiness' I 
would like to suggest that, for Nietzsche, breaking with the past requires a 
rather drastic obliteration of events. Nietzsche's notion of forgetting 
suggests the oblivion of crucial experiences. This strategy proves 
problematic in, for instance, a post-conflict society where people have 
suffered atrocities and pain, and where forgetting, deleting or obliterating 
takes away people's legitimate urge to articulate grievance and to have 
their traumas recognised. As such it belittles their agony. In addition, in 
most cases, violence has left obvious reminders like the loss of family 
members, houses and homes which call for endless remembering. 
Nietzsche's invitation to forget seems necessary, yet his strategy appears 
unfeasible.
There is, however, an alternative to Nietzsche's conception of 
forgetting which recognises the validity of remembering while at the same 
time allowing for breaking, or rather transforming, the boundaries of 
horizons.98 I t  recognises that present consciousness, in fact the present 
identity, by necessity derives from remembering the past (which is still in 
accordance with Nietzsche's suggestion) and yet contains a form of 
forgetting that does not lead to a state of oblivion or amnesia. Rather, it 
recognises that forgetting itself is simply a way of remembering differently. 
Here, "remembering is not the negative form of forgetting. Remembering is 
a form of forgetting."99
When, for instance, Gadamer writes that "[o ]n ly  by forgetting does 
the mind have ... the capacity to see everything with fresh eyes, so that 
what is long familiar combines with the new into a many levelled unity",100 
he does not call for oblivion in order to determine the boundaries of a 
horizon, in the way Nietzsche does. Gadamer rather suggests opening one's
98 I am very grateful for the discussions at the ECPR workshop on The Political Use of 
Narrative in Mannheim from 26-31 March 1999 which led to the development of this 
argument.
99 Kundera (1995): 128.
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horizon to the interpretation of somebody else's experience in order to re­
evaluate one's own horizon and to potentially change the way one 
interprets, and thus remembers, an event.
In doing so Gadamer recognises that there cannot be a true 
interpretation of one's past. To be a la rechere du temps perdu, to use 
Marcel Proust's aphorism, does not suggest that there is a true time to be 
rediscovered. Remembering is rather a re-fashioning of this temps perdu, in 
fact it is a re-membering of thoughts, or, put another way, it is an 
opportunity to construct a new 'ordering' of contingent historical events. 
The crucial difference between Gadamer and Nietzsche is that whilst 
Nietzsche seems to suggest blanking-out of past experience, Gadamer asks 
for re-interpreting the incidence. One could paraphrase Nietzsche as 
suggesting 'forget the past, it did not happen', and Gadamer to say 'look at 
your past, are there not different ways of interpreting it?'
To return to the subject of this thesis, post-conflict societies in 
transition from war to peace, one could illustrate their difference by either 
suggesting that some of the atrocities never happened, or by encouraging 
people to consider their own responsibilities during the insurgency and not 
to use the indisputably horrible crime to produce, or continue to produce, 
the Museveni government as the evil Other.
Re-membering
So to remember the past differently is to re-member.101 The 
remembering of the past by a community previously exposed to violent 
conflict re-members the members of this community, it re-organises social 
life, that is it assembles it in a different way. Through re-membering 
differently we re-constitute our previous horizons and simultaneously the 
narratives we draw upon to constitute our own identity as well our 
opponent's. This re-construction bears the potential to assemble not only 
our thoughts and perceptions in a different way but also war-torn
100 Hans-Georg Gadamer (1985): Philosophical Apprenticeship. New York: Seabury, p. 16.
101 Again, these thoughts have been inspired by the group discussions at the ESRC workshop 
in Mannheim.
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communities per se. I t  ailows for a redefinition of the collective identity 
which is not based on antagonism against an outside (former) enemy. 
Where there was an exclusive boundary between identity/difference before, 
this border might become more permeable. Re-membering, or re-arranging 
the members, allows for removing the enemy from the site formerly known 
as 'hostile territory1 - in both metaphorical as well as actual terms. As such 
it opens up possibilities for a peaceful co-existence.
To return to Halbwachs' notion of collective memory, re-membering 
is a social process which produces meaning and creates a collective identity 
on the basis of shared language games. Through evaluating the past anew 
the language used to narrate the experience changes and so does the 
identity of the community.
I t  has been suggested that only through taking control of the 
apparatus of memory and history can societies coming out of violence begin 
to engage with and develop constructive collective memories of the 
conflict.102 Constructive here is not only understood in terms of portraying 
an adequate and just picture of past atrocities, if this is ever possible, but 
also transforming the structural properties that allow for violence and 
discrimination to occur in the first place. The focus must not only be on 
direct action, in form of killings and gross abuses of human rights, but also 
on the structures that give way to enforced removal, poor infrastructures, 
and poor educational institutions to name just a few.103
Critical Hermeneutics
Our discussion of violent conflicts and the transition to peace began 
in Chapter 1 with a discussion of post-structuralism in International 
Relations theory. Through introducing deconstruction, scholars like Ashley, 
Walker and Campbell have provided the discipline with a valuable
102 Brandon Hamber (1998b): Remembering to Foret: Issues to Consider when Establishing 
Structures for Dealing with the Past, in: Hamber, Brandon (ed.): Past Imperfect. Dealing 
with the Past in Northern Ireland and Societies in Transition. Londonderry: INCORE, p. 78.
103 Mahmood Mamdani (1997): From Justice to Reconciliation: Making Sense of the African 
Experience, in: Leys, Colin/Mamdani, Mahmood (eds.): Crisis and Reconstruction - African 
Perspective. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, p. 23.
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methodology to challenge sovereignty and exclusion. However, the use of 
deconstruction with reference to violent conflicts only allows for opening up 
closed environments, but it does not provide any suggestions as to how to 
change the status quo and how to invent new ways of co-existence which 
are less exclusive. One way of inventing peace, which promises to change 
the structural properties of exclusion, is Habermas' discourse ethics. 
However, as we have seen, Habermas' emancipatory project maintains a 
degree of authenticity and closure itself, and thus cannot sufficiently 
challenge and change exclusion.
In order to reconcile the relativism inherent in deconstructive thought 
and the degree of authenticity in discourse ethics hermeneutics was 
suggested as a mode of conceptualising the fusion of divergent entities like 
parties to a conflict. In contrast to deconstruction, it focuses on the creation 
of shared concepts and truths as important for war-torn societies. Yet at the 
same time it avoids the pitfall of discourse ethics for it remains truly 
contingent -  it merely depicts the arresting of the flux, encouraging it at the 
same time to flow again. Hermeneutics is thus critical. I t  is critical for 
challenging traditions and horizons and for revealing the structures of 
inclusion and exclusion that run through them. And, it is critical because it 
allows for understanding the changing of these exclusive structures in the 
process of fusing horizons. Critical hermeneutics should therefore not be 
understood in the sense of critiquing and faultfinding, but rather in terms of 
being important and crucial.
By way of conclusion the question arises what value the introduction 
of critical hermeneutics has for peace and conflict studies. First of all, it is 
important to remember that hermeneutics is not a method which can simply 
be applied to 'invent peace'. Rather, it is the description of a process that 
happens when two or more parties reach understanding. In contrast to 
Habermas' discourse ethics, hermeneutics does not invite to establish 
models of communication, or conflict facilitation workshops in our case. 
Hermeneutics is neither normative nor does it promote a certain code of 
conduct. As such, it does not advance the 'invention of peace', in the way 
Jabri, Hoffman, Snyder and Lloyed-Jones suggest communication ethics 
does. Hermeneutics does not solve problems.
81
The important insights gained through the discussion of hermeneutics 
are thus of a different nature. To conceptualise how understanding is 
accomplished, or horizons fused, to use Gadamer's terminology, enables us 
to comprehend the formative and transformative process through which the 
parties to the conflict have to go in order to 'invent peace'. The particular 
focus on ontology and identity inherent in an hermeneutic approach might 
then reveal what mitigates or exacerbates the fusing of horizons. To be able 
to identify these successes and failures might lead to the articulation of 
particular policies and strategies to enhance a peace-building process.
Gadamer's fusion of horizons depicts an ideal case of understanding. 
In reality, however, the encounter with what is different to us is often less 
harmonious. As for the case of the Teso insurgency, the former parties to 
the conflict are today still strongly divided. The fighting has ceased yet no 
horizons have been fused. The case study of the present thesis therefore 
does not attempt to illustrate how understanding is brought about, but how 
the forces, the effective history, that work in the horizons of the Iteso and 
Kumam obstruct their potential to question their own role in the 
antagonism, to re-evaluate their position towards the government and to 
enter into a process of rapprochement.
Another valuable insight gained by hermeneutics is the importance 
that the 'retrieval of the past' and the 'casting forward into the future' have 
on how people perceive themselves today. The retrieval of the past can be 
analysed through narrative theory as introduced above and deployed in 
Chapter 6.
Violent conflict is not simply a means which leads to a political end. 
Rather, the legitimate application of violence is deeply embedded in 
structural properties as they prevail in a society at a particular time, and 
the pursuit of political objectives is often revealed to be much more 
personal than national power distributions. I t  can, for instance, result from 
particular traditional and economic constraints as was the case in Teso, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Hermeneutics, however, can also permit us to understand how, in the 
process of communication, horizons may indeed fuse, or at least approach 
each other, as will be the subject of Chapter 8 which explores the mediation 
efforts which brought the fighting in Teso to a halt.
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To what extent has the Teso mediation led to a re-membering of the 
community? Do the people of Teso still define themselves in antagonism to 
the Museveni government? With reference to a war memorial as well as a 
newly invented tradition of monarchy, Chapter 9 will discuss ways of 
recalling the past and casting oneself forward into the future shall be 
illustrated and the process of reconciliation assessed.
Hermeneutics as a train of thought has not been without criticism. As 
already noted in the earlier discussion of Habermas' discourse ethics, 
hermeneutics lacks the potential to be an emancipatory project. In the 
conclusion I will therefore take up the discussion of power in mediation and 
suggest that the process of fusing horizons requires a creative element in 
order not to perpetuate the domination of the stronger party. Only through 
a poetic process of redefining ways to relate to the Other is dissent possible.
Hermeneutics is not the new truth of discourse analysis in general 
and peace and conflict studies in particular. Rather, it is a way of looking at 
the world with all its problems and conflicts, which goes beyond positivist 
analysis. To return to Vasquez, it does not invent peace, yet it might open 
up new possibilities to understand its invention and by implication increase 
the range of responses we are able to imagine.
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chapter iv
Lo c a l  A p p r o a c h e s
t o
Co n f l ic t  A n a l y s is
In his publication Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures o f War, 
Michael Shapiro argues that traditionally the focus of war and security 
studies is on policing, defending and transgressing of boundaries. He argues 
that this traditional methodology prevents the disclosure of ontological 
aspects which facilitate the outbreak of violence.1 Shapiro suggests an 
alternative approach which looks at the practices and discourses through 
which boundaries have been established, that is how space and identity 
have materialised performatively and how the relation between Self and 
Other has been defined historically.2 This emphasis, Shapiro proposes, 
requires a people centred rather than a strategic approach to violent 
conflict.
In recognition of the importance of anthropos, that is human beings, 
the present study tries to give a voice to the people, regardless of their 
political and social position.3 Through applying Participatory Action 
Research, as shall be discussed in the following, the thesis seeks to pay 
attention to "local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges 
against the claims of a unitary body".4 As such it seeks to pay respect to the 
'objects of research' whose stories and lives form the core of the case 
study. The focus on the local shall however not be to the exclusion of
1 Michael J. Shapiro (1997): Violent Cartographies. Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, p. ix.
2 Shapiro (1997): 31.
3 Anthropology, nevertheless, is also a highly contested concept and discipline. From a 
hermeneutic perspective one has to ask how we interpret other people, and what aspects of 
ourselves we bring in. Can the anthropologist's work ever be more then a personal 
confession? as asked by Levi-Strauss and paraphrased by V.Y. Mudimbe (1991): Parables 
and Fables. Exegesis, Textuality, and the Political in Central Africa. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, p. xv.
4 Michel Foucault (1994a): Two Lectures, in: Kelly, Michael (ed.): Critique and Power. 
Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, p. 22.
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regional, or even global, aspects but rather acknowledge their interaction, 
or the lack thereof.
One form of analysis which seeks to sketch the ontology of societies 
is discourse analysis in the form of text analysis. In this chapter I shall 
critically discuss its potential, show its limitations and suggest a 
participatory approach as an alternative way of understanding what 
constitutes a society.
Discourse Analysis
Inside and outside of International Relations literature discourse 
analysis has risen to significant popularity. Discourses, it has been 
recognised, are invested with meaning and form the locus for the 
production and reproduction of individual or collective identities. Deeply 
imbedded in the concept of hermeneutics, discourse analysis has taken 
more recent departures towards post-Marxism (Ernesto Laclau/Chantal 
Mouffe), deconstruction (Jacques Derrida) or universalism (Jurgen 
Habermas).5
While many analysts have a wide conception of what constitutes a 
discourse others have limited their research to pure text analysis. The 
writings of David Howarth, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe include wider 
social practices whereas the textual approaches taken by Michael Shapiro 
for instance focus mainly on their semiotic expressions.6 In the following I 
shall briefly criticise the limits of discourse analysis when focusing on text 
only (textuality), in order to then introduce an alternative methodology in 
the following section.
5 For an introduction into discourse analysis see David Howarth (2000): Discourse. 
Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open University Press.
6 Michael Shapiro (1989a): Textualising Global Politics, in: Der Derian, James/Shapiro, 
Michael (eds.): International/Intertextual Relations. New York: Lexington Books, 11-22.
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Text Analysis
The aim of text analysis is to map the constitution of a community, or 
international relations, at a particular point in time. According to Michael 
Shapiro
[t]o  regard the world o f'in ternational relations' as a tex t ... is to inquire 
into the style of scripting, to reveal the way is has been mediated by 
historically specific scripts governing the interpretations through which it 
has em erged.7
Shapiro makes reference to the writings of the French philosopher 
Roland Barthes which has had a significant influence on IR scholars 
advocating textuality.8 Barthes' text analysis shifts the focus from trying to 
identify the essence of the writing to the rhetorical and textual practices 
that invest individuals, acts and institutions.9 Based on semiotics, Barthes 
seeks to isolate signs and codes of signification as expressed in the text, 
and to interrogate what questions are raised, answered or avoided. In doing 
so, he tries to identify where the meaning of the text is opened or closed, 
what images are deployed to produce a particular understanding and how 
the text is situated in a wider network of other texts.10
As a consequence, in Barthes' textual approach, the author is of no 
significance to the text -  she/he is dead. The meaning of the text is not 
produced by whoever wrote the words but rather by the reader. Since it is 
language that performs rather then the author, the reader is the true owner 
of the tex t.11 The meaning of the text is liberated from the domination of 
the author in particular and higher powers in general, and becomes 
dependent on the reader. "[T]he death of the author makes way for the 
birth of the reader".12 The reader can thus, uncontrolled by the author, 
produce different and alternative interpretations of a text.
7 Shapiro (1989a): 11-2.
8 Alfred J. Fortin (1989): Notes on a Terrorist Text: A Critical Use of Roland Barthes Textual 
Analysis in the Interpretation of Political Meaning, in: Der Derian, James/Shapiro, Michael J. 
(eds.): International/Intertextual Relations. New York: Lexington Books, 189-206.
9 Fortin (1989): 190.
10 Fortin (1989): 191.
11 James Risser (1991): Reading the Text, in: Silverman, Hugh J. (ed.): Gadamer and 
Hermeneutics. New York/London: Routledge, p. 95.
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Based on Barthes' strategy of showing what images are produced in a 
text and how they invest individuals and communities, Cornelia Hie analyses 
a collection of speeches given by the former Romanian dictator Nicolae 
Ceausescu from 1960-80.13 Ilie deploys a strictly semantic analysis in order 
to account for the "ideologically based and deliberate linguistic distortion 
underlying the rhetoric of [a] totalitarian discourse."14 In his speeches, she 
argues, Ceausescu sought to deconstruct and reconstruct reality through 
the systemic distortion of linguistic structures with the aim of imposing a 
particular perspective from which events were assumed to be perceived.15 
Amongst Ceausescu's tools were the "agentless use of verbs", as well as the 
"agent like treatment of typically inanimate participant roles".16
Ilie links the constitution of individual and collective identities to the 
understanding of a text or speech. She argues that Ceausescu's rhetoric 
"promotes a distorted image of reality" which gradually shapes the recipient 
society according to this image. The discourse analysis of Ceausescu's 
speeches reveals, according to Ilie, how in Romania party discipline and 
dictatorial control became more coercive, fear-triggering and all- 
pervasive.17 She argues that the analysis of particular texts, here 
Ceausescu's speeches, allows for ontological insights into the constitution of 
a community. With the aid of text analysis Ilie attempts to break into the 
political ideology of the Romanian dictator and to illustrate its effect on the 
Romanian people. Ilie's analysis seeks to provide an example of how the 
liberation from the authority of the author allows for alternative insights into 
the ontological politics that work inside of a text. The ontological importance 
of a text for the constitution of a community is best illustrated by the 
impact of Hitler's Mein Kampf, a 'little  red book' called Quotations from  
Chairman Mao, or even the Bible. Here, texts were highly significant for the 
production and re-production of collective identities, perceptions and truths.
12 Risser (1991): 97.
13 Cornelia Ilie (1998): "The Ideological Remapping of Semantic Roles in Totalitarian 
Discourses, or, How to Paint a White Rose Red." Discourse & Society 9 (1 ): 57-80.
14 Ilie (1998): 58.
15 Ilie (1998): 76.
16 Ilie (1998): 76.
17 Ilie (1998): 63-4.
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However, does the impact of a text only depend on its language and 
content? Or does the interpretation of a text depend on its readership, too?
To answer this question I would like to return to Gadamer's notion of 
horizons. In Barthes' argument, the death of the author empowers the 
reader (or researcher) to analyse a text without considering the horizon of 
its author in order to understand how the text invests individuals or 
communities. This presupposes that individuals and communities have a 
horizon which can potentially be transformed. In the Romanian example, 
the recipients of the text, the people of Romania, changed their horizon in 
the process of understanding Ceausescu. They questioned their prejudices 
and prejudgements and ultimately fused their horizons with that of the 
speech. This fusion of horizons relies heavily on the particular effective 
history which has shaped the horizon of the people from Romania.
Understanding is only possible from a particular spatio-historical position; 
the interpretation of a text is closely tied to the situatedness of the reader. 
To repeat Caputo's words, "[w ]e understand as we do because we exist as 
we do"18 In the process of understanding, not only the semantic
construction of a text is of importance, the historical construction of the 
recipients is, too.
I f  the horizon of the reader is significant for the ontological impact of 
a text, if the transformation of a community is dependent on its particular 
spatio-temporal situatedness from which it derives its Vor-urteile 
(prejudgements and prejudices), how is an external analyst like Ilie able to 
evaluate the way a text impacts on the identity of the people of Romania? 
She, herself, is situated in a different effective history which gives way to 
different Vor-urteile as starting points from which she interprets the text, 
leading to a different understanding. Consequently, when trying to identify 
the ontological impact of a text an outside observer, who is situated in a
different historical context, is unable to map the way the addressed
readership is constituted.
In short, discourse analysis based on texts is conducted with the 
intention of identifying the elements that have an impact on the ontology of
18 Caputo (1987): 61.
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the community to which the text is directed. I t  asks: "How does the text 
shape perceptions and realities?" Posing these questions presupposes that 
the community, in reading the text, engages in a process of transformation 
which changes its prevailing identity. Thus, it is accepted that the 
community has a particular horizon which is affected when understanding a 
text. Yet, what is not considered in many cases is that the analyst who 
investigates the impact of a text on the prevailing identity is also 
conditioned by her/his effective history which has a strong impact on the 
way she/he approaches and analysis a text. Due to different circumstances, 
epochs, or cultures our own reading is restricted by who we are and how we 
have come to understand ourselves, and cannot simply be transferred to 
other cultures.
To briefly illustrate my argument with reference to a widespread text, 
the Bible, the way people in Britain interpret the testaments, and practice 
Christianity, is very different to, say, Uganda; notions of what constitutes 
the Self and how we relate to God differ significantly. For many people in 
Britain, believing is an additive to the day-to-day life, it is removed from the 
realm of necessity and is thus 'pure'. As modern beings, people are able to 
care for their own needs so that to pray fo r something is inappropriate. In 
Uganda, on the other hand, in a context where half of the population have 
less then 1 USD/per day, and where poverty and hunger prevail, to ask God 
for the bare necessities of life is essential. Here, God is seen as the provider 
of, for example, food, whereas in Britain supermarket chains supply the 
meals. In the event of a British analyst interpreting a religious Ugandan 
text, or a Ugandan analyst a religious British text, difficulties may arise as 
to how to understand particular concepts, and more importantly, their 
ontological impact.
Another anecdote to illustrate the different analysis of a text, or in 
this case a film, is a conversation I had with an Iteso friend. We were 
talking about the film house in Soroti town, a room with a video projector, 
which shows a small selection of Kung-Fu films, but also occasionally the 
American blockbuster Titanic. My friend had seen the film so I asked him 
whether he liked it. I expected him to launch into a critique of Hollywood 
movies, an interpretation likely to be the subject of discussion in my place
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of residence in London. Yet he looked at me for a while and said in a very 
affectionate voice: "Please let me assure you that my people here really feel 
for you people there." Knowing that the basic narrative of the Titanic 
sinking and people dying was true my friend took up his responsibility to 
express his condolences to me. To him, the film was a documentation of a 
true event which cost many British people their lives -  as it indeed did. He 
interpreted it according to his knowledge and experience, and responded in 
a way appropriate to his very polite and formal culture. Was he to conduct a 
discourse analysis based on the film Titanic his insights into British culture 
would have probably suggested that in the UK a high degree of trauma 
amongst the survivors of the Titanic accident prevails which lead them to 
narrating their story in public. As for the viewers in the UK, I am doubtful 
whether many British filmgoers contemplated the fate of their compatriots 
who died in the cold depth of the Atlantic Ocean.
In the context of the present study, to focus on textuality only, and 
to analyse newspaper-articles, reports, statements etc., would have led to 
very different results. For instance, the insurgency army in Teso, the 
Uganda Peoples Army (UPA), released a number of communiques which 
potentially lend themselves to an exercise of textual analysis -  a futile 
endeavour considering that they had almost no impact on the ground. Texts 
might have the potential to inform social life in a highly industrialised 
society where the media and other means of communication are very 
powerful, yet outside of this geographically limited sphere their ontological 
impact can be contested. In Teso, the sparse distribution of political 
manifestos and the high degree of illiteracy hindered their wider reception 
as much as the fact that many people did not join the rebels for political 
reasons anyway. The ontology of the insurgents, and of the people of Teso 
as their supporters, had little to do with printed paper. For myself, a 
German student, to analyse the Uganda Peoples Army and Uganda Peoples 
Front's (UPA/F) political manifesto would have misrepresented the 
situation.19 When analysing the identity constituting impact of a script, a
19 Amongst them are for example UPF/UPA (1988a): Random Thought and Notes Towards 
Analysis of ’Lt. Gen.' Yoweri Museveni's Dynasty. Kampala: UPA/F Headquarters; UPF/UPA 
(1988b): The Face Behind Museveni's Pretensions to Belief in the Rule of Law and Human
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non-indigenous analyst runs the risk of applying her/his own notions of 
what concepts have a performative capacity, and how.
So does this leave us with the impossibility of analysing culturally 
different discourses? The view suggested in the present study is that in 
order to be able to understand issues as culturally determined as the 
interpretation of meaning or the formation of identity the mere reading of a 
text is insufficient. In the following I shall discuss a research methodology, 
again based on a hermeneutic framework, which meditates Self and Other 
and hence allows for a better understanding.
Participatory Action Research
Participatory Action Research (PAR) was first developed in the 1960s 
and 1970 in the wake of liberation theology,20 and it soon became 
increasingly popular amongst academics and practitioners alike. Especially 
in development or organisational studies PAR is becoming more and more 
prominent as a helpful evaluation methodology. The amount of literature, 
networks and working-groups on the worldwide web is vast, development 
institutes organise courses and NGOs employ specialists to assist their 
programme design.
The aim of PAR, as loosely used in this thesis, is to understand 
conflict in its social, political and institutional context. I t  is an interactive 
and participatory process that facilitates the understanding of an 
environment different from one's own. Through active participation in the 
research environment the analyst, seeking to interpret the unfamiliar, 
evaluates, and possibly alters, concepts and conceptions deriving out of 
her/his own tradition. PAR is thus a methodology which seeks to bridge the
Rights. Kampala: UPF/A Headquarters; UPF/UPA (1989): Lt. Gen. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni's 
Terror and Genocide in Uganda Grinds on Unabated: Children and Women Incinerated in 
Metal Wagons in Kumi. Kampala: UPF/A Headquarters; UPF/UPA (1990a): Uganda: Myths, 
Prejudices and Realities. Kampala: UPF/A Headquarters; UPF/UPA (1990b): Today's Uganda. 
Re: Sadistic and Gruesome Massacres by Lt. Ge. Museveni's NRM/A. Kampala: UPF/A 
Headquarters; UPF/UPA (1990c): Lt. Gen. Y. K. Museveni (The OAU Current Chairman) 
Invades Rwanda Under the Pseudo-Expression of NRA "Dissenters". Kampala: UPF/A 
Headquarters; UPF/UPA (1991): Uganda: The Hidden Tyranny. Kampala: UPF/A
Headquarters; UPF/UPA (1992): Press Release. Kampala: UPF/A Headquarters.
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gap between different cultural backgrounds through practice. This, of 
course, can only happen to a limited extent.
One project which has applied PAR to post-conflict reconstruction is 
the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development's (UNRISD) 
War-Torn Society Project (WSP). Although I do not want to discuss the 
project in depth it is worth mentioning WSP's emphasis that
[t]h e  subject m atter of the project necessitates th at the prim ary focus of 
its activities be at the field level. I t  is in the w ar-torn  countries 
them selves that new approaches to rebuilding have to be supported, 
from the bottom up, if they are to be sustainable.21
WPS is po licy oriented and thus very different from the present study. 
Nevertheless, PAR provides a valuable framework through which to develop 
new policies.
I t  appears that the epistemological roots of PAR vary with every 
person who applies the concept. A range of influences from Aristotelian 
ethics, critical social science, Deweyian philosophy, feminism, Buddhism to 
popular knowledge have been identified. All approaches nevertheless share 
the same strategy and incentive.22 PAR stands in stark contrast to 'classical' 
anthropological research in which the researcher is an outside observer with 
an assumed capacity to accurately record social interactions within the 
community studied.23 PAR, at least in my use in this thesis, does not seek to 
reveal true insights but rather to create new, shared meaning. I hence want 
to contribute to the colourfulness of underlying methodologies and argue 
that the basic idea of PAR is similar to the notion of hermeneutics. When 
setting out to conduct research for, say, a PhD thesis, the researcher has in 
her/his mind a series of hypotheses and concepts, Gadamer's Vorurteile, 
which she/he attempts to verify or falsify. Naturally, these concepts derive 
form the researcher's cultural horizon, they are determined by her/his
WSP (n.d.): Eritrea. War Torn Societies web site/UNRISD:
< www.unrisd.org.wsp.erit/erit.htm>, 20.05.2000.
21 WSP (n.d.): Objectives, Approaches and Intended Outcomes. War Torn Societies web 
site/UNRISD: < www.unrisd.org/wap/exec.htm>, 20.05.2000.
22 Robin McTaggart (1997): Reading the Collection, in: McTaggart, Robin (ed.): Participatory 
Action Research. International Context and Consequences. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, p. 8.
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particular spatio-temporal background. For a project which seeks to 
understand why people fight, or stop fighting, such as the present, the 
researcher might have a iist of topics like 'the availability of fire-arms', 'the 
level of education in a society', 'the economic interests of elites' and many 
others. Yet, once the researcher has arrived at the destination, a 
participatory approach suggests, the concepts can be compared against the 
horizon of the people concerned. Researchers are encouraged to visit 
places, to spend time with the people, and to get local 'street-wisdom'. 
Practical ways and attitudes to go about might include:24
• listening and learning rather then lecturing and imposing;
• relaxing and not rushing;
• 'handing over the stick';
• embracing error and falling forwards;
• being transparent;
• asking them;
• unlearning.
On a personal note from my experience in Teso, the most rewarding 
places to conduct research were the local pub, market stalls and 
celebrations, that is areas and occasions where one does not go with 
notepad and pen, but with local friends. While staying in Teso, considering 
the different cultural and geographic environment, I was indeed dependent 
on local people to teach me various things like how to show respect to a 
leader, what to say how and when, or how to ride on the back of a bicycle 
taxi. Oblique as it may sound, it nevertheless facilitated some 'insight into 
the Other's horizon'. As a female, and in the context a relatively young 
person, people in Teso, I felt, did not feel patronised by me as an 'outside 
researcher', but rather they were constantly concerned about my health, 
entertainment and work. 'Handing over the stick', allowing people I met to
23 WSP (n.d.): Eritrea.
24 Tim Holmes (2001): A Participatory Approach in Practice: Understanding Fieldworkers' Use 
of Participatory Rural Appraisal in ActionAid the Gambia. Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies report, p. 10.
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look after me, was not only personally very rewarding, but also led to 
changes in both my attitude and my research agenda.
To return to a more abstract level, in the encounter the researcher 
learns to understand better how communities different from her/his own 
operate. Their own horizon is evaluated in the light of the Other's, concepts 
are reconsidered, confirmed, amended or discarded, and by consequence 
the initial research agenda modified. In what Gadamer calls 'a fusion of 
horizons' neither the researcher nor the people who she/he encounters 
remain who they were. Rather, the experience of the unfamiliar enriches 
the respective horizons and thus identities. Participatory Action Research is 
thus a dynamic, ontological process of defining and redefining researcher 
and research agenda.
Jay Rothman takes a similar approach with what he calls 'reflexivity'. 
Reflexivity acknowledges the lim it of one's understanding by one's own 
spatio-temporal situatedness, and it suggests that "interactions and 
relations with others can also importantly influence and even shape 
oneself."25 This requires an awareness of one's own interactions, as I have 
done to a very limited extent with some personal narratives above. 
Rothman applies his approach to both the 'outside observer' as well as to 
parties in a conflict-resolving workshop, which leads him to develop his so 
called ARIA Conflict Management Framework based on Adversarial, 
Reflexive and Integrative stages.26
Reflexivity can be conceptualised as understanding every statement 
by the other as an answer to a question. This then leads to reflecting back 
on one's own position which poses this question, and to a reflexive self- 
evaluation in light of the other's horizon. In Gadamer's words:
[A] person who wants to understand must question w hat lies behind 
w hat is said. He [or she] must understand it as an answer to a question.
I f  we go back behind  w hat is said, then we inevitably ask questions 
beyond  w hat is said. We understand the sense of the te x t only by 
acquiring the horizon of the question -  a horizon that, as such, includes
25 Rothman (1992): 59; see also Jay Rothman (1997): "Action Evaluation and Conflict 
Resolution: Theory and Practice." Mediation Quarterly 15(2): 119-31.
25 Rothman (1992): 65.
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other possible answers. Thus the meaning of a sentence is relative to 
the question to which it is a reply, but th a t implies th a t its meaning 
necessarily exceeds w hat is said in it.27
Again, as argued above, how we understand always already includes 
our own interpretation which relates back to our own understanding of the 
issue at stake and which supports and extends the statement of the other. 
The reflective relationship between question and answer therefore 
simultaneously evaluates our own as well as the Other's prejudices and 
prejudgements.
Another approach similar to Participatory Action Research, and based 
on hermeneutics, has been suggested by Joseph Rychlak in what he calls a 
'Hermeneutic-Dialectic Method of Inquiry'.28 His methodology is guided by 
the question of "how to allow human beings under observation the freedom 
to express their true and spontaneous behavioural inclinations, as opposed 
to what is viewed as the natural-science strategy of forcing data into 
preconceived models which 'f it ' in the laboratory but distort or otherwise 
trivialize ... criticism."29 Rychlak denounces traditional ways of theorising 
based on procedural evidence, derived from a coherence theory of drawing 
on internal consistency and plausibility, and validating evidence through 
empirical tests based on a succession of events fitting into a pre-established 
hypothesis. Because the research collector always brings herself/himself 
into the data collection, Rychlak argues, what she/he ends up with is 
framed by the theoretical preconceptions she/he harbours. Yet a lot of 'the 
world out there' does not fall inside these categories. He therefore suggests 
not attempting to locate some kind of validity and truth, and promotes 
hermeneutics as a backdrop for an alternative research design which 
recognises human beings as meaning-creating agents and allows for a 
productive interaction between researcher and researched.
27 Gadamer (1993a): 370. (translation cited in Hans Herbert Koehler (1999): The Power of 
Dialogue. Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press, p. 122-2.)
28 Joseph Rychlak (1996): "An Enquiry into the Hermeneutic-Dialectic Method of Inquiry." 
Journal of Social Distress and Homelessness 5 (3): 305-17.
29 Rychlak (1996): 306.
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To sum up, in contrast to textuality drawing on personal experiences 
through PAR allows for the dynamic process of evaluating, and maybe 
changing, concepts and conceptions about violent conflicts. Since conflicts 
are very particular to where they occur it is paramount to find the solutions 
for reconciliation amongst the former combatants, and not in an abstract 
handbook. This can only be achieved if the affected people themselves 
dictate the analysis, and this is only possible in their presence. A text has 
little to say about who fights and why, and it might obstruct important 
insights as to how to bring about peace in war-torn societies.
New Methodologies?
Nevertheless, it is worth considering Clifford Geertz' appeal for 
caution when he writes that
to turn from trying to explain social phenomena and weaving them  into 
grand textures of cause and effect to trying to explain them  by placing 
them  in local frames of awareness is to exchange a set of well-charted  
difficulties for a set of largely uncharted ones.30
I t  is not my intention in this present study to develop answers to 
newly arising difficulties of research methodologies but rather to given an 
account of how social phenomena have been constructed over space and 
time, and what implications this has for the future. The lack of a more 
traditional research framework might lead to questioning the work, to 
acknowledging doubts about underlying assumptions, to feelings of guilt 
and embarrassment, as well as to an uncertainty of what to do next,31 Yet 
at the same time the moment of doubt opens up the opportunity to be 
creative and inventive.
30 Clifford Geertz (1993): Local Knowledge. Glasgow: Harper Collins, p. 6.
31 Patricia Spittal et. al. (1997): "We are Dying. I t  is Finished.” Linking and Ethnographic 
Research Design to an HIV/AIDS Participatory Approach in Uganda, in: Smith, Susan 
E./Willms, Dennis/Johnson, Nancy (eds.): Nurtured by Knowledge. Learning to do 
Participatory Action Research. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, p. 86.
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chapter v
S t o r y  o f  U g a n d a
Wirkungsgeschichte, the effects of history on us, are central to this 
part of the thesis. While the main focus shall be on the immediate historical 
surroundings of the insurgency in Teso from 1987 to 1992, this chapter 
seeks to situate the occurrence of the insurgency in a wider, national 
context.1 The Ugandan polity, like any other community, has been shaped 
over time, it has developed alliances and cleavages amongst its people, it 
has developed party structures and its own political culture.
The chapter is split into two parts. While the first part seeks to 
provide a 'history of origin' for the Iteso, the second focuses on the national 
history. Against the backdrop of British colonial rule it outlines the 
developments in Uganda from Teso's perspective. The people of Teso have 
never played a major role in national politics, although they benefited from 
some governments more than from others, so that their existence has been 
largely ignored by historians. Nevertheless, despite the gap in the literature, 
a few observations can be made in relation to general trends in the country 
which had repercussions for Teso.
The Iteso
1 One of the central arguments of the present thesis is that history is always selective and 
narrated with view to a particular aim. Within this wider argument a chapter on the 'Story of 
Uganda' can at best be ironic. At the outset I would therefore like to confess my personal 
motivations in selecting the particular accounts of history that fill these pages. Firstly, they 
serve the purpose of introducing a number of people and events which will be repeated in 
later chapters. Secondly, it establishes 'truths' about the antagonism between the Iteso and 
Kumam and the Museveni government, which have developed over time. These particular 
'truths' will again be of significance for later arguments. And thirdly, it attributes a 
considerable number of the causes for conflict and violence in Uganda to white colonial rule 
which renders the people of Uganda somewhat innocent -  and makes writing for a white 
researcher like myself slightly easier. The accounts on the history I have selected are thus 
strongly anti-colonial, and mainly situated in Marxist thought. This reflects a general 
tendency amongst contemporary historians writing on Uganda for many are close to, or even 
promoted by, Museveni's (originally left-wing) government. Personally, due to encounters 
and affiliations, I am strongly sympathetic with the anti-colonial/Marxist line of thought and 
prefer it to other, equally biased, accounts. Admittedly, the present chapter is simply one 
account of Uganda's past, but one I happen to prefer.
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The Turkana, the Iteso and Karimojong were living peacefully together 
in northern Kenya. W hether because of the difficulties in finding 
pastures, or because of the severity of the winters, they decided to 
disperse. The Turkana said 'Caves are enough shelter for us, and 
enough protection from our en em ies / Turkana means 'cave'. The  
Karimojong said 'W e will keep moving until we become withered old 
m e n / Am ojong  means 'old', and akikar  means 'th in ', so that 
Ngikarimojong means 'those who have become dried up with age'. The  
Iteso said: 'nor will we close ourselves up in caves until the tom b claims 
us'. Ates means 'tom b', and so they became the Ngiteso, 'those of the  
tom bs'.2
The Turkana, so the story goes, therefore stayed in Kenya, and the 
Karamojong and the Iteso moved into what is now known as Uganda. From 
there, only the Iteso continued the journey westwards until they reached 
what is today called Teso. Their exodus is said to have happened between 
1600 and 1830.3
The story of origin of the people of Teso might sound romantic, yet it 
has great significance for the Iteso today. Although the people of Teso have 
never been important national political players, there always has been a 
degree of regional turmoil with their Karamojong neighbours. And yet, as 
transpiring in the above narrative, the Iteso and the Karamojong are blood 
relatives. "The Karamojong", so the Iteso say, "are our uncles". Since the 
'Karamoja problem' had a serious impact on the beginning and development 
of the insurgency, it will be described in greater detail in the following 
section.
Teso today is comprised of three districts: Soroti, Kumi and Katakwi. 
Katakwi was only secluded recently, it formerly belonged to Soroti district. 
Two different ethnic groups inhabit the region of Teso: the Iteso derive from 
the Karimojong, the Kumam are of Luo decent. They share many cultural 
traits, yet their languages differ and so does their self-conception. Although 
the two people have been living in the same region for generations they still 
maintain their individuality and distinction. Conflicts between the ethnic 
groups occur sporadically, however they are hardly ever violent in scope.
2 Augosto Pazzaglia (1982): The Karimojong: Some Aspects. Bologna: EMI, p. 35.
3 Jan Jelmert Jorgensen (1981): Uganda. A Modern History. London: Croon Helm, p. 102.
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Only during the insurgency did the differences lead to mutual persecution, 
and cut a rift through the society that has not yet been reconciled.
The Kumam and Iteso were formerly cattle herding people. However, 
especially due to the introduction of cash crops during the colonial period 
the tradition has gradually changed towards an increase of agriculture. The 
insurgency disrupted this process violently, it left the Iteso and Kumam with 
merely 7% of their cattle. Ever since, Teso has been struggling to find a 
middle-way between agriculture and livestock. Compared to western and 
central Uganda the agricultural and farming conditions of Teso are rather 
harsh. The climate is very hot with little rainfall, and food scarcity after poor 
rainy seasons is not uncommon. The seasonal cattle rustling by the 
neighbouring Karamojong warriors constantly disrupts the local economy, 
standing in the way of growth and prosperity.
The Karamojong
Karamoja is the largest region in Uganda, yet it has the lowest 
population. Situated in the northeast it is comprised of Moroto and Kodito 
district with international boundaries to Sudan and Kenya, and national to 
Kitgum, Lira, Katakwi, Kumi, Mbale and Kapchorwa. The immediate 
neighbouring district to Teso (bordering Kumi and Katakwi) is Moroto. In 
Moroto, about 180,000 people live in a semi-arid area of 14,113 km2; the 
landscape is sparsely decorated with isolated thorny trees and shrubs. 
Annual rainfall is as low as 400-600mm, with an average temperature over 
30°C.4 Rainfall is also highly variable and droughts are cyclical.
The Karamojong people are semi-nomadic cattle herders. During the 
dry season, water and pasture become so scarce that the pastoralists are 
forced to move their animals to more fertile regions like Teso. Throughout 
recorded history the Karamojong have used the grazing area in what is now
4 Mugisha Odrek Rwabwoogo (ed.): Uganda District Handbook. Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, 1997, p. 94.
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referred to as Teso district, yet the conflict has been intensified by colonial 
boundary drawing.5
Contrary to the Iteso and Kumam the Karamojong are pure cattle 
herders, they have hardly any other economic or social base but their 
animals. In Karamoja, therefore, animals mean survival. Water and pasture 
become matters of security, the loss of animals is the loss of life.
The Karamoja region consists of a number of different sub-groups 
that share some cultural traits, however there is no community called the 
'Karamojong'. Karamojong merely refers to all different tribes who reside in 
Karamoja, a territory defined by colonial administration. One of the tribes, 
however, is the Karimojong (with Y  as opposed to 'a '), which consists of the 
Bokora, Mathenico and Pian. Together with the Chekwii and the Upe they 
inhabit the territory of Moroto district.
So far, the Karamojong have escaped attempts of western 
modernisation. Today the resentment amongst many Karamojong towards 
the British colonialists is very strong. The accusations range from merely 
neglecting Karamoja to consciously creating a 'human zoo' where nature, 
including humans, was kept in the most original state. Karamoja has always 
been excluded from the Ugandan polity, it differs in culture and tradition, 
not least due to the lack of western influence, and is treated rather 
sceptically by many Ugandans and non-Ugandans alike. Numerous myths 
about Karamoja distort the perception of, and attitude to, the region.6 
Infrastructure, education, economic and social development lag behind the 
general standards in Uganda. Inside and outside of Uganda, the 
Karamojong are either criminalised or romanticised. For instance, in the 
Ugandan media they are referred to as 'naked savages' and pictures 
showing Karamojong warriors drinking fresh blood from puddles are used to
5 a.a. (1994): Security in Grazing Areas and Villages. Paper presented at the Conference on 
Strategies for Peace and Sustainable Development in Karamoja and Neighbouring Districts, 
18th-22nd July. Kampala: Makerere University.
6 David Pulkol (1994): Karamoja Cattle Rustling - a National Dilemma: Myths and Realities. 
Paper presented at the Conference on Strategies for Peace and Sustainable Development in 
Karamoja and Neighbouring Districts, 18th-22nd July. Kampala: Makerere University.
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document their beastliness and unhumanness.7 The Iteso and Kumam refer 
to the Karamojong as Illoke which translates 'naked people who smell'.8 The 
debates on how to 'civilise' Karamoja are fierce, and opposed by the view 
that the Karamojong should be granted the right to continue living their life 
in their own way.
The only modern object widely available in Karamoja is the firearm. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the Karamojong were subjected to raids by their 
Kenyan neighbours and relatives, the Turkana. At the time, the Turkana 
were already armed, so that in the course of the raids the Karamojong 
obtained their first guns. When Idi Amin was defeated in 1979, his 
retreating soldiers left behind a large gun arsenal in Moroto; about 30,000 
guns were suddenly available in Karamoja.9 In 1985 and 1986 more guns 
were acquired due to the retreat of Obote's troops and the UNLA, so that 
the availability of guns today is estimated at about 80,000.10 Of major 
importance is also the business of international arms trafficking through the 
Horn of Africa which guarantees a permanent proliferation of small arms. 
Yet, not ail tribes who inhabit the area of Karamoja possess firearms.
The source of the 'Karamoja problem' is their warring culture. 
Warriors protect as well as acquire cattle through raiding; the tradition of 
cattle rustling predates colonialism. Today, the districts neighbouring 
Karamoja like Teso are frequently subjected to cattle raiding, which 
occasionally takes violent forms and causes the death of herders.and 
farmers.11 However, it is important to note that raiding is not a feature of all 
tribes, nor of all members of a particular tribe. Only Karamojong warriors 
cattle rustle, and not every Karamojong, as it is widely believed. Raiding is
7 My visit to Teso coincided with the strongest cattle rustling ever since the beginning of the 
insurgency. In spring 2000 the Ugandan media was very instrumental in demonising the 
Karamojong. Almost every day new reports about killings and raids covered the front pages. 
During my trip to Moroto I learned that not only were most stories unfounded, the violence 
that did indeed occur was also started by individual Iteso, and, so the allegations, by the 
UPDF.
8 Joanna de Berry (2000): Life After Loss: An Anthropological Study of Post-war Recovery, 
Teso, Uganda, with Special Reference to Young People (unpublished doctoral thesis). 
Department of Anthropology. London: London School of Economics, p. 75.
9 Interview Michael Griffith, London 12.01.2000.
10 Interview Owmony Owjok, Arapai 20.03.2000.
11 The death-toll of battles amongst different Karamojong group occasionally reaches several 
hundred. Whilst I was in Uganda, allegedly 600 Karamojong perished in one battle.
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not only practised against non-Karamojong ethnic groups, like the Iteso or 
Turkana, but it also occurs amongst the different groups inside of Karamoja. 
What was formerly carried out with spears, bows and arrows, has today 
increased in scope due to the availability of AK-47s. Especially non-armed 
communities, like the Iteso and Kumam, have no possibility to defend 
themselves, let alone to counter-raid to return their animals.12
And yet, despite the constant fear of their neighbours the Iteso 
always emphasis that the Karamojong are their uncles. As a consequence, 
every time the dry season forces the Karamojong pastoralists to move into 
Teso's grazing areas the Iteso welcome them and share their grounds. 
Although most people on the boarder between Karamoja and Teso would 
probably prefer not to have to host their seasonal guests they nevertheless 
forge friendship with their 'uncles' and 'aunties'. Young men in particular 
develop friendships.13
Colonialism
Karamoja is not the only district of Uganda to have inherited the 
legacy of colonialism. The history of Uganda, like all formerly colonised 
nations, has been strongly affected by foreign rule. The following section 
shall first given an account of the impact of British colonial rule on Teso and 
then on Uganda as a whole.
Colonialism in Teso
After five years of negotiation between the Iteso and the missionary 
enterprise Teso district was created in 1912. According to Joan Vincent, the 
mission of Christianity was instrumental in providing the ideology of 
capitalism in Teso. The establishment of colonial rule saw the introduction of 
taxes, the growth of an ethnically heterogeneous and racially administered 
population; the creation of hierarchies of civil service chiefs (partly based in
12 Due to a number of violent incidences in spring 2000 the Ugandan government gave way 
to the demands of the people form Teso, Lango, and Acholi to provide arms for Local 
Defence Units so the farmers could defend themselves against the rustling.
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the structure of indigenous leadership and Baganda overrule as we shall see 
in the following); mission education; as well as the growth of a small middle 
sector education.14
Education, through church missions, gained major significance in 
Teso. To this very day the Iteso pride themselves on their training and 
education, which has become an important part of the regional identity.15 
During and after colonialism, many Iteso gained access to influential 
administrative positions. In addition, in relation to the vastly illiterate 
Karamojong, the Iteso make constant reference to their own status and 
their superiority over their neighbours.16
Today, the people of Teso think back to the colonial period as 'the 
golden age', and it is against this backdrop that the present lack of 
development in measured.17 The wealth accumulated in Teso during 
colonialism was mainly due to the introduction of cash crops, most notably 
cotton. The introduction of cotton production through the colonial rulers into 
the peasant society of Teso led to the development of a labour market in 
which 20% of Teso men were employed.18 As we shall see, this radical shift 
from ancestral farming to labour had significant implications for the 
historical and political development of Uganda.
Colonialism in Uganda
British colonialism in Uganda began with the Anglo-German 
Agreement of 1890 which brought Uganda under the sphere of British 
influence. The administration of the country was first given to the Imperial 
British East African Company. In 1893, Britain took full control of the 
country's administration and turned it into a provisional 'protectorate'.19 One 
year later, Uganda was formerly declared a British Protectorate.
13 de Berry (2000). Interviews with Peter Otim and Alfred Aruo.
14 Joan Vincent (1982): Teso in Transformation. Berkley: University of California Press, p. 
10.
15 de Berry (2000): 75.
16 de Berry (2000): 80.
17 de Berry (2000): 79.
18 Vincent (1982): 10.
19 Mahmood Mamdani (1983): Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda. London: Heineman, p. 6.
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The colonial period in Uganda lasted for 68 years. In 1962, the British 
Parliament approved a constitution that handed over state power to elite 
groups "best trusted to serve the British Interest".20 On the 9th of October 
1962, Uganda gained independence. During the 68 year of colonial rule, the 
political landscape of Uganda had changed dramatically; the cleavages 
produced through British colonial administration still have repercussions 
today.
Jan Jorgensen has identified three areas on which the British 
administration had a lasting impact and which are of relevance for the 
present study:21
1. the political tension between the encapsulated kingdom of Buganda 
and the colonial state of the Uganda Protectorate.
2. the economic and political tension between regions with de ju re  or 
de facto systems of private ownership and land (Buganda, Sebei, 
south Busoga, and parts of Kigezi, Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro) and 
the rest of the country where, apart from official estates granted to 
chiefs, African cultivators were technically tenants on Crown 
(Public) Land.
3. the economic tension between the export-commodity producing 
areas of southern and central Uganda and the labour-exporting 
regions of the north, northwest and southwest.
In the fol lowing I shall address each of these points separately.
Political Tensions due to Power Asymmetries between Different Regions in 
Uganda
The political tensions between different regions in Uganda are the 
result of a policy of inequality practised under colonial rule which supported 
the kingdom of Buganda at the expense of the rest of the country. This
20 Winfred K. Byanyima (1992): How Guerrillas Became Peace Builders. Boulding, Elise (ed.): 
New Agendas for Peace Research. Conflict and Security Reexamined. London/Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, p. 131.
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established a power asymmetry which still affects the political landscape. 
The privileging of Buganda was a result of the British policy of indirect rule. 
According to Terence Ranger
[c]olonial governm ents in Africa did not wish to rule by a constant 
exercise of m ilitary force and they needed a w ider range of collaborators 
than those Africans who were brought into the neo-traditions of 
subordination. In  particular, they needed to collaborate with chiefs, 
headm en and elders in the rural areas.22
The attempt to avoid military force was however not an altruistic 
decision. Rather it had proved impossible to control the large populations of 
people in colonised states. In Uganda, the first six years of British 
involvement led to three civil wars, which had a devastating impact on 
export and trade.23 The British realised that colonialism was impossible 
without the mediation of rules and laws through classes physically located in 
the colonies. They hence established a system of'ind irect rule' in which part 
of the colonised people are involved is governing the country.24
The people of Buganda, the area around the capital Kampala, became 
the main vehicles for indirect rule; it was here where Uganda's 
administrative system was first introduced.25 In 1900 the (B)Uganda 
Agreement was signed between the British administrators and the chiefs of 
Buganda, who were then already literate Christians and allegedly in full 
understanding of the terms of the treaty.26 The agreement consisted of 
three parts: the fixing of Buganda's boundaries; the establishment of 
indirect rule through the Baganda king Kabaka,27 as well as land settlement. 
Buganda became an independent province under the British Protectorate, 
equal in status to the other provinces. In return, the Kabaka, his chiefs and 
his people had to co-operate with the Protectorate governments.28 Hence, 
the Kabaka, and this was an exception in British colonialism, remained the
21 Jorgensen (1981): 176.
22 Ranger (2000): 229.
23 Mahmood Mamdani (1976): Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. London: Heinemann, 
p. 41.
24 Mamdani (1976): 41.
25 Buganda is the name of the region, Baganda of the people and Luganda of the language.
26 M. Louise Pirout (1995): Historical Dictionary of Uganda. London: The Scarecrow Press, p. 
96.
27 Kabaka is the word for king in Luganda.
28 Pirout (1995): 97.
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leader of his people. The most radical deviation from British colonial practise 
was however the land settlement which allocated almost half of the land of 
Buganda to the Kabaka and his chiefs.29
In response to obtaining land, the predominately protestant Baganda 
chiefs were loyal to the colonial rulers. Over the years, the so called 
'Buganda system of administration' was extended to other regions of the 
country, and land guarantees and chief appointments of Baganda chiefs 
started reaching beyond the border of Buganda.30 Teso became the home of 
a number of Baganda whose interest was mainly in commerce and who, 
unlike the Iteso, were permitted to acquire land. The colonial administration 
benefited from the cultural proximity of the Baganda to the Iteso which 
turned them into "intermediaries or brokers for the 'civilising mission' of 
European Christianity and administration"31 - indirect rule was successfully 
established. However, due to increasing disagreement and resentment 
between Iteso and Baganda, the colonial rulers were forced to withdraw the 
Baganda later.
Why did the Baganda receive special treatment from the British 
administration? The, albeit very limited, respect for the Baganda is apparent 
in the following quote:
I f  there is any country form atting part in the Uganda Protectorate which 
could do us any real harm it is Uganda itself -  the kingdom of Uganda 
[i.e . Buganda]. Here we have something like a million fairly intelligent, 
slightly civilised negroes of warlike tendency, and possessing about 
10 ,000  to 12 ,000  guns. These are the only people for a long tim e to 
come who can deal a serious blow to British rule in this direction.32
I t  has been suggested that the pride of their own monarchy led 
colonial anthropologists to classify African societies into centralised 
(monarchical) and stateless societies.33 The monarchical societies resembled 
'civilised' European states with a higher degree of cultural development.
29 Pirout (1995): 98; Apolo Nsibambi (1989): The Land Question and Conflict. Rupesinghe, 
Kumar (ed.): Conflict Resolution in Uganda. London: James Curry, p. 233.
30 Mamdani (1983): 9.
31 Vincent (1982): 145.
32 Memorandum by Johnston, No. 13, East African Confidential, London, March 2, 1903, 
quoted in Mamdani (1976): 42.
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Other societies were still considered savage. In the case of Uganda, the 
kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole, all based in southwest 
and central Uganda, were thus considered more civilised than the north and 
the northeast.
I t  has been argued that the British administrators were furthermore 
concerned that at least some Africans should become members of the 
governing class of colonial Africa. They established institutions like King's 
College, Budo, in Buganda.34 The education of a political and cultural elite 
was valued highly, as apparent in the following quote:
We felt strongly that if the ruling class in the country were to exercise in 
the days to come an influence for good upon their people and to have a 
sense of responsibility towards them , it was essential th a t something  
should be done for the education of these neglected children, on the  
soundest possible line ... by the disciplines of work and games in 
boarding school so as to build character as to enable Baganda to take  
their proper place in the adm inistrative, commercial and industrial life of 
their own country.35
The king of Buganda, Kabaka Mutesa, was inaugurated while still at 
school at King's College, Budo, where he stayed until he finished his studies. 
In addition to his formal education through the British administration the 
Kabaka also joined the Cambridge Officer's Corps, and was later, thanks to 
the suggestion of King George VI, promoted to the rank of a captain, which 
was a very rare exception for an African.36
The role of kingship in Buganda was thus adapted to the British idea 
of the Crown. As a culture which honoured and respected royalty "British 
administrators set about inventing African traditions for Africans", they 
started codifying and promulgating traditions they considered valuable, 
thereby transforming flexible customs into hard prescriptions.37 As for 
Uganda, it promoted the kingdom of Buganda and turned it into the centre 
of political power for the whole of the country. Whilst the Baganda enjoyed
33 As stated by Apolo Nsibambi (1995): The Restoration of Traditional Rulers. Hansen, Holger 
Berndt/Twaddle, Michael (eds.): From Chaos to Order. The Politics of Constitution Making in 
Uganda. Kampala/London: Fountain/James Curry, p. 43.
34 Ranger (2000): 221.
35 G. P. McGreagor (1967): King's College, Budo: The First Sixty Years. London; quoted in 
Ranger (2000): 221.
36 Ranger (2000): 225.
37 Ranger (2000): 212.
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privileges laid out in the Uganda Agreement of 1900, the rest of the country 
was governed under the Native Authority Audience of 1919.38 This 
imbalance of power between Buganda and the other kingdoms, on one 
hand, and the rest of Uganda on the other, remains the locus for tensions 
until today. It  introduced major cleavages into the polity.
The Economic and Political Tension due to the Distribution o f Land and the 
Means o f Production in Different Regions o f Uganda
The Buganda Agreement of 1900 created a class of Baganda notables 
and powerful landlords which resulted in an increasing class division 
amongst Ugandans. In an agricultural economy like Uganda the ownership 
of land is the most important means of production. Due to the 
commercialisation of agriculture and the inclusion of Uganda into the world 
economy a capitalist class developed. Landowners either received taxes 
from farming tenants or use their land for cash-crop production through 
paid labour.39 The private ownership of large areas of land in the hands of a 
minority eventually led to the first appearance of landless proletariat in
1972 .4°
In the early days of colonialism, while Buganda was economically 
prospering and producing export commodities, cash-crops were discouraged 
in the northern regions, and the land remained in the hands of the Crown. 
Simultaneously, in central and south Uganda the colonial rulers encouraged 
a culture of kingship supremacy and a high degree of education and 
commodity production for export, whilst the north and north-east of the 
country was turned into a labour reservoir.41 West Nile, Acholi, Lango and 
Teso turned into recruitment grounds for soldiers, police officers and prison 
guards, but also administrators, clerks and farm workers. The employment 
in the security sector in particular had a significant impact on the identity of 
the region, which still prevails today.
38 Samwiri Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1989): The Colonial Roots of Internal Conflict. Rupesinghe, 
Kumar (ed.): Conflict Resolution in Uganda. London: James Curry, p. 31.
39 Jorgensen (1981): 90.
40 Jorgensen (1981): 94.
41 Yoweri Museveni (1987): Speech given at a consultation organised by International Alert, 
25th September 1987. Kampala: Makerere University.
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With the increase of labour migration from Rwanda, the recruitment 
process came to a sudden halt.42 Due to the harsh Belgian colonial rule 
many Rwandans left their countries to make a better living in Uganda. The 
sudden increase in the number of available workers made the labour force 
from northern Uganda partly redundant and turned peasants farmers into 
petty commodity producers.43
This process coincided with the promotion of cash crops, particularly 
cotton, in Teso in the early 1920s. As we have seen above, the agricultural 
change from farming to cash crops introduced a radical rupture to the social 
make-up and created an even larger workforce. Most Iteso stopped working 
in the army, the administration or on Baganda farms and started paid 
labour on Teso farms.44 The introduction of oxen ploughs in the late 1930s 
led to significant changes in the farming of cash crops, and to an increase in 
production as well as in the wealth of landowners. Plough and oxen owners 
emerged as the 'Big Men7, as capitalist farmers, who owned large parts of 
the land and employed workers for cultivation.45 For Teso, at the time, 
cultivating cotton led to increasing prosperity, which today still marks a 
point of reference. Working in the civil sector remained nevertheless 
important so that in the 1950s, traders, teachers, and civil servants 
comprised a petty bourgeoisie.46
Consequently, British colonialism had a very significant influence on 
the Teso identity. People defined themselves in opposition to the rich 
kingdoms of the south. The majority of Kumam and Iteso belonged to a 
certain work force and, despite modest wealth, there was a large gap 
between the prosperity of the kingdoms and the district of Teso.
Towards Independence
At the time of independence Uganda was spilt by a strong 
north/south divide. Buganda, as well as to some extent the kingdoms of
42 Mamdani (1976): 133.
43 Mamdani (1976): 133.
44 Mamdani (1976): 133.
45 Jorgensen (1981): 106.
46 Mamdani (1976): 209.
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Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole, were characterised by their wealth, prosperity 
and education.47 The rest of the country, however, was united in the 
struggle against the "sub-imperialism by non-indigenous chiefs like 
Baganda, Batoro, Banyoro [and] Bagisu" as well as against the Buganda 
style land settlement.48 Hence, in the wake of independence, Uganda was 
split along ethnic lines of Baganda and non-Baganda, yet also along 
religious lines between Protestants in the north and Catholics in the south.49 
"[R]eligion and the modern political Uganda were like Siamese twins that 
saw the light of the day at the same tim e."50 In 1962, Uganda was rated 
one of the most promising economies on the African continent, yet it was 
highly unstable politically.
Five parties emerged in the last years of colonialism:51 the Uganda 
National Congress (UNC), which later turned into the Uganda People 
Congress (UPC), the Progressive Party (PP), the Democratic Party (DP) and 
Kabaka Yekka ('Kabaka Only', KY). However, the newly formed parties did 
not reflect a rise of national interest but rather ethnic, religious and regional 
divisions. Amongst the parties that consolidated over time, the UPC had a 
strong socialist profile and was affiliated with the Northern regions, the DP 
was strongly Catholic and anti-communist and could draw on large support 
in Buganda, whereas the KY, established in response to the DP, was 
Baganda, strongly loyalist and did not recognise any person as superior to 
the Kabaka.
The British colonial rulers handed over Uganda to the parties they 
thought were best suited to govern the country. Buganda and the Kabaka 
maintained their privileged status to the extent that Buganda was granted 
federal status in relation to the central government.52
47 A. G. Gingyera-Pinycwa (1987): Milton Obote and His Time. London: NOK Publishers, p. 
22.
48 Jorgensen (1981): 176.
49 Susan Dicklitch (1998): The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa. Lessons from Uganda. 
Basingstoke/London: Macmillan, p. 32.
50 Gingyera-Pinycwa (1987): 23.
51 Dicklitch (1998): 38.
52 Gingyera-Pinycwa (1987): 127.
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Independent Uganda
Party Politics and Dictatorships
Milton Obote
In the first few years after independence the political parties operated 
in a multi-party framework.53 In 1962, the UPC, under the leadership of 
Milton Obote from Lango in the north, formed an alliance with the KY in 
order to increase its strength against the DP in the first Ugandan elections. 
As anticipated, the UPC won the majority of the seats outside of Buganda, 
whereas the KY emerged as the strongest party inside of Buganda.54 The 
UPC/KY coalition formed the first government, based on the Westminster 
model, with Milton Obote as the Prime Minister and Kabaka Mutesa as 
President. The harmony between UPC and KY was however short-lived. 
Within a few years the ideological and political discrepancies defeated 
pragmatism and led to a civil constitutional coup in 1966. The coup 
culminated in the battle of Mengo, in which the army under Idi Amin 
defeated the Baganda. About one thousand people were killed, leaving 
lasting hatred for Obote amongst the Baganda.55 The Kabaka fled to the UK 
and Obote imposed a unitary constitution, appointing himself as the 
President of Uganda. One year later, he abolished all kingdoms and 
rendered Uganda a republic.
Uganda's new constitution abolished the federal status and 
independent powers of the former kingdoms, as well as all Baganda 
privileges. I t  consolidated the power around the President. Obote justified 
this radical shift by arguing that it de-ethnicised politics, yet he achieved 
the opposite.56 The dissatisfaction in Buganda, and in the southern regions 
in general, forced Obote to rely more and more on military force to secure 
his power.
53 Holger Berndt Hansen/Michael Twaddle (1995): The Issues. Hansen, Holger 
Berndt/Twaddle, Michael (eds.): From Chaos to Order. The Politics of Constitution Making in 
Uganda. Kampala/London: Fountain/James Curry, p. 3.
54 Athur Gakwandi (1999): Uganda Pocket Facts. Kampala: Fountain, p. 22.
55 Pirout (1995): 296.
56 Dicklitch (1998): 40.
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Obote increasingly adopted left-wing policies culminating in the 'Move 
to the Left' in 1969. In 1970, he nationalised Uganda's 85 leading 
companies, a move which was not appreciated by the former British colonial 
rulers.57 In addition, Obote abolished strikes and attacked feudalism and 
Buganda hegemony.58
Teso was one of Obote's strongholds. As a northeastern region it was 
traditional UPC territory. The UPC promised to solve all post-colonial hopes 
and fears: to tame the dominance of the Baganda, to abolish feudalism and 
to equalise the national economy through unitary price regulation.
Id i Amin
While Obote was preoccupied with introducing new politics to Uganda 
as well as struggling against the increasing ethnic divide, the greatest 
threat to his Presidency emerged from his own ranks. The creation of 
northern Uganda as a labour reservoir by colonial administration led to most 
of his soldiers coming from the north. Ethnic tensions between the different 
northern groups soon developed.59 Disputes grew between soldiers from 
Acholi and Lango (the latter Obote's ethnic group) on one hand, and the 
people from West Nile on the other.60 Central to this was the increasing 
personal mistrust between Obote and his army commander from West Nile, 
Idi Amin. When Obote left the country to attend a Commonwealth meeting 
in January 1971, Amin took over power.
In the first instance, especially in Buganda, Amin's coup was 
welcomed.61 He returned the dead body of the Kabaka, who had died in 
exile, and arranged a state funeral. Amin released prisoners and he was 
widely hailed as 'a man of peace'.62 This situation was short lived and Amin 
governed the country in a reign of terror. "Within three months after he 
took over power ... Amin suspended all democratic rights, gave the army
57 Gakwandi (1999): 23.
58 Dicklitch (1998): 40.
59 Human Rights Watch (1999): 31.
60 Phared Mutibwa (1992): Uganda Since Independence. A Story of Unfulfilled Hope. London: 
Hurst & Company, p. 9.
61 Thomas P. Ofcansky (1996): Uganda. Tarnished Pear of Africa. Boulder: WestView Press, 
p. 43.
62 Mutibwa (1992): 86.
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dictatorial powers of arrest and punishment, and set up a military tribunal 
to try  political offenders."63
Amin destroyed Uganda. He destroyed the people through his 
unimaginable cruelty,64 of which he made no effort to conceal, and by 
driving the rather prosperous country into financial ruin through, for 
instance, the expulsion of all Asians from Uganda in 1972. The fairly large 
Asian community had developed as one of the economic backbones of the 
country and with its disappearance commerce and trade came to an almost 
complete halt.
Today, people in Uganda still seem bewildered by the experience of 
the time. Amin has become the subject of a countless number of jokes,65 
derived from the lack of understanding of his personality. As apparent in the 
following quote:
Amin had a kind of intelligence but he was undisciplined and 
uneducated, and appeared to lack any moral sense. Even his enemies  
said he possessed a commanding presence and could be charm ing, but 
he would fly into ungoverned rages. He did not understand either the  
process of governm ent or the function of civil society. He made much 
play of being Muslim, but made little effort to practice the Muslim ethical 
code, and frequently offended against its norms, drinking to excess, for 
exam ple, and ordering public executions on a Friday during Ramada, as 
well as ruling with terror.66
Contrary to most regions of Uganda Teso was little affected by Amin's 
terror regime. People continued their lives without showing any political 
ambitions and successfully avoided falling into Amin's discredit.
The international community followed the developments in Uganda 
with shock and horror, yet it was a more immediate neighbour who came to
63 James J. Busuttil et. al. (1991): "Uganda at the Crossroads -  A Report on Current Human 
Rights Conditions."The Record, October 1991; quoted in Human Rights Watch (1999): 32.
64 It  is estimated that between 100, 000 and 500,000 people were killed in Amin's eighth 
year presidency. Persecuted were mainly supporters of Obote from Lango and Acholi, as well 
as Baganda. Human Rights Watch (1999): 32.
65 Two most popular Amin jokes go as follows: 'One day Amin orders guns on the phone. The 
line was very bad so he had to spell his request. "GUNS as in G for Jinja [town in Uganda], U 
for youth; N for knowledge and S for psychology/" In another joke Amin is quoted to have 
said: "Uganda is north of the UK, south of South Africa, West of Japan and east of America. 
Therefore, Uganda is in the centre of the Equator and should be the home of the United 
Nations."
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the countries defence. Amin's politics finally went one step to far when he 
annexed 1,800 square miles of Tanzanian territory, alienating President 
Nyerere who had already been an outspoken critic of the dictator.67 In 
Tanzania, a group of exiled Ugandans formed the UNLA (Uganda National 
Liberation Army) and united with the Tanzanian People's Defence Force 
(TPDF). They invaded Uganda jointly in 1979. Amin fled to Saudi Arabia 
where he still lives today.
Milton Obote I I
Amin's defeat was followed by two short periods of governance. Yusuf 
Lule (UNLA) only stayed in office for 69 days until political intrigues, paired 
with his lack of experience in political leadership, led to his removal.68 His 
successor Godfrey Binaisa fell prey to a bloodless coup by the military 
regime of Paulo Muwaga in 1980, which opened the path to general 
elections in the same year.
The main contending parties in the elections were the two major 
traditional parties, the DP with much support in the south and the UPC 
which could draw mainly on the votes of the northern regions. In addition, 
the Conservative Party (CP) and the Uganda Patriotic Movement under 
Yoweri Museveni competed in the elections.
Obote's UPC won the election and he became President of Uganda for 
the second time.69 His success was strongly contested by his opponents, 
accusing him of rigging the elections. Museveni, despite his party having 
performed rather poorly in the election, set up the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM), and its military wing the National Resistance Army 
(NRA), and began an insurgency war in a region called Luwero, which soon 
became known as the 'Luwero Triangle'.
Two rival accounts are on offer to explain the beginning of Museveni's 
guerrilla warfare.70 People from the north argued that Museveni took up
66 Pirout (1995): 35.
67 Human Rights Watch (1999): 33.
68 Mutibwa (1992): 128.
69 Obote's second presidency is commonly referred to as Obote II.
70 Mutibwa (1992): 154.
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arms to end the succession of northern rule of the country. Since Kabaka 
Mutesa fled into exile, Uganda had been ruled by people form the northern 
districts. Museveni, himself from Ankole in the southwest, represented the 
section of the country which had been privileged by the colonial rulers but 
which had not been in power since independence. The people around 
Museveni, however, argue that Uganda had in the past suffered from 
oppressive regimes, that the elections had been seen as a window of hope 
for a democratic government, but that Obote's rigging of the elections had 
brought these ambitions to a halt. For them, NRM/A guerrilla warfare was 
the only alternative.
The Luwero Triangle
During the Luwero insurgency, the Kumam and Iteso fought side by 
side with the Acholi and Langi in Obote's UNLA. In line with colonial 
traditions and political affiliations Obote had recruited his army staff 
predominately amongst the northern and northeastern ethnic groups. Yet, 
after several years of fighting against Museveni, Obote faced strong 
tensions inside his army and was accused by the Acholi of favouring his own 
ethnic group the Langi. The tensions culminated in a military coup in 1985, 
which gave way to the military council of Tito Okello and Bazilio Olara 
Okello.
With the Okello government in place disunity persisted in Uganda. 
The instability of the new government forced it into negotiations with the 
NRM, resulting in the Nairobi Peace Accord. Despite the Nairobi Accord, 
Museveni's troops launched a final attack in January 1986, which led to the 
successful seizure of Kampala, and the subsequent installation of the NRM 
as the new government. By March 1986 the NRA/M had gained control of 
the whole country.
Defeated in their struggle the Kumam and Iteso UNLA soldiers 
retreated eastwards towards their homes where they sceptically awaited the 
course the new government would take. Many returned to their villages and 
families.
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Museveni's Uganda
Amongst the left-wing African elite Museveni's victory was celebrated 
and praised. In the words of A. M. Babu:
The Uganda Revolution is ... politically and morally the most significant 
event th a t has happened in Africa since the Ghana victory; and there is 
no doubt th at in the next few years it will establish itself as having had a 
much more profound and far-reaching im pact on Africa's history than  
even Ghana's. Ghana was the first place, and Uganda the second in the  
long march to genuinely free Africa71
Museveni, at the time, personified the end of post-colonial influence and the 
beginning of a new area.
And yet, Uganda's liberation was not for everybody and armed 
resistance developed rapidly.72 In 1986, a group of UNLA soldiers fled to 
Sudan and regrouped as Uganda People's Democratic Army/Movement 
(UPDA/M);73 pro-Amin rebels gathered in West Nile and formed the West 
Nile Bank Front (WNBF); in western Uganda the Allied Democratic Front 
(ADF) came into existence and is still active today; in the most southern 
parts of the country the Rwandan Interahamwe —the main culprit of the 
1994 genocide— started raiding Ugandan settlers, and in Acholi a women 
called Alice Lakwena started the Holy Spirit Movement which has now 
turned into Joseph Koney's Lord Resistance Army (LRA).
As for Teso, Museveni's take-over was initially welcome. The cattle 
raiding by the Karamojong warriors had accelerated in 1985-6. I t  had been 
supported by the Okellos who used it as a means of intimidating the Iteso 
and Kumam. The new Museveni government was expected to put an end to 
the neighbour's assaults.
From the NRM government's side there was also no initial antagonism 
against the Iteso and Kumam. The resentment was rather directed against 
the Acholi, as manifested in a radio speech by Museveni in which he
71 A. M. Babu, quoted in Ondoga ori Amaza (1998): Museveni's Long March to from Guerrilla 
to Statesman. Kampala: Fountain, p. 1.
72 Sverker Finnstroem (1999): Living with Bad Surroundings. War and Uncertainly in 
Northern Uganda. Uppsala: Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology report, 
Uppsala University, p. 10.
73 Interview David Mafabi.
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explained that his quarrel was not with the Obote soldiers but with the 
'Okellos'. 'Okellos' served as a synonym for Acholi.74
Museveni's Policy of Demobilisation
Army and Civil Servants
Nevertheless, the climate changed within a few months and mutual 
mistrust grew gradually. Immediately after Museveni seized power he 
began to reorganise the public sector.75 As a consequence, vast numbers of 
civil servants were made redundant, and since Teso had, during Obote's 
regime, provided a substantial portion of the police, prison and military 
staff, unemployment affected the region severely.
The reorganisation of the national army was one of Museveni's 
priorities:
[W ]e  had realised that once we came to power it would be necessary to 
do away with the old colonial-style arm y which had been recruited along 
sectarian lines and manipulated by unscrupulous politicians and 
directors. Therefore, im m ediately after the fall of Kampala we started  
organising a new national a rm y .76
The ex-combatants in Teso learned about their demobilisation 
through a radio announcement in 1986/7 in which they were asked to 
report to the local administration to hand in their guns.77 This message, 
however, evoked negative memories. When Idi Amin came to power in 
1971 he broadcast a similar announcement, and when the soldiers arrived 
at the administration offices to deliver their arms many were tortured or 
executed. In 1986, the Kumam and Iteso ex-soldiers feared that these 
atrocities would be repeated, and that they would be punished for having 
fought Museveni in the Luwero Triangle. Instead of reporting to the 
authorities many kept their arms and hid in the villages.
74 Interview Dennis Pain, London 13.01.2000.
75 It  has been suggested that the reorganisation was imposed by IMF and World Bank as part 
of the Structural Adjustment Programme. Interview with Grace Akello, Portsmouth
06.01.2000.
76 Yoweri Museveni: Sowing the Mustard Seeds. The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in 
Uganda. London & Oxford: Macmillan, p. 174.
77 Interview Dennis Pain.
117
Special Forces
In addition, in 1981 Obote had introduced a para-military police 
force, called Special Forces, out of with 5000 out of 8000 members 
originated from Teso.78 The Special Forces were under direct control of the 
Minister of State of Internal Affairs, Col. Omaria, himself an Etesot. They 
had played an instrumental role in Obote's regime, and they were all well 
trained professional combatants. During the Luwero bush war the Special 
Forces gained a bad reputation for their aggressiveness against the NRA, 
UFM/A (Uganda Freedom Party) and FEDEMU/FDA (Federal Democratic 
Army). One of Museveni's first political decisions was to disband the Force, 
yet many of its members found it difficult being made redundant.79
Militia
In addition to the Kumam and Iteso soldiers and the Special Forces a 
third military group was demobilised. During Obote's regime a Militia had 
been established with the objective to guard the borders between Karamoja 
and its neighbours. The Militia deterred cattle raiding and enabled the 
Kumam and Iteso to thrive economically. Museveni's interpretation of the 
militia was however different:
During the Obote I I  regim e, UPC politicians complicated the [Karam oja] 
problem further by creating tribal militia in Acholi and Teso which, in 
turn , raided Karamoja and counter-p lundered.80
I t  has been suggested that this view of the Militia may be closer to 
the truth than that of it merely being a protector of Teso.81 For instance, the 
Militia has been accused of being aggressive towards the Karamojong.82 
However, in 1986-7 the removal of the Militia from the Karamoja border 
opened the way for the Karamojong warriors to enter and raid Teso to an 
extent previously unknown.
78 Interview Musa Echweru.
79 Col. Omaria himself commented once that after having received special training at home 
as well as abroad it is difficult for a professional soldier to 'retire' forcefully.
80 Museveni (1996): 58.
81 Henriques (2000): 39.
82 Interview with Teko Lokeris, Moroto 14.04.2000.
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The scale of the demobilisation of combat forces from Teso was large 
and left the Kumam and Iteso with a feeling of mistrust. Since many of 
them had played a significant role in the Luwero war they interpreted the 
new government's action as punishment. The Iteso and Kumam feared 
harassment and human rights abuses, including extra-judicial executions.
And yet, in the first phase of the NRM government a policy of 
reconciliation prevailed. The exiled political leadership was encouraged to 
return to Uganda.83 The rationale was to 'bring the enemies in', to give 
them a prestigious public office in order to prevent them from turning 
against the Movement. The NRM policy of reconciliation contributed 
significantly to taming potential political opponents.
Inside the NRM cadre Museveni's long-term supporters were critical 
of this policy.84 To co-operate with the politicians against whom they had 
fought so fiercely in the Luwero Triangle went against their conception of 
victory. I t  was also felt that many opponents, especially from the UPC, had 
joined the NRM for opportunist reasons and that they were only waiting for 
power relations to change again to continue with their own political 
agenda.85
Such was the atmosphere in Uganda and Teso at the beginning of 
Museveni's leadership. In north and northeast Uganda peace was very 
fragile. Although the NRM made an effort to assure people that it's intention 
was to unite the country, it was unsuccessful in establishing trust. Armed 
warfare began in Teso, as well as in Lango and Acholi. In Lango, the violent 
conflict ceased after a short while, in Teso it continued for some years, in 
Acholi it persists to this day.
Changes in Uganda
Many things have changed in Uganda since the days of Obote and 
Amin. Most importantly, in order to facilitate the democratisation process
83 E. A. Brett (1996): Rebuilding War Damaged Communities in Uganda. Allen, Tim (ed.): In 
Search of Cool Ground. War, Flight and Homecoming in Northeast Africa. London/Trenton: 
James Curry/Africa World Press, p. 208.
84 Conversation with Okwiri Rabwoni, Kampala 05.04.2000.
85 ori Amaza (1998): 129.
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Museveni introduced an alternative governance and administration system 
On a local, institutional level, the government set up a system of Resistance 
Councils (RCs) which operated on village, parish, sub-county, county and 
district level.86 Through direct elections at the village and indirect at higher 
levels the population at large is drawn into the decision making process, 
enabling them to influence communal politics. Although their executive 
power is limited the RCs nevertheless provide some scope to criticise the 
activities of central and local authorities. I t  has been argued that the RC 
system had a crucial impact on the process of reconciliation and 
integration.87
Nationally, multi-party politics was replaced by the National 
Resistance Movement, or in short 'the Movement'. The Movement system is 
a no-party system, which Museveni introduced with reference to the legacy 
of Ugandan party politics being the causes for violence and disruption. 
Initially designed as a temporary solution to allow the split country to 
reconcile the Movement is today highly contested, and often described as a 
one-party system, and admittedly this is also the way it is being referred to 
in the present study.88 In June 2000 a referendum was held about keeping 
the Movement system, or re-introducing multiparty politics. The outcome 
was in favour of the Movement yet in Uganda today there is increasing 
discontent about the system, leading to demonstrations and sporadic 
violence. Nevertheless, compared to most other countries in Africa, 
Museveni's Uganda maintains a relatively high degree of civil rights and is 
fairly prosperous.
A History o f Violence
Since independence in 1962, Uganda has suffered from five violent 
political overturns: the first Prime Minister Milton Obote launched a civil 
constitutional coup in 1966 which removed Kabaka Mutesa as the head of 
state and rendered Obote President; Obote was overthrown by his army 
commander Idi Amin in 1971; and Amin was toppled by the UNLA with 
assistance of Tanzanian forces in 1979. This led eventually to a second
86 The RCs have been replaced by very similar LCs (Local Councils).
87 Brett (1996): 210.
88 Human Rights Watch (1999).
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Presidency of Obote, the period is commonly referred to as Obote II, which 
was again terminated violently, this time by Bazillo and Tito Okello in 1985, 
who were, in 1986, ousted by Yoweri Museveni.
Uganda's history of violence was largely a result of colonialism. What 
this chapter sought to reveal is that the post-colonial Uganda has suffered 
from tensions introduced by the British rulers. Obviously, it is impossible to 
know how Uganda would have developed in conditions free from this strong 
foreign influence, and whether its past would have been more peaceful. 
Nevertheless, the British influence split the polity and provided the ground 
for violence and conflict, with the Teso insurgency presenting yet another 
instance of this legacy, as we shall see in the following chapters.
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chapter vi
H is t o r y  a n d  T r u t h : 
T he  Be g in n in g  o f  
t h e  I n s u r g e n c y
The uses and disadvantages of history have been contested for some 
tim e.1 We cannot simply reduce the past to pure knowledge since the past 
is subjected to the impulse of life and the living.2 Events are properties of 
the past, narratives of the present. In Gadamer's words
I f  we are trying to understand a historical phenomenon from the  
historical distance ... we are always subjected to the effects of effective 
history. ... True historical thinking must take account of its own 
historically. ... A proper hermeneutics would have to dem onstrate the  
effectivity of history within understanding itself.3
Conventionally, past events are first memorised, then documented 
and through this act turned into everlasting monuments.4 Writing history is 
thus the process of rendering remembered narratives into established and 
solid structures and it needs an exercise of genealogy to reveal their 
contingency.
[ I]n  contrast to the various projects which aim to inscribe knowledge, a 
genealogy should be seen as a kind of a ttem pt to em ancipate historical 
knowledges from ... subjection, to render them  .. capable of opposition 
and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and 
scientific discourse.5
The objective of the present chapter is therefore to reveal the 
discontinuities and contestations in the local history of Teso.
In contrast to the previous chapter, which offered a traditional 
approach of mapping the cleavages that run through Uganda in order to
1 Nietzsche (1983).
2 Nietzsche (1983): 104.
3 Gadamer (1975): 267.
4 Foucault (1972): 7.
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explain what caused the Teso insurgency, in the following we shall seek to 
understand how the antagonism between the Kumam and Iteso on one 
side, and the government on the other have evolved over time. In Ashley's 
words:
I t  is a question of how, in history, meaning is imposed, put to question, 
reinterpreted, and fixed anew. How, admits the diversity and change of 
texts and signifying practices of a culture, are knowledgable practices 
normalized and orchestrated, resistance disciplined, and social energies 
focused so that, in history, it becomes possible to effect a narrative  
structuring in which specific modes of subjectivity are constituted both 
as the self-evident sovereign origins of power, on the one hand, and the 
truthful voices of history's objective possibilities and necessary limits on 
the other?6
Consequently, this chapter will look at the Teso past through the lens of the 
Iteso and Kumam today.
The present Teso identity is shaped by recollections of the past and 
anticipations of the future. As suggested in Chapter 3, the way people 
remember their past re-members their society, while forgetting is simply a 
way of remembering differently. In order to understand Teso it is therefore 
essential to ask how the Iteso and Kumam refer to the beginning of the 
insurgency. How is the way the Iteso and Kumam narrate their past 
constituted by and constitutive of their present identity? And how is their 
Other, the Museveni government, determined in this process?
How, then, do people in Teso reply to the question ’What caused the 
Teso insurgency?'
Teso History
The truth about the beginning of the insurgency in Teso has not been 
confined to a formal discourse as referred to by Foucault in the above 
quote. In fact, no literature about it has ever been published, and yet in 
Teso there is a consensus about how the insurgency began.7 The oral 
documentation of the past has a similar effect to the academic discipline of
5 Foucault (1994a): 24.
6 Ashley (1989): 283.
7 Oral and written accounts of past events do not vary in their characteristics of importance 
to this study and are thus treated in the same way. See also Tonkin (1992): 113.
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history departments: it creates a regime of truth. Foucault understands 
truth as "a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation and operation of statements."8 Central to his work in 
the notion of power relations, a concept which we will take up in the 
conclusions. For now it is important to stress that the disciplining power of 
truth as described in the above quote makes possible what can be said in a 
particular social environment.
The disciplining power is very apparent in Teso where the discourse 
about the beginning of the insurgency is tightly ordered. Accounts that are 
not in line with the meta-narrative are conventionally not appreciated.9 
Whereas towards the end of the insurgency in 1990-2 people seemed to 
have a much more nuanced understanding of why they were fighting, and 
listed a number of different reasons,10 eight years later a 'true history', a 
'true account', of the past has developed.
Competing Narratives
In order to understand the people of Teso today it is important to pay 
special attention to the way they refer to their past, and what claims arise 
out of this recollection. The following outlines three different narratives 
about the beginning of the insurgency. They are neither exclusive nor 
comprehensive. For foreigners who newly arrive in the Teso region only the 
first version is on offer. The vast majority of people today refer to the cattle 
raiding by the Karamojong as the reason for taking up armed struggle, to 
the exclusion of all other accounts. When listening to, for instance, senior 
school students it becomes apparent that this is also the version passed on 
to the younger generation, which has no conscious memory of the time of 
the insurgency.11 As collective memory it therefore becomes local history. 
However, in the course of my research, and after staying in Teso for several 
weeks, alternative voice began to emerge, as reproduced in the following.
8 Foucault (1980): 133.
9 This view is supported by numerous encounters with people in Teso.
10 I am here referring to the collection of interviews conducted by E. A. Brett during a field 
trip to Teso in 1990-2.
11 Impression won at workshop at a secondary school in Soroti (Soroti SS).
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Karamojong Warriors' Raiding
As we saw in the previous chapter, shortly after his inauguration 
Museveni disbanded the Militia which protected the border between 
Karamoja and Teso.12 The Karamojong warriors used the power vacuum to 
raid their neighbours with an intensity previously unknown, even exceeding 
the extent experienced under the Okellos in 1985-1986.13 Within a few 
months after the NRM came into power the Karamojong warriors had 
overrun the whole of Teso, then comprised of Soroti and Kumi districts. 
They did not only raid cattle but also other animals. I t  is estimated that the 
livestock in Teso was reduced to 7%.14 According to an Oxfam report the 
figures were15
District 1980 1989 Loss/Gain
Soroti (then Soroti 
and Katakwi)
317,563 20,000 -297,563
Kumi 135,000 15,000 -120,000
The report estimates that the cattle stock in Kumi went down to 3-
4,000 after renewed raiding in 1990-1. When the raiding of Teso began in 
late 1986, it was marked by the power asymmetry deriving from the 
armament of the Karamojong warriors. People in Teso had no means to 
protect themselves. The Karamojong warriors walked all the way to Lake 
Kyoga, no area in Teso was spared from their assaults. They came through 
towns, and killed and abused people indiscriminately. Witnesses affirm that 
they were accompanied by their wives and children, who collected clothing 
and household goods, while the warriors took the animals.16
As early as April 1987 political attempts were made to stop the 
rustling. In a meeting at the Conference Centre in Kampala the government 
was urged to stamp out the raids, to disarm the Karamojong, to establish
12 Interview with Musa Echweru, Soroti 26.3.2000.
13 Interview with James Eceret, Kampala 9.2.2000.
14 Interview with James Eceret.
15 OXFAM (1993): OXFAM Kumi District Agricultural Rehabilitation Project: Final Evaluation. 
Uganda: OXFAM report, p. 13.
16 E. A. Brett's private notes from Oct 1990.
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an emergency relief programme and to implement development projects in 
Karamoja in order to provide sufficient water and pasture for the 
Karamojong cattle.17 From the Karamojong side, elders promised peace and 
pleaded with the government to establish development programmes in their 
districts.18 These appeals, however, remained unsuccessful.
The government's policy towards the raiding in Teso was marked by 
inactivity. The failure to secure stability in Kumi and Soroti was explained 
by a lack of military resources, for the new government had to fight against 
violent opposition in the north and west of the country. In Museveni's 
words: "We did not have enough forces to deal simultaneously with the 
cattle raiding. As a result the Karamojong cattle raiding intensified, 
especially in Teso."19
Nevertheless, the inactivity of the NRM was interpreted by many 
people in Teso as a deliberate policy by the new government to intimidate 
them, and to deprive them of their main source of livelihood. At the time, 
cattle were the major economic and cultural commodities in the region. 
People called their cows the ir'bank', for they provided them with the means 
to pay tuition fees, dowries, day-to-day necessities and food.20 Apart from 
cattle being economic commodities they were also of social and cultural 
significance. Cattle were a symbol of wealth and prosperity, they provided 
power. Large herds of cattle were often invested in the acquisition of new 
wives and dependants, and thus became a political currency. The loss of 
cattle due to raiding and the insurgency not only deprived the Iteso and 
Kumam of their economic but also of their social livelihood.21
When the rustling by the Karamojong warriors began, the first 
rumours spread that the NRA actively supported the assaults in order to 
undermine the economic and social foundation of Teso. People reported that 
they saw lorries full of cows being driven southwards, towards Kampala,
17 New Vision, 16.4.87.
18 New Vision, 14.5.87.
19 Museveni (1996): 177.
20 Interview with Frieda Ediamo, Soroti 25.2.2000.
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and that they went 'as far as Museveni's house' in west Uganda. The 
allegations were never verified, yet the mistrust remained. Museveni, 
towards the end of the insurgency, invited a group of Iteso to west Uganda 
to prove that he had not 'stolen' Teso cattle. The delegation's report was 
negative, yet its findings were not accepted by most people in Teso.22
Although, in my interviews, the Kumam and Iteso always mentioned 
that the NRM/A-Karimojong co-operation is only alleged it nevertheless is a 
shared belief and as such legitimates the collective resentment against the 
NRM/A. The cattle rustling narrative is invoked whenever the beginning of 
the Teso insurgency is explained. I t  symbolises the perceived deprivation 
and punishment by the Museveni government and legitimates taking up 
arms. The insurgency is therefore seen as just.
Harassment o f Former Special Forces and Military
Parallel to the cattle rustling, the NRM local administration started a 
policy of harassing the Iteso and Kumam.23 Former political leaders and 
military personnel were arrested without explanation,24 but also less 
prominent Kumam and Iteso suffered intimidation. Torture in custody was 
frequent.25
One narrative, alternative to the cattle rustling, is that the insurgency 
was a result of the harassment of the former Luwero combatants in 
particular and the Kumam and Iteso in general. The Special Forces in 
particular were targeted.26 There was widespread fear of being punished for 
the atrocities committed in Luwero, which were very fierce (allegedly up to
300,000 people were killed by the Special Forces),27 and from where the
21 Heriques (2000): 47.
22 Interview with Kenneth Oluma, Soroti, 24.02.2000.
23 Musa Echweru: "Iteso Love Museveni - Ex-rebel". The Monitor: Kampala, 22-26 April 
1994.
24 Amongst the targets were for instance Col. Omaria (MP for Soroti Central from 1980, and 
Minister of State for Internal Affairs in Obote I I )  (NV 18.11.86, p. 16) as well as the Director 
of the Flying School George Oguli (NV 22.8.86, front-page)
25 Interview with Sam Otai, Soroti 27.3.2000. Interview with Musa Echweru, Soroti
26.3.2000.
26 Interview with Musa Echweru.
27 Interview with Kenneth Oluina, Soroti 24.2.2000.
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NRA soldiers and the soldiers from Teso already had a six year history of 
fighting against each other. Rumours spread rapidly that Museveni's NRA, 
when fighting Obote's troops in Luwero, had threatened them with 
punishment once they came to power.28
Another rumour that was spread at the time was the cruelty and 
violence of Museveni's troops. The Teso rebels ...
... told heart-chilling stories of hideous crimes th at the NRA allegedly 
com m itted on innocent civilians. Such crimes, according to the rebels, 
included cutting open pregnant women's tum m ies, bashing babies' 
heads on trees, burying people alive and cutting off people's ears. ... 
Those in the know, however, said that those were some of the crimes 
that the [Teso] rebels themselves used to m ete out to innocent people 
in Luwero Triangle, during their w ar with M useveni.29
For former Kumam and Iteso combatants, in response to the 
harassment, self-defence seemed necessary. In the words of the former 
rebel-leader and now Minister of State Omax Omeda:
The truth about the insurgency is very clear. We were forced to go into 
the bush. The administrators who came to Soroti first, or to Teso as a 
region, had their own problems. They really mishandled the situation. 
For when the arrests of prominent politicians started, when they started
prosecuting form er Special Forces and p o lic e  understandably people
ran away. We were not organised that we wanted to fight governm ent - 
people ju s t run to the bush for fear of being harassed. Then, a fter some 
tim e we saw the thing continued, and we thought that the only way to 
handle this situation was to group ourselves. Maybe where we went 
wrong was that we did not contact the authority, but we did not have 
the opportunity to reach the President. So the only way we thought we 
had was to take up our arms and to defend ourselves.30
Self-defence rendered the insurgency just.
The new government legitimised the arrest and intimidation of Iteso 
and Kumam by arguing that it was hunting for dissidents, especially from a 
political organisation called Force Obote Back Again (FOBA). The hunt for 
FOBA members was intense and affected the whole of Teso. FOBA was
28 Olupot (2000): 60.
29 Fidel Omunyokol (2000): The Day a Helicopter Landed in Mukongoro. Soroti: private 
manuscript.
30 Interview with Omax Omeda, Kampala 13.3.2000.
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discussed in the press at large,31 and funds were allocated to the army to 
conduct an operation to clear Teso of FOBA members.32 FOBA, however, 
never existed. I t  was invented as a joke by former UPC politicians in a bar 
in Kampala.33 Today, it is difficult to find out if the NRM/A genuinely believed 
in the existence of FOBA or if they only needed a pretext to legitimise the 
strong actions against the Kumam and Iteso.
Regardless of the 'FOBA-joke', the concern of the NRM/A that violent 
opposition might flare up in Teso was not unwarranted. When withdrawing 
from Luwero the thought of revenge was already playing on the mind of a 
number of Kumam and Iteso soldiers and Special Forces, as we shall see in 
the following.
Political Motives
The third narrative to explain the beginning of the insurgency 
suggests that there were political ambitions to topple Museveni. Some UPC 
politicians, most notably Peter Otai, former Minister for Defence in the 
Obote I I  government, realised the degree of resentment against Museveni 
in Teso and used the situation for their own political objectives. Based in 
Kenya and London they promised arms and military support, yet failed to 
deliver.34 The frustration at the time is apparent in Min. Omeda's remarks:
For us a t home [in Uganda] we wanted governm ent to recognise our 
existence. To say: 'These are people of Uganda, w hat has been done to 
them '. But the politicians [abroad] wanted to use us as m ercenaries to 
fight for them . Which was very unfair. And we never got any assistance 
from th em .35
As described in the previous chapter, Teso had always been an UPC 
stronghold, and had supported Obote since independence. During his 
presidency Teso was prosperous and peaceful, employment rates were high 
and people were generally content. In Teso, there has always been little 
ambition to provide a leader, people are is satisfied as long as they can live
31 New Vision, 16.9.86, p.3/p.6-7; 19.9.86 p.8-9
32 Interview with Ateker Ejalu, Kampala 5.4.2000.
33 Interview with Ateker Ejalu.
34 Interview with Musa Echweru.
35 Interview with Omax Omeda.
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without major disturbances.36 After having been privileged by Obote, 
however, the policy of Museveni was perceived as strong neglect. The good- 
life the Iteso and Kumam had appreciated for so long was suddenly 
interrupted by Museveni's seizure of power.
From an ethnicity perspective, Museveni, who was born in Western 
Uganda, is considered a 'natural adversary' in Teso.37 Ethnicity is an often 
cited cause for violent conflict in Africa. Despite wide recognition that ethnic 
groups are invented rather than natural David Turton reminds us that 
ethnicity is not imaginary.38 Firstly, because it is a subjective reality, and 
secondly because it has historically developed and consolidated over time. 
For people in Uganda ethnicity is therefore plausible and meaningful.
Museveni belongs to the Banyankoie, a Bantu group, while the Iteso 
are Nilo-Hamites, a Nilotics sub-group.39 According to a now-discredited 
tradition of colonial anthropology, the African continent is divided into 
Hamitic and Nilotic tribes in the north, and Bantu in the South.40 The 
separation runs right through Uganda, splitting east and west into two 
different camps. Colonialism, throughout Africa, invented categories to 
define not only who people were but also which qualities their 'tribe ' 
possessed.
Term s like the Bantu, the Nilotics, the N ilo-Ham ites, the Sudanics, and 
all that, began to crop up in school classrooms, so th at a child who was 
a "Nilotic" was now made to learn in his Primary 3 or 4 th a t he was, 
while another child in another class was sim ilarly now made to know  
th a t he was from the "Bantu" group.41
36 Olupot (2000) 54.
37 Interview with Frieda Ediamo.
38 David Turton (1997): Introduction: War and Ethnicity, in: Turton, David (ed.): War and 
Ethnicity. Global Connections and Local Violence. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 
p. 3-4.
39 For a description of different cultures see Richard Nzita (1995): Peoples and Cultures of 
Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
40 Heriques (2000): 32. See also Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1989).
41 A. G. Gingyera-Pinycwa (1989): Is there a Northern Question? in: Kumar Rupesinghe 
(ed.): Internal Conflicts and their Resolution: The Case of Uganda. London: James Curry, p. 
49.
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Museveni, in agreement with many historians,42 and as discussed in 
the previous chapter, suggests that the ethnic separation in Uganda is a 
result of the colonial legacy where cash crops and economic development 
were introduced to the central and western region of the country, whereas 
the north and the north-east served as a reserve for army recruitment.43 
Inequalities in wealth were created, which generated conflicts between the 
different ethnic groups. According to Museveni "[t]he  rivalry over access to 
opportunities and resources gave rise to the formation of attitudes of 
superiority and inferiority complexes."44 At the time of the insurgency, the 
Ugandan polity was strongly split along ethnic lines, leading to a rejection of 
Museveni by the Iteso as the 'right' president to govern the country.
Challenged Teso Identity
The above provides an account of some of the different narratives 
about what caused the Teso insurgency. One feature that runs through all 
stories is that the reality of the Kumam and Iteso existence in the wider 
Uganda had changed. During Obote, the people from Teso had been 
relatively privileged but under Museveni this role was reversed. Manifested 
in actual changes like the removal of the Militia along the border to 
Karamoja as well as the disbanding of the security service personnel and 
the Special Forces, the people of Teso realised that their position in Uganda 
had changed. They had to give up what had historically constituted their 
identity, that is being relatively privileged compared to other ethnic groups 
in Uganda.
To this day, people in Teso constantly draw attention to the fact that 
before the insurgency they were educated, affluent and westernised, and 
that they had good relations with the colonial rulers. All was lost due 
Museveni's seizure of power and the subsequent insurgency. A vast amount 
of Iteso and Kumam lost their jobs in the Ugandan civil sector and the 
security services which led to immense economic problems. People had to 
return to farming in an environment where land was scarce and already a
42 See for instance Gingyera-Pinycwa (1989) and Paul Gifford (1998): African Christianity. 
Its Public Role. London: Hurst & Company, p. 133.
43 Museveni (1987): 62.
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source for conflict. Whilst some regions of Uganda, particularly Museveni's 
home area, began to prosper, the people in Teso felt that their status was 
declining.45 The Kumam and Iteso had to re-adjust themselves in light of a 
changing nation, and find a new niche for their existence.
The Beginning of the Fighting
The combination of the cattle rustling, the hunt for former Special 
Forces combatants, the indiscriminate arrests of Iteso and Kumam as well 
as political objectives marked the beginning of the creation of the Rebel 
High Command. The 1st Commander of the Rebel High Command was 
'H itler' Francis Eregu, a former Special Forces member. Sam Otai, who had 
previously fought in Obote's army, became 2nd Commander. Together they 
planned the insurgency, bought arms from NRA soldiers and mobilised 
Eregu's former Special Forces and UNLF soldiers. The former President 
Obote as well as the potential future President Peter Otai (Sam Otai's 
uncle), then already in exile in Kenya, were unaware of this development 
until a meeting in Peter Otai's house in Nairobi in 1987 where the 
insurgency was formally launched.46 The first attacks were simultaneously 
on the Soroti Flying School, Soroti Barracks and Soroti Hotel. Although 
largely unsuccessful the rebels managed to free their detained comrades 
from Soroti prison and to increase their manpower.
Significantly, today it is very difficult to establish whether the 
insurgency preceded the cattle rustling, or whether it was a consequence. 
As mentioned above, in the locally narrated history the violent uprising is 
referred to as a response to the Karamojong warriors' raiding and the 
government's inactivity, which was interpreted by the Iteso and Kumam as 
neglect and punishment for their former allegiance to Obote. However, it is 
also possible that 'H itler' Eregu and Sam Otai already planned the
44 Museveni (1987): 62.
45 Interview with Stella Sabiiti.
46 Interview with Sam Otai.
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insurgency before the cattle rustling began. In Teso today, nobody is 
prepared to answer this question.47
The Government's Position
The government's version of the beginning of the insurgency is that a 
number of Kumam and Iteso politicians, with the intention to regain power, 
manipulated and misled the Teso population.48 Through drawing on cattle 
rustling, vast support was mobilised. The NRA, however, admitted to having 
made a mistake by not responding to the cattle rustling by the Karamojong, 
and that they attacked the Iteso and Kumam rebels instead. They 
nevertheless justified their strategy by saying that "cattle rustling is a 
criminal offence but rebellion against an established government is not only 
criminal but also treasonable".49
In the military rhetoric at the time, described in the widely read NRA 
journal and mouthpiece Tarehe Sita, the insurgency was explained as 
follows:50
• The conflict in Teso is essentially a problem of armed criminals who 
sometimes collude with misguided rebels.
• In addition, there are other criminal gangs (esp. in Soroti district) of 
former UNLA soldiers comprised mostly of elements who have committed 
crimes while serving in the army and who now fear facing law. They did 
not surrender their guns when they were demobilised during and after 
the Okello regime.
• Karamojong mainly raid for cattle and fight those who try  to prevent 
them. Rebels, on the other hand, steal everything and indiscriminately 
harass, rape and regularly murder civilians.
47 Interview with Sam Otai, Ateker Ejalu, Frieda Ediamo.
48 The Museveni government position shall only be mentioned here, it is however not subject 
of the present study.
49 Brig. Chefe Ali (1994): Preaching Peace Against War. Conference on Strategies for Peace 
and Sustainable Development in Karamoja and Neighbouring Districts, 18th-22nd July 1994. 
Kampala: Makerere University.
50 "Defeating the Rebels and Cattle Rustlers". Tarehe Sita: Kampala, May/June 1987.
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• Karamojong and rebels are not organised. After sharing their loot their 
unity rarely goes beyond collective defence against other gangs and the 
NRA.
• Efforts by UPDA rebels to join forces with Karamojong have failed 
because Karamojong are only interested in cattle rustling.
• FOBA has not been successful in unifying different force in Soroti. FOBA 
is still handicapped by internal power struggles.
• In Teso the NRA's integrity is tarnished to alienate it from popular 
support.
What is apparent in the above rhetoric is that the Teso insurgency 
was not given any status by the NRA/M, it was not recognised as an 
insurgency but rather degraded to thuggery and criminal offence. This 
deliberate ignorance has important implications for political and military 
responses. Militarily the NRA/M started a strong offensive against the Teso 
rebels,51 and a scorched earth policy against civilians.52 Paired with the 
inability to prevent the Karamojong cattle rustling this also served as a 
conventient strategy. When the insurgency in Teso began the northern 
Ugandan region Acholi (today Kitgum and Gulu) was already fighting 
fiercely against Museveni. The government was concerned that the Acholi 
and the Teso rebels would collaborate in their struggle and thus become too 
powerful a threat. And indeed, the Teso Rebel High Command had meetings 
with Alice Lakwena, and later Joseph Kony, to contemplate potential co­
operation.53 For the government to sustain the assaults by the Karamojong 
warriors along the Acholi and Teso border guaranteed a buffer zone and 
prevented the two insurgencies from fusing.
From a political perspective, not to recognise the insurgency 
undermined its national impact. The rebels were not given any legitimacy
51 The number of troops reduced very suddenly in 1990 when Uganda supported the invasion 
of exile-Rwandans into Rwanda. This military exodus might have had a very strong effect on 
the ending of the insurgency as argued in interviews by Grace Akello, John Maitland (London 
15.01.2000) and Dennis Pain.
52 Interview with John Maitland.
53 The prime reason for the Rebel High Command not to collaborate with Kony was that the 
Acholi rebels were considered to be too violent and cruel towards their own people. Interview 
with Sam Otai.
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and thus their cause remained unrecognised. Deliberate political ignorance 
meant not having to address the political claims made by the Teso people, 
whilst at the same time undermining the insurgency militarily. As we shall 
see later, to recognise an insurgency is important for it legitimises the 
struggle, as the Iteso and Kumam experienced through the support from 
'friends' in the UK. Simultaneously, however, the fact that Museveni 
suppressed rather than promoted bipolar enemy structures between his 
government and Teso made it easier for him to then, at a later point, reach 
out in a gesture of reconciliation, as we shall see in Chapter 8.
Teso and Narratives
In the first instance, for a new visitor to Teso the awareness of the^ 
availability of different narratives of the beginning of the insurgency, and, 
the exclusive preference of one in particular, leaves one at best bewildered. 
The experience raises serious questions about the truthfulness of the 
prevailing narrative. I therefore would like to emphasis explicitly that when 
referring to different, alternative, contested or prevailing truths I by no 
means want to imply that people in Teso are in any way insincere. What is 
at stake in the selection of one truth as the dominant discourse is far more 
ontological a phenomenon, and is a characteristic o f every community. In 
Chapter 3 we argued that people select the narratives on which they draw 
to make up their lives. Stories are always told in a particular situation and 
with a particular audience in mind.54 The interpretation and recollection of 
the past, expressed in the choice of a particular explanation and narrated in 
a particular way, is always performed with view to a particular future. In the 
case of Teso, what was the future people envisaged and how did they try to 
make up their lives?
Unmade Worlds
After the insurgency Teso required a coherent collective identity in 
order to come to terms with the shock of the insurgency. The narrative
54 Donald Brenneis (1996): Telling Troubles: Narrative, Conflict, and Experience, in: Briggs, 
Charles (ed.): Disorderly Discourse. Narrative, Conflict and Inequality. New York/Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 42.
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construction of a collective identity is particularly important in a post­
conflict environment in which the communities lay in pieces. For "[w ]ars 
unmake worlds, both real and conceptual."55 As a result of violent conflict, 
people lose their houses, friends and family members, jobs, wealth and 
material goods. In addition, they might be permanently disabled, HIV 
positive as a result of rape, or suffer from post-traumatic symptoms. Ex­
soldiers and ex-rebels are difficult to re-integrate into the community, their 
future is often marked by severe poverty and even more severe frustration. 
Family and neighbourhood support structures have eroded, institutions like 
churches or schools have lost credibility. Migration and refugee movements 
have unsettled local notions of belonging and what constitutes a home. 
Most of the material past is gone forever.
In Teso, at the end of the insurgency people had lost everything.56 
Many people had been killed in the fighting, insurgency-related crimes or 
homicides. Trust in each other and faith in the future was very low, while 
tensions remained high.57 An aggressiveness previously unknown prevailed 
amongst the Kumam/Iteso.58
But not only were these 'real worlds' unmade by the insurgency -  
concepts were erod, too. Formerly apparently fixed notions of good and 
bad, right and wrong, friend and enemy were shaken beyond repair: in Teso 
atrocities were committed by the NRA, but also by the rebels and 
Iteso/Kumam; cattle were stolen by the Karamojong, but also by the local 
people; rebels fought in the bush, yet surrendered and joined the NRA the 
same day; neighbours supported each other, but they also committed 
crimes against each other; the church preached reconciliation, and incited 
the people to support the armed struggle; the cause was just, yet was it 
really justified? This list of eroded concepts could be endlessly continued. It  
reveals that during violent conflict previously established orientation is lost. 
The loss of certainty and faith, in combination with poverty and destruction,
55 Carolyn Nordstrom (1995): War on the Front Lines, in: Nordstrom, Carolyn/Robben, 
Anthonius (eds.): Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies in Violence and Survival. 
Berkley: University of California Press, p. 131.
56 Interview with James Eceret.
57 Conversation with Pius Okiria, Soroti 15.03.2000.
58 Interview with Michael Obwaatum, Kumi town 28.03.2000.
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are heavy burdens to carry. To re-make a world and to re-gain lost 
confidence are difficult tasks.
In light of the 'unmade world' in Teso, after a few years a collective 
truth about the causes of the conflict emerged. As suggested via Foucault at 
the beginning of the chapter, 'tru th ' refers to a system of ordered practises 
that produce, regulate, distribute and circulate statements. The statements 
in the case of the Teso insurgency are that it broke out as a response to the 
government's aggressive and exclusive politics. In Teso today there is an 
unarticulated consensus about the validity of this account of events. As 
stated above, the cattle rustling narrative prevails, it is produced and 
reproduced in social encounters. Yet what effects does the selection of this 
narrative have on the Teso identity?
Performative Power of Narratives
To define the local history about the cause of the insurgency with 
reference to cattle rustling has the advantage of producing a collective Teso 
identity. I t  has been argued that " [ i ] f  winners write history, losers dwell on 
it more".59 In order to explain this phenomenon, the term 'chosen trauma' 
has been suggested, which refers to an event
th at causes the group to feel helpless and victim ized by another group.
.... The group draws the mental representations or emotional meanings 
of the traum atic event into its very identity, and then it passes on the  
emotional and symbolic meaning from generation to generation. For 
each generation the description of the actual event is modified; w hat 
remains is its role in ... the group identity....60
Here, then, a true narrative is not only produced by, but is at the 
same time productive of a collective identity. The repetition of tales about 
the own identity, as well as the identity of the enemy, becomes the social 
reality for those who participate in this discourse. A common identity, a ’we-
59 J. Cole (1998): The Use of Defeat: Memory and Political Morality in East Madagascar, in: 
R. Werbner (eds.): Memory and the Postcolonial. African Anthropology and the Crisis of 
Power. London/New York: Zed, p. 121.
60 Vamik Volkan (1991): "On Chosen Trauma". Mind and Human Interaction, 3:13. Cited in 
Cole (1998): 121.
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feeling1, is shared between the people who apply the same words and 
metaphors (as suggested by Wittgenstein's language games); their social 
interaction is meaningful for, and indicative of, their belonging together. To 
narrate the beginning of the insurgency in terms of cattle rustling by the 
Karamojong provides exactly this 'we-feeling'. From today's perspective, 
everybody living in Teso at the time fell prey to either the Karamojong 
or/and the NRA atrocities. This shared experience has the capacity to unite 
people under the guise of 'victimhood'. In this interpretation the 
perpetrators (the Karamojong and the NRA/M) and victims (the Iteso and 
Kumam) are clearly defined. To promote the narrative of cattle rustling 
constitutes a coherent identity behind which all the people of Teso can 
gather. And, in the words of Pius Okiria: "The collective memory of the 
people, I have the feeling there is a lot of anger in them."61
What is wiped out in the production of a collective Teso identity is the 
differentiation between people who became victims and people who had 
political motivations to go into the bush. Discussions about their reasons to 
participate in the insurgency have disappeared from the public discourse 
and they have been submerged into the collective victimhood.
This is particularly interesting because, as the next chapter will show, 
during the insurgency a high rate of crimes were committed by 
Iteso/Kumam against each other. Homicide, robbery and violence occurred 
inside the community. To recognise this was highly unsettling for the 
community. A true identity had to be established as a means of coming to 
terms with the disruptive experience of internal violence. Societies torn by 
violent conflict need to establish new certainties and coherence to start a 
process of inner social healing and to re-make unmade worlds. In particular 
in light of internal mistrust and suspicion a collective identity carries the 
promise of consolidation.
Identities are established in relation to difference, and in the case of 
Teso the former enemy (the Museveni government) was the obvious 
"Other" in opposition to whom a new identity could be created. However, as 
already quoted in Chapter 2, "the multiple drives to stamp truth upon ... 
identities function to convert difference into otherness, and otherness into
61 Interview with Pius Okiria, Soroti 24.02.2000.
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scapegoats created and maintained to secure the appearance of a true 
identity."62 In the process of narrating their identity 'true ', people in Teso 
again turned the former enemy into a scapegoat. The way the past is 
recalled not only constitutes a, in this case, rather coherent identity 
internally, but it simultaneously defines outside relations. To portray 
Museveni as the perpetrator who caused the insurgency produces and re­
produces a solid us/them dichotomy. A process of boundary drawing is 
enacted which leaves little space for national dialogue and reconciliation 
between Teso and the NRM/A. Here, then, an authentic discourse defines 
who is friend and who is foe, it introduces a sense of closure which does not 
allow for alternative interpretations. In Chapter 3, I argued that to practice 
closure is an essential requirement to define local relationships which have 
been destroyed by a violent conflict and that, through a degree of closure, 
eroded concepts can be re-made. In Teso, however, the hermeneutic 
process of recalling the past in light of the Other, the Museveni government, 
has led to the exclusive interpretation of Self and Other. The flux of time 
was arrested and, to extend the metaphor, given a long prison sentence. 
The recollection of the past in a particular way has introduced an authentic 
truth, and identity, which stands in the way of future reconciliation.
The Politics o f Narratives
The political function of narratives becomes apparent if one looks at 
the claims the Iteso and Kumam derive from promoting a particular tale. 
Regarding Ugandan national politics, if indeed innocent the Iteso have the 
negotiating power of a victim. The Museveni government, solely responsible 
for the violent conflict, owes the people what they have lost: development, 
education, political participation etc. There is thus an important political 
dimension in the selection of one narrative over another: to be constituted 
in a certain way entitles to certain demands.
In addition, in a post-conflict society victimhood might lead to a 
degree of apathy, as apparent in Teso. To blame the central government for 
causing pain and suffering, and to demand compensation, results in not
62 Connelly (1991): 67.
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taking on responsibility and not trying to improve the condition out of one's 
own energy.
In hindsight a number of different narratives are on offer to explain 
the motivation behind 'going into the bush'. The one which has turned into 
the true story about the cause of the insurgency portrays the people of Teso 
as victims and the Museveni government as perpetrators, leading to a 
coherent collective identity. While this is helpful for the process of social 
healing it obstructs future reconciliation, and ignores the fact that the 
insurgency served numerous internal functions. These issues are the 
subject of the next chapter.
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chapter vii
T h e  S o c ia l  
Co n s t it u t io n  o f  T eso  
a t  t h e  B e g in n in g  
o f  t h e  I n s u r g e n c y
Why do people fight? Traditionally, conflict analysis focuses on broad, 
mostly national power asymmetries that give rise to violent conflicts. As 
criticised by Shapiro in Chapter 4, it takes issue with policing, defending and 
transgressing of boundaries between Self/Other. As an alternative, the 
previous chapter has analysed the drawing of boundaries between 
Teso/government from an ontological perspective. In addition, however, 
what is frequently ignored by conflict analysts are the prevailing social and 
cultural continuities that allow for acts of violence to occur. Not every 
conflict leads to outbreaks of violence so it is essential to ask why this was 
the case in Teso.
The importance of mapping the constitution, or structural proclivities, 
which allow violent conflict to occur have recently been highlighted by 
Carolyn Nordstrom and JoAnn Martin. With reference to academic research 
they suggest that outside observers to violent conflicts are generally misled 
by textual analysis and media sources.1
The 'im ages' of conflict that are carried to outsiders by the visual and 
print media focus on dram atic vignettes th a t are intended to convey 
sociopolitical 'tru ths' about the situation in question. In  all of these 
formal portrayals the ideology is clear-cut, the opponents are obvious, 
and the fighting takes place among delineated factions th at are 
politically recognisable. Soldiers fight, ideology teaches, civilians support 
or suffer for power.2
1 Carolyn Nordstrom/JoAnn Martin (1992): The Culture o f Conflict: Field Reality and Theory. 
in: Nordstrom, Carolyn/Martin, JoAnn (eds.): The Paths to Domination, Resistance, and 
Terror. Berkley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, p. 4.
2 Nordstrom/Martin (1992): 4.
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A discipline like International Relations is susceptible to these 
allegations for much of the conflict literature is written on the basis of 
newspaper reports and public statements. As argued before, this proves 
highly problematic if one is to write about a culture different from one's 
own. In countries like Uganda, for instance, where not only documents as 
such are rare but illiteracy rates high, and, even more importantly, where 
radios and newspapers are too expensive to purchase, public discourses are 
the domain of a small elite. Interviews with leaders and policy-makers, 
another feature of IR field research, also misrepresent the population at 
large, for leaders are often educated in the West, and will most likely not 
divert from the official line of explanation.3
As a consequence, in the discipline of IR, case studies neatly fit into 
categories and concepts. Violent conflicts are often characterised as 
sporadic and exceptional -  so that their resolution is envisaged as the 
addressing of a 'cause' like the lack of resources, repression or exclusion. In 
addition, it is frequently argued that insurgency wars derive either from 
blocked political aspirations or from reactive desperation.4 The act of 
violence is silenced through rational explanations of violent conflicts, where 
the focus is on conflict and not on violence. In doing so the event is 
rendered more controllable, the threat of the unpredictability of violence is 
disciplined into safe accounts and theories.
This thesis therefore tries to narrate 'a different kind of war story'.5 
The outbreak, as well as the mediation, of the Teso insurgency was 
facilitated by a number of factors that find no representation in traditional 
conflict analysis. And yet, they might have been vital factors to the 
commencement as well as end of fighting.
3 Nevertheless, it is important to mention here that interviews can contribute to some extent 
to learning about a particular situation. My criticism is rather focused on research with 
exclusively uses interviews, newspaper articles and other public sources yet which fails to 
learn about the horizons through which the people affected interpret the sources themselves, 
as argued in ch. 4.
4 Clapham (1998): 5.
5 Nordstrom (1997).
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The Social Constitution Teso in 1986-7
One of the most striking features of the Teso insurgency was that it 
was a 'people's insurgency': "In those days, we were all rebels!"6 people say 
today. Women and girls hid their brothers and husbands from the 
government troops, they provided food and shelter. Boys, too young to 
fight, acted as spies or messengers.
Rebel leaders found it easy to recruit and encourage people to 
support them with all their efforts; the whole community supported the 
cause. Thus the beginning of the insurgency, like any other development, 
was situated in an interaction of agency and structure as elaborated in 
Giddens' structuration theory. At the time, the prevailing structural 
properties provided a fertile ground on which to promulgate an insurgency 
war. The following section shall describe in more detail the social 
constitution of Teso in 1986-7. The question is again: what caused the 
insurgency in Teso? Once more, it shall be addressed from the very local, 
internal perspective when we ask: is war the continuation of politics by 
other means?
The Different Practices o f Warfare
The 'field reality' of violent conflict is very different from the detached 
and protected distance afforded the analysis of texts and sources conducted 
at some removal.7 Carolyn Nordstrom and JoAnn Martin draw our attention 
to the fact that
notions of witchcraft, bureaucracy, tim e, and everyday conversation or 
their repressive silencing are often the arenas in which power struggles 
are manifested and aggression given a cultural vo ice;... and claims of 
ju s t w ar are often used as ideological whitewash covering far different 
practices.8
6 Joseph Okello, Serere 02.05.2000.
7 From my very limited experience of staying in and travelling through regions classified as 
'insecure and unsafe', whilst conducting research (in Karamoja, Uganda, during the raiding of 
Teso cattle in Spring 2000), I am in strong agreement this argument. Not only is one able to 
see the conflict from an almost shockingly new perspective, but, in addition, the personal 
experience of threat and the anticipation of danger, whether justified or not, alters one's 
perception and understanding of people's motivations.
8 Nordstrom/Martin (1992): 4.
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Nordstrom and Martin's argument that "just war" narratives of, say, fighting 
against a hegemon, cover "far different practices" runs counter Karl von 
Clausewitz's comment that
[w ]hen whole communities go to w ar ... the reason always lies in some 
political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political 
object. W ar, therefore, is an act of politics.9
Since in Teso the whole community went to war it is essential to ask 
whether Clausewitz's rational argument can be sustained.10 Or was Teso, at 
the beginning of the insurgency, also driven by 'different practices', other 
than acts of politics?
The Benefits o f the Insecurity
Murray Last suggests two different dimensions of war: "[flighting 
against fighting men, and, separately, violence against what fighting men 
claim as their property in its broadest sense."11 In the second case, violence 
is not restricted to the frontlines, it does not know of any boundaries but 
floods into the domestic and personal realm. Last thus suggests that 
"people live in a region of war where conditions of insecurity are 
generalised."12 In 'regions of war' a large number of people benefit from the 
insecurity through pursuing their own interests, and they consequently 
promote, and even increase, instability and violence. As revealed in the 
following Iteso comment quoted by Heriques:13
... the other reasons [for joining the insurgency] were more personal 
and cannot be generalised. For exam ple people who were treated as 
social outcasts, thieves, those who practised w itchcraft and so on. So 
suddenly these people were no longer needed and fe lt the best thing to 
do would be to go to the bush.
During the insurgency, many rebels, but also civilians, raided cattle, 
intimidated fellow community members to elicit material support as well as
9 Clausewitz (1993): 98.
10 A similar point is made by David Keen, David (2000): Incentives and Disincentives for 
Violence, in: Berdal, Mats/Malone, David (eds.): Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in 
Civil Wars. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
11 Murray Last (2000): Healing the Wounds of War. (Murray Last's private notes) Lecture 
given at University College London: London, p. 6.
12 Last (2000): 6.
13 Heriques (2000): 129.
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threatened and killed Kumam and Iteso they claimed had collaborated with 
the government.14 What is striking in the case of Teso is that, allegedly, 
during the insurgency, more Iteso were killed in feuds between each other 
than by government troops.15 Violence had become, to some extent, a 
tolerable way of solving problems or of 'settling old scores'. Violence can 
thus be understood as a structural property in Giddens1 sense which, over 
space and time, had become a legitimate way of social interaction.
With a view to the functional use of violence, the following shall give 
a brief, yet incomplete, overview of motives (alternative to Clausewitz's 
political goals) for engaging in a violent conflict as they transpired during 
my research in Teso:
• Land tenure: land is scarce in Teso. In an economic environment which 
relies heavily on (subsistence) farming land is one of the most valuable 
assets. However, as a result of inheritance, marriage or bad neighbourly 
relations, land ownership is often contested. Arguments over land often 
lead to physical violence and even homicide.
• Women: women in Teso are often considered as assets. When married, 
the bride's parents receive a dowry payment such as cattle, food, 
household goods, clothes and today also occasionally money. The dowry 
system opens ground for disagreement about both the dowry and the 
performance of the new wife. Physical violence occasionally results from 
this. In addition, due to the subdued role of women domestic violence, 
rape and child abuse are not exceptional.
• Cattle: for a (formerly) cattle herding culture like the Kumam and the 
Iteso cattle signify the most important asset. Arguments occasionally 
arise regarding distribution or care of animals and similar to land 
disputes this often leads to violence and homicide.
The above examples all refer to the economic assets, which in Teso often 
mean bare existence. They concern the livelihood of people and are 
therefore defended fiercely. Here "[v io lence  ... meet[s] an individual's basic
14 Interview with Alibai, Soroti 17.3.2000. Similar reports where collected by E. A. Brett and 
Heriques (2000).
15 Interview with Pius Okiria.
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needs when long-term under-development and economic and social 
exclusion mean that peaceful behaviour does not."16 In addition many 
young rebels I spoke to acknowledged that they went into the bush because 
they were offered money or because they hoped for other rewards.17 
Poverty was thus an important factor that facilitated the beginning of the 
insurgency.18
Moreover, the insurgency in Teso offered the potential for 'settling old 
scores', that is for resolving long-standing arguments, through killing the 
enemy.19 This happened either in clandestine acts or through more refined 
measures like denouncing the person to the NRA as a rebel, which would 
most likely lead to their execution. The insurgency in these terms was 
beneficial for personal and private revenge.
In addition to economic functions, some traditional components were 
important:
• Youth: For the youth the insurgency brought significant advantages. 
Teso, like in many African cultures, has strong age hierarchies which 
leave little room for young people. With the increase of westernisation, 
traditional and modern social roles become more and more difficult to 
negotiate. Especially for sons who were not 'first-borns', and who do not 
inherit house, farm and gardens, the future is often rather bleak and 
hopeless. The insurgency enabled them to break with these traditions: 
young men could either join the army or the rebels and gain some form 
of autonomy and independence.
• Witchcraft: before the insurgency Teso had a large population of witches 
and sorcerers. They were often made responsible for the death of a 
person, diseases, family misfortunes, or environmental miseries like 
droughts. A very large number of alleged witches and sorcerers were
16 David Keen (1998): The Economic Function of Violence in Civil Wars. London: Adelphi 
Paper 320/IISS, p. 46.
17 The irony is here that the same young men left the bush when promised money by the 
NRA. And yet, apparently, the 'boys' never received a single Ugandan Shilling from anybody.
18 Interviews with James Eceret and Peter Kalagala, Soroti 23.2.2000.
19 Interview with Pius Okiria and Mary Epechu, Soroti 24.02.2000.
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assassinated in the course of the insurgency so that their prevalence is 
today very low.
In short, in Teso many people benefited from the insurgency. As 
mentioned above, it is estimated that more people were killed due to 
internal rivalries than by government troops. So people in Teso had a stake 
in the beginning of the insurgency, too. Teso society contained many 
fissures and was split along many lines. The disunity in Teso is apparent in 
the words of Iteso Anglican Bishop Illokur towards the end of the 
insurgency:
[t]h e  division of Teso society goes back m any years: religion, pride, 
richness, clans, politics. There has been loss of culture and loss of 
language. Teso has been deserted by educated people -  break down in 
developm ent. Iteso are not engaged in picking up pieces and 
reconstruction. Iteso have destroyed them selves and their a re a .20
In a similar mode, Mahmood Mamdani points out that many peasant 
communities are internally divided and reproduced through internal 
struggles, and that
to focus exclusively on the dimension of tribalism  as civil w ar, and 
thereby to present a peasant m ovem ent as an unm itigated revolt from  
below against oppression form above is to indulge in m ythm aking by 
presenting an aspect of reality as to ta lity .21
Components like class, gender and age are also of salient importance since 
they make up the social fabric of the community.
The above has to be considered against the particular backdrop of the 
Teso region in Uganda.22 Many rural dwellers live in very remote areas and 
have little access to national news. For instance, during the time of my 
research in Teso the region was 'endangered' by new raids from the 
Karamojong. The newspapers were full of horror stories about the 'naked 
savages' in the north of the country. Whilst the Karamojong 'threat' was the
20 Geresom Illukor (1991): Divided We Have Fallen - United We Stand. Seminar on the Role 
of Women in Securing Peace and Development for Teso and Pallisa, Ongino, Kumi District.
21 Mahmood Mamdani (1996): Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of 
Late Colonialism. Kampala/London: Fountain/James Curry, p. 186.
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sole topic of discussion in urban settings, people in the villages knew very 
little about the 'looming danger7 and did not seem to care much.23 Similarly, 
when asked about the motivation behind the insurgency, many interviewees 
did not know about the political context of its origins. Then, as well as 
today, it appears, they were very badly informed about national or even 
regional politics. What matters to people are issues that effected them 
directly such as water supplies, farming, medical care and family, and also 
for an increasing number their religious faith.24 National, or regional, politics 
are a luxury people simply cannot afford to engage in.
The absence of a greater political picture, and interest, in the life of 
many rural dwellers in Teso enforces the argument that local dynamics and 
motivations are crucial in fuelling an insurgency war. People are easily 
mobilised into violent combat, simply because they recognise the benefits 
insecurity and instability has for their lives: hopefully better living conditions 
and less poverty. As for Teso, within a few years of fighting people realised 
that the insurgency had the opposite effect for it made their condition far 
worse. So they surrendered, as we shall see in the following chapter.
The benefits of instability and violent conflict for some people in Teso 
should not therefore be underestimated. I t  adds an important dimension to 
all the external, national or international factors that give rise to the 
fighting. Returning to Clausewitz, it is thus fair to challenge the maxim, 
"[w ]a r is .." merely "an act of force to compel your enemy to do your w ill",25 
and to suggest that this 'w ill' hides a number of alternative objectives, as it 
did in Teso.
Recognition of the economic function of violent conflicts has recently 
given rise to discussions about 'greed7 or 'grievance7.26 Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler have developed an econometric model through which to analyses 
the degree of motivation broadly based on greed (the ability to finance a
22 The following argument is based on a large number of conversations I had with rural 
people in Kamuda, Soroti district 24.3.-25.3.2000.
23 The urban and rural divide is very strong so that I e.g. met villagers who had not been to 
Soroti town for about 15 years, although they only live 10 km away.
24 It  is amazing to realise that in the most remote areas people know more about the 
Pentecostal Church then about national politics.
25 Clausewitz (1993): 83.
26 Luckham/Ahmed/Muggah/White (2001): 23.
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rebellion through primary commodity exports and through a large disapora) 
versus grievance (based on the size of ethnic and religious diversity, 
political repression and inequality).27 They conclude that primary commodity 
export and lack of opportunities for young men strongly correlate with civil 
conflict, and that thus 'greed' is stronger a motivation than 'grievance' to 
engage in violent struggle.
Without being able to make a wider argument due to the local scope 
of the present study, I would like to contend that in Teso the two categories 
'greed' and 'grievance' cannot be sustained or separated. What is labelled 
'greed' is often a sheer survival mechanism in order to cope with social and 
economic exclusion promoted in the public realm through concepts like 
'ethnicity' or 'religion', which are in themselves mere discursive terms 
legitimising inequality. Against the backdrop of a high degree of poverty as 
prevalent in Teso 'going into the bush' indeed promised economic benefits, 
yet at the same time it was also motivated by the political objective of 
fighting against Museveni's governance as well as very complex internal 
issues which disrupted the community at the time. The insurgency started 
because of political objectives and the economic functions only emerged 
once people realised that they could 'materially' benefit from the 
insecurity.28 Thus, to separate the concepts of 'greed' and 'grievance' is 
impossible in light of the present case. To make assumptions about the 
occurrence of violent conflicts it is thus more important to understand how 
greed and grievance interact.29
Whilst this section has addressed the functional motivations of why 
people fight, and put into perspective the central importance of 'political 
objectives' in Clausewitz's account of war, the following shall focus on the 
practical component of violence as 'the means' of warfare.
27 Paul Collier/Anke Hoeffler (2001): Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Washington: World 
Bank report, p. 1.
28 David Keen, for instance, argues that so called "war economies" only develop in the course 
of a conflict yet do not cause it. Keen (2000).
29 David Keen (2001): Disqualifying Grievance? A Response to the Collier/Hoeffler Model as 
an Explanation of Civil Wars. CODEP Conference, 18th-20th June 2001. London: SOAS, p. 4.
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The Means o f Warfare
According to Clausewitz:
W ar is m erely the continuation of politics by other means. ... [W ]ar is 
not m erely an act of policy but a true political instrum ent, a continuation  
of political intercourse, carried on with other means. W hat remains 
peculiar to w ar is simply the peculiar nature of m eans.... The political 
object is the goal, w ar is the means of reaching it, and means can never 
be considered in isolation from their purpose.30
The means of warfare is violence. Violence, for Clausewitz, is an 
instrument which can be deployed whenever necessary. The use of violence 
is rational action, it can be separated from the individual or the community 
that resorts to it. In Clausewitz's argument, violence and culture are 
disconnected. "Violence and culture ... [are] conceived as externals to each 
other, as alters, and not as historically complicit."31 In other words, violence 
is not a cultural expression but a universally applicable tool.
This perspective has been contested by the writing of Nordstrom. Her 
research on violent conflict in Mozambique suggests that local people 
understand violence not as a means but rather as a fluid cultural construct. 
"Violence is crafted into action by those seeking to control others. I t  is 
made."32 People exposed to violence 'learn violence' and are then able to 
use it themselves.33 To 'learn violence' is a historical process which does not 
only involve individuals but also communities. Over space and time certain 
cultural traits are being developed as responses to internal and external 
influences. They provide the structural properties that define what is 
possible in a particular society. In order to understand the violent conflict in 
Teso it is thus important to situate the use of violence historically.
A Culture o f Violence?
How has violence been legitimated over time? In the case of Teso it is 
difficult to map out the historical process of 'learning violence'. Hardly any 
literature is available, apart from the anthropological studies of British
30 Clausewitz (1993): 99.
31 Allen Feldmann (1994): Writing the Inhuman: Aesthetic Control and Iconic Transgression 
in the Depiction of Violence. Atlanta: American Anthropology Association report, p. 5.
32 Nordstrom (1997): 217.
33 Nordstrom (1997): 217.
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colonial administrators, which do in fact make reference to the use of 
violence in Teso.34 However, the act of colonial conquest was in itself an act 
of violence, including the use of physical violence, against people in Teso 
and elsewhere. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, ever since 
independence in 1962, Uganda has been ruled by a sequence of violent 
dictators. I t  has been suggested that the experience of terror and 
oppression under Obote and Amin served to undermine the development of 
tolerance and trust.35 Especially the degree of political violence under Amin 
encouraged a culture of private violence to remove enemies.36 Furthermore,
Ugandans killed each other for property, for a culture of okuliira mu 
kavuyo (literally 'eating in confusion') had set in the minds of people.
Given a background of considerable poverty and the elem ent of 
uncertainty of the new ownership, instant wealth a t the cost of no more 
effort than that involved in gambling (praise the chief, blacken the  
present owner or w hat-have-you) diverted m any away from honest hard 
work to concentrate on the search for titles to new assets th a t could be 
appropriated.37
With the seizure of power by Museveni in 1986 the use of violence 
and coercion reduced on a national level. This is despite Museveni's victory 
being a new legitjmisation of military violence as a political strategy, and 
indeed in areas such as Acholi rebels have been fighting the government 
ever since it has been in place.38 Often, forms of violence are inherent in 
traditional expressions, too.39 In addition, throughout the whole of Uganda 
violent acts, such as mob justice (including killing the suspect) sexual abuse 
and domestic violence are constantly on the front pages of the newspapers, 
rendering violence almost normal.
Before the western influence through colonialism, traditionally crimes 
such as murder amongst the Iteso were settled through a council of elders
34 As argued for instance in the ethnographic work of the colonial administrator in Teso J. C. 
D. Lawrence (1957): The Iteso: Fifty Years of Change in a Nilo-Hammitic Tribe of Uganda. 
London: Oxford University Press.
35 Dicklitch (1998): 46.
36 Pirout (1995): 34.
37 Mutibwa (1992): 117.
38 See for instance Heike Behrend (1999): Alice and the Holy Spirits. War in Northern
Uganda 1985-97. Kampala/London: Fountain/James Curry.
39 Suzette Heald (1999): Manhood and Morality. Sex, Violence and Rituals in Gisu Society. 
London: Routledge.
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and required compensation in form of a girl or a cow. During inter-clan 
settlement the elders would debate fully armed. "In case the other side 
showed uncompromising behaviour, fighting could easily ensue."40 The 
waging of war depended on the prognoses of a fortune teller, Amurwok, and 
the collective approval of the elders.41
Yet, a more recent development in Teso increases the use of 
violence, too. As a result of economic globalisation and the spread of 
western thought through different forms of the media, many people in Teso 
find themselves at a loss. Elders report about the rapid increase of violence, 
for example, committed by street children in Soroti as a result of Kung-Fu 
videos shown in local film houses.42 The clash of modern and traditional 
worlds leaves elders angry and almost helpless for they have lost the 
authority to discipline their offspring. Traditional structures and institutions 
of reconciliation have been eroded due to external influence,43 while the 
youth in particular finds itself in confusion over what is right or wrong. 
Violence is often a result of breaking old structures without having 
alternative conceptions.
Hence in Teso, physical violence is part of the day to day life and as 
such it constitutes a feature of the Iteso and Kumam identity.44 The daily 
discourse is informed by references to violence, be it caning of school 
children or as a punishment for petty crime, domestic violence or abuse of 
women, occasional killings of thieves and the like.
When Iteso talk much about violence it is not because it is absent, but 
because it is part of life. W e cannot say, "'life is cheap'" in Teso, but 
violence has a place as a social praxis.45
Therefore, without engaging in value-laden allegations about the 
preparedness to use violence in Uganda in general, and in Teso in
40 Nzita (1995): 124.
41 Nzita (1995): 125.
42 Interview with Francis Okello, Soroti 17.04.2000 and Edmund Okella, Soroti 20.3.2000.
43 Heald reports about similar developments in neighbouring Gisu district, Uganda. Suzette 
Heald (1998): Controlling Anger. The Anthropology of Gisu Violence. Kampala/Oxford: 
Fountain/James Curry.
44 Heriques (2000): 223.
45 Heriques (2000): 224.
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particular, I would like to suggest that the use of violence as a way of social 
interaction is more widely accepted than in Germany, for instance.46 This is 
not to say that violence does not exist in Germany, but rather that it is not 
legitimised in the same way as in Teso. To refer to the concept 
'legitim isation' has one important implication: in the west violence has a 
negative connotation, it is conceived of as being anti-social. In other 
cultures, however, it is a more common practice and does not have the 
same negative tinge. Violence therefore does not constitute something anti­
social or pre-social but should be considered in its social context as one 
form of social interaction amongst others. The acceptance or non- 
acceptance of violence is a cultural tra it which cannot be judged on 
universal grounds of right and wrong.
Not every conflict necessarily leads to the outbreak of violence and 
yet in a cultural environment, where the threshold for using violence is 
rather low and legitimate, a violent conflict might occur more easily. I t  is 
here where violence becomes a means, yet it is not rational or irrational 
but rather historically conditioned. In Teso, at the beginning of the 
insurgency, and to some extent also today, violence was socially accepted 
and therefore facilitated the outbreak of the fighting.
Agency in Teso
When discussing the social constitution of Teso which enabled the 
agency of a small group of rebel leaders to ignite widespread violence one 
must also pay attention to the social constitution of the rebel leaders (and 
rebels) as actors themselves. How are leaders socially constituted so that 
they consider violent conflict as an adequate option to achieve their aims?
In many African countries inter- and intra-state wars have a long 
history. Often the political leaders and elites fought their way into 
government as rebels trained in military practise and strategic thought. 
Proxy wars during the Cold War guaranteed military training either in the
46 This section refers to physical violence only. The preparedness to use violence has also 
been pointed out by Angelika Spelten (2000): GTZ-Studie zu Kriesenpraevention und 
Konfliktmanagement in Uganda. Kampala: GTZ, p. 12; and Olupot (2000): 7.
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Soviet Union, Cuba or North Korea, or in the US. Former rebels in Teso, for 
instance, without hesitation quote Mao, Marx or Lenin, or they praise 
German Wehrmacht warfare strategy. In many African countries, a culture 
of militarism prevails which renders fighting a more comfortable and 
familiar activity than negotiation or settlement.47
Militarism, it has been argued, "is a belief system founded on the 
basic assumption that human beings are by nature violent, aggressive and 
competitive and on the corollary assumption that social order must be 
maintained by force and power."48 This interpretation of human nature 
legitimises war as a necessary means to an end.49
Due to their historically ascribed role as military staff, police forces 
and prison officers, imposed by the British colonial power, many men in 
Teso identify themselves strongly with a certain culture of militarism. For 
instance, during a conference on Peace, Conflict Resolution and 
Development the former Special Forces commander and Minister of the 
Interior under Obote (and later rebel leader during the insurgency) Col. 
Omaria stated that when Museveni came to power senior army officers like 
himself, who had received the best military training all over the world, 
found themselves deprived of their former importance, stripped of their 
identity and left with a sensation of uselessness, which led to strong 
resentment.50 The disillusioned ex-army commanders thus resorted to the 
behaviour they were trained in and most familiar with: armed struggle.
What is at the core of this form of governance is the understanding 
that politics and the use of military force are intrinsically, and legitimately, 
intertwined. This attitude is embedded in left-wing thought (as it prevails in 
Teso thanks to Obote) and bush-war practice where the resort to arms is a
47 Alex de Waal (2001): "Brute Causes." Index on Censorship 30 (1 ): p. 134. I am very 
grateful to Alex de Waal for inspiring me to this argument.
48 Betty Reardon (1985): Sexism and the War System. New York: Teachers College Press, p. 
14.
49 Riitta Wahlstrom (1992): The Challenge of Peace Education: Replacing Cultures of 
Militarism, in: Boulding, Elise (ed.): New Agendas for Peace Research. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, p. 173.
50 Col. Omaria's comment at the Peace, Conflict Resolution and Development consultation 
organised by the Office of the Prime Minister in conjunction with the Swedish government at 
Soroti 24.3.2000.
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commonplace. Having received political and military training from allies like 
Cuba, Libya, Russia, North Korea etc. left-wing political leaders are heavily 
indoctrinated with notions of revolution and violent struggle -  they strive on 
the notion of being a vanguard fighter. Here military doctrine has entered 
body and mind of the individual as a rebel leader, or the rebels as a group. 
Practical and intellectual training has disciplining effects which determine 
how the world appears -  and by indication how one responds to it.51 Left- 
wing military training orders thoughts and decision-making in a way that 
legitimises, if not demands, the use of violence as a way of emancipation. 
The agency of Teso leaders, the act of starting the insurgency, was deeply 
embedded in their historical constitution as soldiers which rendered the 
decision to retreat into the bush to fight against Museveni an adequate 
option.
A Different Kind of War Story?
With reference to Clausewitz, what this chapter has sought to 
illustrate is that violent conflict is not merely the result of the pursuit of 
political objectives, but also economic, cultural and traditional motivations, 
and that violence is not simply a means to an end, that is achieving these 
objectives, but rather a cultural tra it situated in structural properties.
In Teso the fighting was plotted and initiated by a small group of 
people, whose decision-making agency was conditioned by their constitution 
through military training and practise. Their actions were enabled by the 
silent consent of the society at large that fighting was both just and 
necessary, even if only for very personal reasons. The rebel leaders at the 
time were aware of the support in the population, they had no difficulties 
recruiting rebels, or to survive in the bush with the help of villagers who 
provided food and shelter. Agency was thus enabled by the prevailing 
structural properties in Teso at the time.
51 For the disciplining power of military training see Michel Foucault (1991a): Discipline and 
Punish. London: Penguin, part I I I .
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And yet, in the course of the fighting people in Teso altered their 
attitude to the insurgency and withdrew their widespread support. The 
experience of death, extreme poverty and deprivation, as a result of the 
armed struggle, not only ran counter the expected economic improvement, 
but also led to disillusionment regarding the political aims that could be 
achieved. Thus, the popular support ceased eventually and opened a 
possibility for peace.52
52 The present thesis takes issue with the past, present and future of Teso. As for the past, 
however, it does not attempt to give a comprehensive historical account of the developments 
during the insurgency but merely mention what is of significance with reference to the 
process of reconciliation.
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chapter viii
M e d ia t in g  H o r iz o n s  -  
T h e  Co n s t it u t io n  o f  
P eace  in  T eso
How does peace occur? Where does it derive from? Is it a sudden 
rupture? Or is it rather a process?
Changing structural properties
As we have seen in the previous chapters on the Teso past, the 
insurgency was situated in discursive practices based on exclusive 
identities, as well as cultural properties that rendered the use of violence a 
legitimate means for interaction. The subject of this chapter is to investigate 
the process of reconciliation in Teso, and to assess whether the present 
peace has changed from excluding to incorporating difference.1 I t  shall 
therefore introduce the different agents that participated in the mediation 
process in Teso. What runs like a thread through this chapter is the 
question whether the various agents were successful in changing the 
structural properties of inclusion and exclusion that gave rise to the 
insurgency. Did they have an impact on rendering the dichotomy Museveni 
government/Iteso-Kumam less exclusive?
In addition, in recognition of the culture of violence that prevailed in 
Teso at the beginning of the insurgency, and the role it played in 
legitimising 'going into the bush', in the chapter I shall frequently ask 
whether the mediation efforts reduced the use of violence as a means of 
conflict resolution.
As for the structure of this chapter, I shall first develop a theoretical 
framework, based on hermeneutics, which allows for the understanding of 
mediation as embedded in the process of the transformation of prevailing 
structural properties. This shall then serve as a backdrop against which to 
evaluate the conciliation process in Teso.
1 Jabri (1996): 157.
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In-Between Time
According to Gadamer "[t]he  true locus of hermeneutics is the in- 
between."2 By analogy the time and space after a violent conflict can be 
described as the time 'in-between': in-between war and peace, in-between 
friend and enemy, in-between the parties to the conflict, in-between 
territorial boundaries. "In this situation past and future are equally present 
precisely because they become equally absent from our sense."3 This notion 
of in-betweenness is what Hannah Arendt calls 'the odd time in-between', 
where the threads of traditions are broken and a gap becomes vacant in 
which action and change may occur.4 This gap, she suggests, is no longer a 
condition peculiar to thought but provides the tangible reality for political 
action. Arendt's notion of the gap serves as a useful metaphor for a site on 
which to locate conflict resolution, and the ending of a war provides a 
distinct point in time to accommodate this odd time in-between, the gap.
Mediation
Human Needs and Problem Solving
The term mediation, as used in International Relations discourse, can 
be defined as "a voluntary process in which the parties retain control over 
the outcome (pure mediation), although it may include positive and 
negative inducements."5 Traditionally, academic scholarship which theorises 
mediation is based on the assumption that human beings share the same 
needs and interests, and that conflict arises out of two parties pursuing the 
same, often scarce, good. Most prominently, John Burton's 'human needs 
approach' identifies a series of needs, defined as inherent drives for 
survival,6 like identity, security and development, as the preconditions of
2Gadamer (1993a): 300. (translated in Gadamer (1975): 295)
3Hannah Arendt (1978): The Life of the Mind. One/Thinking. London: Seeker & Warburg, p. 
203.
4 Arendt (1968): 14.
5 Hugh Miall/Oliver Ramsbotham/Tom Woodhouse (1999): Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 21-2.
6 Burton (1990): 39.
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individual progress.7 Burton's human needs approach thus implicitly
postulates that all human beings have certain inherent drives that are
outside of the individual's control.8 I t  has been argued that Burton's theory 
relies on a particular, universal conception of human nature with regards to 
its 'needs',9 yet that these 'needs' might be mere cultural expressions of a 
western, white, middle-class and male environment.10
According to Burton, needs cannot be suppressed or socialised away, 
and unless they are fulfilled there can be no social stability.11 In response to 
essential features of humans like their 'needs', conflict resolution takes the 
shape of 'problem-solving' where the parties to a conflict are brought 
together to realise the similarities in their interests and to find ways to 
cover all participants' 'needs'. With the aid of a third party as facilitator an 
atmosphere is created which allows the parties to the conflict to
constructively manage their disagreements.12 Oblivious of cultural
difference, problem-solving workshops endeavour to create a "non-distorted 
and reciprocal communication" so that the participants can realise where 
their problems 'really' lie.13 Consequently, the theory of problem-solving 
workshops is situated in a particular wider political tradition which assumes 
a certain set of underlying normative principles - principles that have 
recently been challenged.14
In addition, problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution do not 
account for violence being a part of the social fabric of a community but 
promote a view of violence being a means to an end.15 Yet, as argued in
7 Burton (1990): 32.
8 Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (1994): Overlapping Radicalism: Convergence Between Feminist 
and Human Needs Theories in Conflict Resolution, in: Taylor, Anita/Beinstein Miller, Judi 
(eds.): Conflict and Gender. Cresskill: Hampton Press, p. 310.
9 Tarja Vayrynen (1995a): Sharing Reality: An Insight from Phenomenology to John Burton's 
Problem-Solving Conflict Resolution Theory (unpublished doctoral thesis). Department of 
International Relations. Canterbury: University of Kent.
10 Sandole-Staroste (1994): 312.
11 Burton (1990): 23.
12 Vayrynen (1995b): 72.
13 Vayrynen (1995b): 73.
14 Jones (1999): 67; Jabri (1996); Vayrynen (1995a/1995b); Robert A. Baruch Bush/Joseph 
P. Folgner (1994): The Promise of Mediation. Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment 
and Recognition. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
15 As argued in Michel Banks/Christopher Mitchell (1996): Handbook of Conflict Resolution. 
The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach. New York: Pinter, p. 3.
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Chapter 7, the use of violence in times of conflict might be legitimated in a 
particular social, economic and cultural environment. In Teso, the insecurity 
gave way to people pursuing their personal interests like settling old scores. 
More importantly, against the backdrop of severe poverty, violence might 
be functional for economic benefits which ease the hardship of day to day 
life. In an environment where the resort to violence is culturally legitimated 
violent conflict is fuelled by this propensity. This, however, is different from 
Burton's 'needs theory' which considers violent conflict as a means to 
accomplish a particular notion of identity, development or security. The aim 
of a problem-solving workshop is then to exchange violence with a non- 
forcible method.16 In not recognising that violence is not simply a means but 
a socially learned way of interaction, problem-solving workshops do not 
focus on 'unlearning violence'. Cultures of violence remain unchallenged, 
and thus in place.
On a structural note, problem-solving workshops, it has been argued, 
are often couched in the prevailing power relations and institutions and 
shun the alteration of the power relations p e rse .17 Starting from a notion of 
conflict which sees it as non-structural and ahistorical the workshops are 
more concerned with tactics than with strategy and leave structural 
properties of discursive and institutional inclusion and exclusion 
unquestioned. In addition, they mainly focus at the level of leaders and 
leave the social constitution of a society unchallenged.
Narrative Mediation
In response to the shortcomings of problem-solving workshops, the 
present study suggests an alternative approach to conflict resolution. I t  has 
at its core what has been referred to as 'narrative mediation' in which the 
complex social contexts that shape conflicts are considered.18 Focusing on 
the constitutive properties of conflict stories, narrative mediation does not 
evaluate whether a story is true or factual but rather how it constitutes the
16 Banks/Mitchell (1996): 5.
17 Raimo Vayrynen (1991): To Settle or to Transform. Perspectives on the Resolution of 
National and International Conflicts, in: Vayrynen, Raimo (ed.): New Directions in Conflict 
Theory. Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation. London/Newbury Park/New Delhi: 
Sage, p. 2.
18 John Winslade/Gerald Monk (2000): Narrative Mediation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, p. xi. See also Cobb (1994).
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parties to the conflict as enemies. The recent growth of interest in conflict 
studies with a focus on discourse and mediation is closely tied to 
communication studies.19 As we have seen in Chapter 1 and 2, in the 
discipline of International Relations, Discourse Ethics, in the Habermasian 
tradition, and post-structuralism have become increasingly popular.20
A narrative approach to mediation is deeply imbedded in an 
understanding of individual and collective identity as constructed over space 
and time. Different from Burton's problem-solving approach, it is profoundly 
cultural in orientation for it assumes that different people perceive reality, 
and thus conflicts, in different ways -  and that any resolution has to take 
this into account. I f  we accept that social realities and truth only occur in 
language, and that they are transmitted through language games as I tried 
to show with the aid of Wittgenstein, then communication can be the only 
arena in which to resolve conflicts. Changing the language game, that is the 
way we see and refer to the world (or our enemy), is hence core to a post­
positivist approach to conflict resolution. In the process of mediation the 
mediators seek to open up a space amongst the tightly woven stories of the 
opponents in order to allow for different, less totalising, descriptions of 
events.21 Hence, from the perspective of the mediator, Sara Cobb draws 
attention to the fact that "[understanding stories ... requires a set of 
theoretical assumptions:
(a) that social process (negotiation) is both dynamic and interactive 
-  stories emerge in interaction;
(b) that problematic stories are transformed in interaction;
(c) that the transformation of stories requires reflection and inquiry 
with others, over time; and
19 Leda M. Cooks/ Claudia L. Hale (1994): "The Construction of Ethics in Mediation." 
Mediation Quarterly 12(1): 57. See for example the contributions to Linda L. Putman/ 
Michael E. Roloff (eds.) (1992): Communication and Negotiation. Newbury 
Park/London/Delhi: Sage.
20 Jabri (1996); Mark Hoffman (1995): "Defining and Evaluating Success: Facilitative 
Problem-Solving Workshops in an Interconnected Context." Paradigms 9 (2 ): 150-63; Lloyed- 
Jones (2000); Jones (1999); Rothman (1992); Angela R. Febbraro/Roland D. Chrisjohn 
(1994): A Wittgensteinian Approach to the Meaning of Conflict, in: Taylor, Ann/Bernstein 
Miller, Judi (eds.): Conflict and Gender. Cresskill: Hampton, 237-58.
21 Winslade/Monk (2000): 5.
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(d) that fostering inquiry (in self and others) is facilitated by 
appreciative and legitimising moves in interaction, rather than 
negative and delegitimising moves."22 
The process of mediation thus changes both story and reality.
While contributions to the field of mediation are often very limited in 
scope when they focus on workshops and third party intervention, my use 
of the term 'mediation' will be much broader.23 Mediation shall be used 
synonymously with Gadamer's notion of fusing horizons as discussed in 
Chapter 3, and thus include aspects of social transformation and change. 
The post-conflict society, together with the former enemy, has to establish 
new ways of communicating with each other, ways that avoid the tensions 
of the past. In the process of mediation, of the fusion of horizons, 
imagination is required to invent new identities. Mediation is hence a poetic 
process of creating something new out of what has been.24 As such, 
mediation happens always and everywhere, it is ontological in character and 
a core feature of life. Thus, in Gilles Deleuze words:
Mediators are fundam ental. Creation is all about m ediators. W ithout 
them  nothing happens. They can be people ... but things too. W hether 
they're real or im aginary, anim ated or inanim ate, you have to form your 
mediators. It's  a series. I f  you're not in some series, even a completely  
im aginary one, you're lost. I  need my m ediators to express myself, and 
they'd never express themselves w ithout me: you are always working 
within a group, even when you seem working on your ow n.25
Deleuze draws our attention to the perennial influences and impulses 
we are exposed to and which lead us to permanently challenge and adapt 
our identity. We thus constantly change who we are and what we aspire to. 
By consequence, we are closely tied to our environment, to the Other. 
Being is always being-with.26
22 Sara Cobb (2000): "Negotiation Pedagogy: Learning to Learn." Negotiation Journal 16(4): 
316-7.
23 For reviews of mediation literature see Lloyed-Jones (2000) and Jabri (1996).
24 Nordstrom (1997): 190. The etymology of the Greek word poetic reveals its ancient 
meaning as 'creating' or 'making'.
25 Gillies Deleuze (1995): Negotiations 1972-1990. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 
125.
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Similar to the individual, communities also find themselves in 
constant transformation, mediated through space and time. As argued by 
Vattimo and quoted in Chapter 3, communities are not something closed 
and isolated but they move with their horizons.27
I f  the poetic character of mediation holds true for individuals and 
communities it offers an adequate framework through which to consider the 
ontology of peace. Different from Burton's problem-solving approach it 
avoids the pitfall of cultural universalism, of regarding violence as a means 
to an end and of leaving wider social structures of inclusion and exclusion 
unchallenged. Rather, the poetic process of (re)creation, of fusing horizons, 
challenges and changes prevailing truths leading (potentially) to the 
invention of peace. This becomes especially apparent in the odd time in- 
between war and peace.
Yet was this the case in Teso?
Discourse on Peace
To restate the argument of Chapter 2, in Discourses on Violence 
Vivienne Jabri promotes a discourse on peace which "assumes a basis for 
the transformation of symbolic and institutional orders which underpin 
violent conflict." Again, she encourages a counter-discourse which allows for 
the understanding of the structurated legitimisation of violence as well as 
challenging the militarist order and exclusionist identities in which it is 
embedded.28 Jabri thus emphasises that
[t]h e  construct of peace, therefore, must aim  to incorporate both a 
rejection of violence and its institutional underpinnings in combination  
with a defined process which would enable its realisation.29
With reference to Teso, this chapter will investigate if the present 
peace adheres to Jabri's requirements. Is violence rejected and structural 
exclusion dissolved? In order to do so it is first important to understand how 
peace came about, who the driving forces were and how they achieved a
26 Heidegger (1993): 117.
27 Vattimo (1997): 38.
28 Jabri (1996): 146.
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change in people's motivation from war to peace. This shall then lead to an 
evaluation of the present conditions of peace in Teso in the following 
chapter.
The Development o f the Insurgency
In order to understand the resolution of the insurgency in Teso it is 
not only vital to know how it began, but also how it developed over time. In 
the course of violent struggles the political motivations change, economic 
interests drop in and out, personalities emerge and disappear so that the 
initial constellation may have little resemblance to what is at stake at a later 
point.
Although the support amongst the Kumam and Iteso for the fight 
against the new government was vast not everybody was prepared to 
actively engage in the armed struggle. And yet, those who were suitable for 
combat were given little chance. Either the rebels forced them to come into 
'the bush', or they had to join the NRA. For an adult male to stay inactively 
in the village was impossible; they immediately became suspected of either 
collaborating with the army or with the rebels. Thus many were drawn into 
combat although under other circumstances they would never have 
participated out of their own initiative.30 Others had to leave Teso for safer 
grounds.
The cattle raiding of the Karamojong warriors was used to mobilise 
the society. The public discourse revolved around the NRA's involvement, 
resentment was generated. Even in churches, priests and clergymen used 
their position to address the need to fight against the government. This led 
to the shared belief that injustice was committed against the Iteso and 
Kumam and enabled the collective mobilisation of the population. As a 
result 'everybody was a rebel',31 either actively in the bush or in a
29 Jabri (1996): 150.
30 Interview with Michael Obwaatum.
31 Interview with Joseph Okello.
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supportive role through cooking and catering. Women, children and elders, 
who remained in the villages, did their best to assist 'the boys'.
Defeat or Success?
Militarily, the rebels had little chance to succeed against the NRA. 
Apart from the availability of arms and resources to the national army it 
also followed a ruthless policy of scorched earth, forceful encampment of 
civil population for 6 months in Kumi district in order to separate the rebels 
from the non-combatants, splitting of rebel groups into small, regional units 
confined to their areas of operation, and undermining of arms supply from 
abroad, which left the Teso rebels with little hope of victory.
In an environment of violent conflict the heavy loss of human and 
material capacities leads to two alternative conclusions:32 either the 
combatants feel that they have already lost so much and thus they have to 
continue their struggle for they owe it to the cause and their fallen 
comrades. Or they realise that their chances for victory are too slim, and 
that they should avoid increasing the costs the violent conflict has already 
taken and thus surrender. In Teso, the second sentiment prevailed so that 
the rebels, one after the other, came out of 'the bush'. I t  is estimated that 
the NRA absorbed 10,000 rebels. Many turned from fighting against the 
NRA on one day to fighting with the NRA on the next.
Thus the reasons generally given for the ending of the violent 
struggle in Teso are twofold: first, it was recognised that the rebels were 
too weak to topple the government, and second, the suffering was so fierce 
that people were not prepared to expose themselves to it for much longer.33
At first sight, the two reasons provided have the characteristics of 
defeat, and many people in Teso today feel they were outplayed by the 
NRA/M. However, I would like to suggest that these developments in Teso 
were more nuanced than simple surrender, and that a number of actors,
32 This point is similar to an argument made by Christopher Mitchell (1995): "The Right 
Moment: Notes on four Models of "Ripeness"." Paradigms 9 (2 ), p. 39.
33 Interview with Musa Echweru.
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including the government and indigenous actors, contributed to the 
resolution. I t  became evident to me during field work that the Kumam and 
Iteso credit local, indigenous agents to a greater extent than government 
efforts.
Mediation in Teso
African Principles o f Conflict Resolution
In the field of conflict studies indigenous conflict resolution has 
gained much attention in recent years. Especially in light of the so-called 
'African renaissance',34 a new African consciousness is developing with the 
aim of returning 'Africa to the Africans'. This is strongly expressed in the 
words of the General Secretary of the Pan African Movement, Tajudeen 
Abdul-Raheem:
We are our own liberators. W e cannot expect the world to save us. We 
have to show, through responsible and dem ocratic governance that we 
can save ourselves. As they say, where there is a will there is a way.
Woza Africa! (W ake up A frica!).35
Hand in hand with the increase of African confidence goes the notion 
that Africa bears in itself the potential to solve its own conflicts.35 This is 
manifested in a 'return ' to African ways of conflict resolution, such as for 
instance discussed at the UN Ail African Conference on African Principles o f 
Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, held in Addis Ababa in 1999.37
Key features of an African approach to conflict resolution, the report 
states, are38
34 The term 'African renaissance' was first used by the former US President Bill Clinton in his 
speech in Ghana in March 1998. Oliver Furley (1999): Democratisation in Uganda. London: 
RISCT report.
35 Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem (2000): "Africa Must Be Her Own Saviour. The Continent Must 
Show Responsibility and Will to Act". New Vision: Kampala, 13.4.2000.
36 Josaphat Balegamire (2000): The All African Conference on African Principles o f Conflict 
Resolution. OneWorld website: < http://www.oneworld.Org/euconflict/publicat/nl3.l/ 
page20.html>, 30.06.2000.
37 Tim Murithi (ed.) (1999): Final Report of the All-African Conference on African Principles of 
Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation. Addis Ababa: UNITAR.
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• a culture of consensus through discussion and dialogue;
• a bottom up/grass-root approach of'participatory democracy';
• an atmosphere of co-operation enshrined in tradition and religion;
• a culture of tolerance, reconciliation, interdependence, trust, cross- 
cultural respect and ethnic loyalty; and a
• predominant climate of relational living and co-existence.
As potential mediators, elders, and in particular women are mentioned. I 
shall return to these groups and their roles and potential in the following 
section.
In Teso, before colonialism, disputes were settled through the 
consultation of elders.39 The charge for the highest crime, murder, was paid
for with a girl or a cow, whereas the lack of beauty in the girl was
compensated for through additional cows. The price would be handed during 
a ceremony, epucit or aijuk, in which a bull, provided by the offending side, 
was roasted and eaten as a gesture of renewed co-operation between the 
clans.
On a general level, African societies have a reputation for conducting 
affairs by discussion. "The elders sit under a big tree and talk until they 
agree" as the late former President of Tanzania, Mwalimu Nyerere, was 
quoted saying.40 This tradition of resolving conflicts through dialogue, it has 
been suggested, should be revived and promoted as an African way of 
decision making.41
However, not only dialogue is a feature of pre-colonial conflict
resolution, but also public gestures like burying spears or roasting and
eating an ox remain important.42 These cultural celebrations of reconciliation 
are at present subject to a romantic renaissance. Often, however, these 
traditional acts of reconciliation do not involve an element of problem
38 Murithi (1999): 15-22.
39 Nzita (1995): 124.
40 Kwasi Wiredu (1996): Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: A Plea for 
a Non-party Polity, in: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi (ed.): Postcolonial African Philosophy. 
Cambridge, Mass./Oxford: Blackwell, p. 303.
41 Wiredu (1996): 304.
42 See for instance Dennis Pain (1997): Bending of Spears - Producing Consensus for Peace 
and Development in Northern Uganda. London: International Alert/Kacoke Madit report.
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solving so that especially younger generations with strong Western 
influence remain dissatisfied. The ritual killing of an ox, for instance, 
signifies a sacrificial 'payment' of a god to take care of and resolve the 
dispute. I t  then is no longer in the hands of the worldly people. This 
symbolism strongly contradicts demands for actual resolution like 
distributing land more equally, allowing access to resources, compensating 
for theft, challenging exclusion etc. -  often the issue that ignited the conflict 
remains unresolved. Frequently, in opposition to traditional rituals, 
questions of justice and punishment are raised, which exceed the mere 
gesture of burying spears and thus silencing a pending conflict.
This nostalgic 'return to the past' of especially pre-colonial African 
values has not remained without criticism. According to Emmanuel 
Chukwudi Eze, the past of colonialism and the introduction of Western 
modes of thinking cannot be undone, nor can the increase of information 
from, and thus proximity to, Europe and North America be halted.43 
Moreover, "[tjrad ition  survives by evolving, not by remaining the same,"44 it 
is permanently challenged by changes in the environment and thus adapted 
to the present. I t  has therefore been suggested that
[b ]y  appealing to the praxis and wisdom of our African foreparents, we 
do not mean to repeat them , but we mean to m ake use of this praxis 
and wisdom as interpretative tools to enlighten present generations of 
Africans.45
As for the praxis of peace-making, therefore, marginalised, indigenous 
approaches should not seek to replace current modern approaches but 
rather attempt to compliment them.46 As such
[a ] ’hybrid' approach has become all the more essential; using both 
traditional African and western approaches to solve conflicts and 
disputes. We should therefore acknowledge the need to strengthen local 
and indigenous capacities in Africa. NGOs th at operate a t local, national, 
sub-regional, regional and international levels should be em powered to 
act as facilitators in term s of dialogue, conflict prevention, m anagem ent
43 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (1996): Democracy or Consensus? in: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi 
(ed.): Postcolonial African Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass./Oxford: Blackwell, p. 313.
44 Jean-Marie Makang (1997): Of the Good Use of Tradition, in: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi 
(ed.): Postcolonial African Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass./Oxford: Blackwell, p. 328.
45 Makang (1997): 338.
46 Murithi (1999): v.
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and resolution. The goals in the tw enty-first century in Africa should be 
to strengthen local and traditional capacities, to prevent violent conflict, 
and to promote developm ent.47
One possibility is the use of indigenous people as mediators between 
the parties to the conflict, as was the case with the Presidential Commission 
for Teso. Together with a number of other actors, the Commission was 
successful in turning Teso from war to peace, as we shall see below.
Indigenous Mediation
Generally, the expectation underlying indigenous mediation is to 
reach practical agreement which keeps broader inter-communal relations 
positive. "Additional results of local conflict management occur when actors 
who do not have a political, social or economic stake in continuing violence 
come together and build a 'constituency for peace'."48 Constituencies for 
peace potentially undermine the perpetration of violence, and thus 
encourage the process of peace-building.
Hence, indigenous mediation can be conducted by a variety of actors 
such as churches or elders. Typically it
incorporates consensus-building based on open discussions to exchange 
information and clarify issues. Conflicting parties are more likely to 
accept guidance from these mediators than from other sources because 
an elder's decision does not entail any loss of face and is backed by 
social pressure. The end result is, ideally, a sense of unity, shared 
involvem ent and responsibility, and dialogue among groups otherwise in 
conflict.49
The Teso insurgency was mediated by a number of different actors - 
all of them where indigenous to Uganda, or even to the region itself. Below 
I shall describe the actions taken by (1) the government, (2) the army, (3) 
the Presidential Commission for Teso (PCT), (4) churches, (5) women and
(6) elders. Only the PCT acted as a third-party mediator in the above sense. 
The impact of the other actors was much less formal and organised.
47 Balegamire (2000).
48 CAII (2000): Non-Official Conflict Management Method. Indigenous Conflict Management
Mechanisms. CAII web site: < http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolbox4.htm>, 30.06.2000.
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Aims o f Mediation Processes
To briefly repeat what has been laid out in the beginning of this 
chapter, mediation seeks to open-up totalising discourses that define friends 
and foes, it seeks to transcend traditional notions of winning and loosing. In 
Chapter 6 we have established that the current interpretation of their past 
has led the Iteso and Kumam to a rather closed understanding of 
themselves as well as the Museveni government. Mediation thus requires a 
significant change of the prevailing structural properties of the belligerent 
parties so that they no longer (partially) define identity by way of excluding 
the Other. As a poetic process, mediation creates new horizons -  it is the 
process of fusing horizons between the past and the present, as well as the 
Self and the Other.
Based on a narrative approach, the process of mediation therefore 
attempts to re-define the stories people refer to when they talk about a 
violent conflict. Whether the indigenous mediators in Teso have 
accomplished the writing of alternative narratives about the causes, 
rationale and development of the Teso insurgency will be the subject of the 
discussion presented below.
Non-indigenousf International Impact on the Teso Mediation
International involvement in Teso occurred by proxy, yet it played a 
significant role. Based in the UK, a group of people, who used to work in 
Ngora hospital, Kumi district, over a long period of time after independence, 
and who had kept in very close contact with their Iteso friends in Ngora and 
started the Teso Relief Committee, learned about Museveni's 'scorched 
earth policy' and started a public campaign.50 The former director of Ngora 
hospital, John Maitland, criticised the Ugandan government in a letter 
published in The Independent newspaper and in a BBC interview regarding 
the NRA atrocities. Below is an extract from The Independent piece:
However, in Teso, where the m ilitary crackdown took place [Maitland  
refers here to the killings in Mukura which will be discussed in Chapter 
9 ], promises will not convince a population em bittered by years of
49 CAII (2000).
50 John Maitland's private correspondence.
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m ilitary confrontation. The 'cordon and search' operations ... combined 
with the visitations by rebel militia and raiders from  the north, have 
devastated a once economically self-sufficient area. One and a half 
million people from Teso are suffering from severe poverty, malnutrition  
and disease. They have lost everything - homes, crops, schools, cattle, 
clinics and social structures.51
Maitland's BBC interview was heard all over Uganda, and the 
Ugandan media picked up the story. Museveni's response in an interview 
was rather confident:
[Q ] This morning there was an interview with somebody who said he 
was a chairman of Teso relief com m ittee and he alleged th a t NRA was 
carrying out a scorched earth policy. I  w onder w hat your com m ent on 
this?
[M useveni] But you know those fellows are ju s t talking stories. Our work 
is to crush the bandits, which we have done in the whole of the north; 
and this small area of Kumi, where they will rem ain, you are going to 
crush them . So, the sympathisers of the bandits will have to talk on BBC 
since the BBC is available to them . But for us, we shall do our work.
These are our people. You know how m any chairm en we lost, the RCs?
But you have been hearing the chairm an, you see w hat has been 
happening when the people elect a chairm an, the bandits come and kill 
him. They elect another bandit [as heard], they come and kill him. So 
they (?are w anting) to destroy our democratic institutions. And we can't 
allow th at to happen. We are also going to crush them . Once you kill 
people, and th at is what we have done in the north, th a t is why you 
hear the north is now peaceful. Now this small area of Kumi which was 
rem aining, we are also going to crush them .
Now, if they go to BBC and BBC sympathises with them , we have also 
got our own radio here. So, our radio doesn't go very far. I t  jus t ends 
here around the lake [presum ably Lake V ictoria]. But th a t is good 
enough, eh, it is good enough...52
Nevertheless, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office's interest 
in the human rights abuses in Uganda began to develop. At the time of the 
insurgency Ateso Grace Akello was resident in the UK, and together with her 
British friends from the Teso Relief Committee she organised a 
demonstration against Museveni in Whitehall.53
The bad publicity in the UK was very inconvenient for Uganda. 
Museveni, who had just seized power, heavily relied on the support of
51 John Maitland (1989): "Suffering of the People form Teso1'. The Independent: London, 25 
July 1998, Letters, p. 15.
52 "Ugandan President Responds to 'Concentration Camps' Allegations". Radio Uganda: 
Kampala, 1 March 1990.
53 Interview with Grace Akello.
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international donors. The UK was then, and still is today, one of the most 
pronounced advocates of Museveni's government, so that a public 
demonstration in London would have harmed this relationship badly. In 
response, Museveni called Grace Akello in London and sent a small 
delegation of senior government members to discuss the insurgency with 
her.54 He invited Akello to return to her country and to work for him as the 
secretary of the Presidential Commission for Teso in the mediation between 
the government and the Iteso/Kumam, an offer she accepted, albeit 
reluctantly.55
Although the insurgency as well as its reconciliation was a very local 
and indigenous process it is worth wondering whether Museveni would have 
offered his gesture of reconciliation through the Teso Commission if it had 
not been for the international pressure. In many cases local uprising and 
violent dissent remain unheard of, and thus futile, as long as the 
government's military can keep the insurgence at bay. International 
recognition, however, lends a voice to those oppressed and is therefore a 
very important mechanism in the advocacy of excluded people. The 
importance of, in particular, the western governmental and non­
governmental organisations is closely tied to matters of development aid 
and financial support which are vital to sub-Saharan countries. Here, then, 
local and global forces coalesce.
Yet the international impact on Teso, and other violent conflicts, does 
not stop with political and development projects. In addition to the above 
case of UK advocacy, in Teso the international community was represented 
in form of small arms and combat gear, as well as through training of 
insurgents and soldiers.56 Weapons manufactured in Europe and combatants 
trained in institutions such as the military training facility Sandhurst in the 
UK, blur the boundaries between here and there. Despite the insurgency in 
Teso having being a rather local event, the global and the local are 
intrinsically intertwined on many levels.
54 Interviews with Grace Akello and Ateker Ejalu.
55 Interview with Grace Akello.
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The Government
The government offered a number of initiatives to promote peace in 
Teso. Twice it sent mediators, first in form of three ministers, then the Teso 
Commission. In addition, the NRA had an impact through a number of staff 
members that gained the confidence of the Rebel High Command over time. 
Today it is difficult to understand why Museveni sought to establish peace in 
Teso region whilst continuing counter-insurgencies elsewhere. Possible 
explanations are that the NRA was already preoccupied with fighting in 
Acholi in the north, and that another source of insecurity might have been 
too great a burden.
I t  has also been suggested that Museveni severely underestimated 
the size of the insurgency in Teso, and thus did not conceive of it as a 
serious threat.57 Museveni's advisors at the time downplayed the importance 
of the insurgency by telling him that he should not think of Teso in terms of 
'a rebellion', but rather mere anarchy, for the rebels had no motivation to 
topple the government.58 There was never an ideological struggle about 
different forms of policies, and the UPC never offered an alternative political 
programme on how to govern Uganda. The cause was local, and so were 
the targets.59 Although the rebels in Teso would have resented this 
explanation and denigration of their violent struggle, it might have helped 
to prevent the acceleration of the NRM actions against Teso. Keeping the 
insurgency rather harmless might have aided the fact that the NRM 
government was willing to reach out to the people in Teso, and to offer a 
cease-fire.
Although the reasons seem opaque today, the NRM government, 
which does not have a very good track record for solving violent conflicts 
peacefully, had little intention to 'crush' the insurgency in Teso.60 Instead, 
an effort was made to build basic trust between the Iteso and the new
55 Interviews with Musa Echweru and Sam Otai.
57 Interview with Ateker Ejalu. A further indication of the little importance Museveni gave to
the Teso insurgency is that it does not find any mentioning in his autobiography, Museveni 
(1996).
58 Interview with Ateker Ejalu.
59 Interview with Ateker Ejalu.
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government. The two major elements were a general amnesty for all rebels 
and development support for the Teso region.
In order to make the rebels' return from 'bush' to civilian life 
attractive, an Amnesty Statute was released, which included the following 
elements:61
• Amnesty for all persons within or without Uganda who were fighting 
as combatants or aiding the prosecution of war in any other way.
• Amnesty for all members of former armies, fighting groups, former 
police forces, prison services and state securities.
• Report and surrender of ail weapons of these groups.
• Resettlement of 'reporters'.62
Today, many ex-rebels refer to the Amnesty Statute as being the 
most important incentive for their surrender. I t  provided them with a safety 
net, and gave them an opportunity to admit that their going to the bush 
had become a failure. Thanks to the Amnesty Statute they could make this 
step reversible without being harmed and punished. Even rebels captured in 
combat were not executed but merely detained.
Moreover, for many young rebels the lack of employment 
opportunities and future perspectives had been a driving force to join the 
insurgency. After a few years in the bush they realised the danger and 
hardship of being a combatant. The financial rewards they were promised 
when they joined the rebels were never paid so that the young men were 
highly disillusioned and felt deceived. When the government reached out to 
them through offering financial rewards and employment in the NRA if they 
only surrendered, the youth suddenly had a new and positive outlook to the
60 Although Museveni threatened to do so in his rhetoric. "Museveni vows to crush Rebels" 
New Vision, 2.3.1990, front-page.
61 International Alert (1987): Uganda - International Seminar on Internal Conflict, 21th-25th 
September 1987. Kampala: Makerere University, Appendix G, p. 32. The general Amnesty 
Statute expired after a few years and has been replaced by a series of Presidential Pardons 
with the same content.
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future. They deserted in very large numbers, and many were absorbed into 
the army or police forces. I t  was particularly the work of the Teso 
Commission that encouraged the reporting, and I will address this issue 
again in the next section.
The promotion of the development of Teso was again a part of the 
Teso Commission's mandate. The underlying rationale was to prevent the 
Kumam and Iteso from thinking that they as a people were not appreciated. 
Building trust and confidence was central to the effort. In addition, due to 
the cattle raiding as well as the insurgency, the development of Teso had 
deteriorated to a point where the vast majority of the population suffered 
from severe poverty and hunger. Relief and aid were needed urgently. The 
strategies of the Commission's development aid will again be laid out below.
The Amnesty Statute and the development support together allowed 
for the Kumam and Iteso to feel appreciated in Uganda. The fear of 
prosecution due to the former Obote alliance was dissolved through the 
Statute, and the hardship and suffering of Teso recognised through aid and 
relief, and later restocking.
In addition, in the first phase of the NRM government a policy of 
reconciliation prevailed. The rationale was to 'bring the enemy in', to give 
him/her a prestigious public office, in order to prevent them from turning 
against the Movement.
To return to the discussion of mediation at the outset of this chapter, 
the question arises whether the government's actions contributed to 
changing the institutional and discursive structures which gave rise to the 
conflict, and whether it aided in rendering violence an illegitimate tool of 
inter-action. Despite its successful impact on ending the fighting, did it 
merely solve immediate problems or did it also contribute to the poetic
62 'Reporter' is the NRM/A jargon for ex-rebels who have reported to authorities and handed 
in their guns. 'Reporters' became the term commonly used for surrendering rebels; it was 
considered more neutral then 'dissident' or 'ex-rebel'. Interview with James Eceret.
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process of creating a new relationship between the Museveni government 
and Teso?
In the early nineties, the Ugandan government did indeed manage to 
ease the binary opposition between Teso/Museveni along which the 
insurgency was fought. In particular the promise of development and 
economic re-construction, which will be discussed later in relation to the 
Teso Commission, encouraged the Iteso and Kumam to believe that they 
were increasingly included into the wider Uganda, and that their perceived 
neglect would turn into a prosperous integration. Museveni's image changed 
from the role of the enemy to patron or benevolent dictator. The people in 
Teso, over time, ceased conceiving of themselves in us/them terms, and 
instead put hope and trust in the care of their president.
Through practising a policy of reconciliation, and incorporating former 
enemies into his government, Museveni created a picture of structural 
change which was hospitable to opposing politicians. The representation of 
Teso in the central government shortly after the insurgency, through, for 
example, outspoken critics like Grace Akello and ex-rebel commander Omax 
Omeda, was to give account of the plurality of views. The Iteso and Kumam 
electorate welcomed this open-door policy and felt appreciated and 
respected. A notion of hope prevailed that now Teso would play a significant 
role in Museveni's Uganda.
As discussed in the previous chapter, in Teso at the time of the 
insurgency violence was accepted as a legitimate way of solving disputes. 
The insurgency amplified these practices through introducing almost all men 
to combat and armed struggle. In order to deal with this tendency amongst 
former rebels, the government offered to enlist reporters in the NRA. And 
yet, in doing so, it did not break with the spiral of violence but merely used 
it to further its own (military) goals. To this day members of the former 
Teso rebel high command are active in the UPDF (former NRA).63
63 In relation to the current involvement of Uganda in the war with neighbouring Democratic 
Republic of Congo people frequently explain Uganda's interest in the fighting by the need of 
keeping the large amount of Ugandan soldiers occupied. There is a great fear that 'idle' 
soldiers (especially form Acholi in North Uganda where an insurgency war has been in place 
ever since Museveni ceased power in 1986) would turn against their own government.
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The Army
The insurgency was characterised by a large number of severe 
human rights abuses concerning both combatants and non-combatants.64 
The incident mostly referred to is the suffocation of 47 Iteso in a railway 
wagon in Mukura, Kumi district.65 In general, the NRA soldiers were 
notorious for raping, looting and indiscriminate killing.66
In order to safeguard the reputation of the NRA being a disciplined 
army, attempts were made to prosecute and punish 'out-of-service' 
atrocities by soldiers such as rape, defilement and murder, committed by 
soldiers. This included public execution of offenders.67
In the late 1980s, a large part of the NRA was comprised of 
Rwandans living in diaspora in Uganda. Therefore, when the exiled 
Rwandans formed the RPF/A (Rwandese Patriotic Front/Army) and invaded 
Rwanda in 1990 the number of NRA soldiers in Teso suddenly dropped 
significantly. Eyewitnesses disclose that there was heavy troop deployment 
in Teso at the time.68 The sudden reduction of NRA soldiers in the Teso 
region might have had a favourable impact on the course of the insurgency.
Today, many ex-rebels, especially those who featured in the High 
Command, refer to personal relationships with high-ranking NRA official as 
being crucial to their reporting. Sam Otai, 2nd Commander, was conversing 
with a senior military person, Charles Agina, through letters delivered by his 
wife.69 Musa Echweru, responsible for arms supply, refers to Brigadier Chefe 
AN as a key figure in the trust-building process between the rebels and the 
army.70 When coming out of the bush the Rebel High Command was 
received respectfully by their former enemies, they discussed the matters of
64Amnesty International (1992): Uganda. The Failure to Safeguard Human Rights. London: 
Amnesty International Report.
65 The Star, 28.7.1989, frontpage.
66 The Citizen, 2.8.1989, frontpage.
67 New Vision, 17.11.1989.
68 E. A. Brett's private notes.
69 Interview with Sam Otai.
70 Interview with Musa Echweru.
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the insurgency frankly and openly, so that some rebels even learned to 
appreciate the government's political philosophy.71 In the words of the 
former rebel Musa Echweru:
The Movem ent [NRM] has continued to be pragm atic. There was a 
message of reconciliation. Those who came out were actually treated  
well. This kind of flexibility was initially there. This flexibility was seen 
and needed. Even if you had disagreem ent, you were still seen to be 
acceptable. You could sit down and discuss issues.72
The NRA/M policy of welcoming, or even rewarding, former rebels 
had a significant impact. Musa Echweru is now RDC of Nebbi district, while 
Omax Omeda, former rebel leader, is now Minister for Works, Housing and 
Communication. More cynical observers suggest the rebels have been 
'bought' by the government.
In conclusion, at the beginning of the insurgency the behaviour of the 
NRA strongly fuelled the violent conflict. However, after a change in army 
personnel there was also a 'change from NRA combatants to agents of 
peace'.73 The personalities of individuals had a great impact.
Through showing respect for the Iteso and Kumam rebels, and even 
offering them lucrative army or civil positions, the rebels felt they were 
equal to the NRA officers. While the insurgency was fought on grounds of 
exclusion and neglect, the attitude of the NRA towards the rebels built a 
bridge of co-operation and potential reconciliation.
The 1st Peace In itia tive
The first initiative undertaken by the government in late 1987-8, 
under the guidance of Minister of State Ateker Ejalu and Paul Etjan, the 
former Kumam and the latter Etesot, was comprised of three Iteso 
Ministers: Minister of Labour S. K. Okurut, Deputy Minister of Animal 
Industry Dr Okol Aporu, and Minister Ekino.74 Despite worries about their
71 Interview with Michael Obwaatum.
72 Interview with Musa Echweru.
73 Interview with Musa Echweru.
74 Interview with Ateker Ejalu.
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safety the three ministers travelled to Soroti town where they met and 
discussed the insurgency with the Anglican Bishop Illukor. Since the 
meeting went very well, the three Ministers continued their journey to Kumi 
town where they received a surprising message that they were expected to 
meet with members of the Rebel High Command at a location in Ngora. The 
Ministers went, accompanied by two priests. At their arrival they were 
immediately brought to Serere Research Station where they realised that 
they had been taken hostage by the rebels.
I t  took two years until the Ministers were freed. Ekino died in the 
course of the liberation, the circumstances are still unclear. Apuro, shortly 
after his release, passed away within 24h of falling sick -  allegations of 
poisoning have been raised.75 Okurut has failed to have a successful political 
career ever since.
According to the report of a rebel eyewitness of the hijacking in 
Ngora, the Ministers' attitude towards the rebels was characterised by 
arrogance and superiority.76 Before the meeting, Okurut, a former 
prominent UPC politician, had allegedly called the rebels on national radio 
'thugs and thieves without any political agenda'. The group of ministers thus 
received little respect, but much resentment, from the rebels. There was a 
general feeling that, although being of Iteso origin, the Ministers were little 
concerned about the cause of the insurgency and the suffering and plight of 
the people in Teso, but rather interested their personal political careers and 
the 'good-life' in Kampala.77
Hence, what contributed significantly to the failure of the mission was 
that the ministers had no credibility in the eyes of the Rebel High 
Command. In addition to the lack of trust, the 1st peace initiative entered 
the conflict at a time when Teso was not ready for peace. Ambitions 
amongst the civil population and the rebels were still high and hopes for 
future gains great.
75 Interview with Kenneth Olumia (brother to the late minister's wife), Soroti 24.02.2000.
76 Peter Olupot (2000): 185.
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The 2nd Peace Initiative: The Teso Commission
The most successful initiative to end the Teso insurgency was the 
Presidential Commission of Teso. Comprised of indigenous people only, it 
crossed a bridge between the two adversaries: the people from Teso and 
the Museveni government.
The Presidential Commission of Teso is a very good example to 
illustrate the success of indigenous efforts in conflict resolution. Again hand- 
picked by Minister of State Ateker Ejalu in 1990, the Teso Commission 
consisted of a number of respected Iteso.78 Apart from Grace Akello as the 
Secretary it included the PCT Chairman Prof. Epelu-Opio, now Deputy Vice 
Chancellor of Makerere University, James Eceret, an economist who still 
manages the PCT today, Mzee Oguli, who now managers the PCT office in 
Soroti, as well as secretaries, drivers and local assistants.
Where the first initiative lacked credibility, the composition of the 
Teso Commission immediately earned the reputation for trustworthiness -  
even though it was clearly operating on behalf of the government. As Akello 
noted:
Most of the people in Teso saw the Commission as an organ to stop the  
bleeding, and to find a niche for them  in the political order of Uganda. I t  
was seen as independent. They knew that I  was working for Museveni, 
but they knew that I  was working under protest. So they knew th a t I 
was critical.79
Even today there is a general agreement that the PCT was "probably 
the best catalyst for change" for Teso.80 What contributed a lot to the 
acceptance was that the Commission sought advice from politicians, 
activists, rebels, local leaders and clerics. Considering that the members of 
the Commission had themselves never been involved in an insurgency war 
before, but rather lived a life in the safety of universities and institutions,
77 Interview with Peter Olupot, Kumi 01.05.01.
78 "Uganda Presidential Commission to Investigate Rebellion in Eastern Districts". Radio 
Uganda: Kampala, 17 October 1990.
79 Interview with Grace Akello.
80 Dan Ochyang (1991): Proposal for the Restoration of Stability, Peace and Progress to 
Teso. Kampala: UPC, p. 2.
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their risky ventures in Teso were also rather brave.81 There was one 
ambush on the Commission,82 in which the rebels had the opportunity to kill 
the Commissioners - yet they refrained from doing so and the 
Commissioners interpreted the incidents as a warning not to travel with the 
protection of the NRA. The PCT followed the hint, and their movements 
remained undisturbed.83
The main objective of the Teso Commission was to address the post­
conflict scenario in the region. The mandate was split into two phases: in 
the first phase in 1991-2, the overall priority was the insecurity in Teso, and 
it was contended that this had to be achieved and preserved by local 
people; government could only supplement it.84 Peace and security were 
considered to be vital for economic development and social progress. The 
second phase, 1993-4 until today, addresses more practical issues like re­
stocking and re-integration of reporters.
The Commission's stated strategies to achieve peace and security 
were as follows:85
• Sensitisation of people about correlation between peace and
development.
• Strategic reduction of army presence (and restoration of police services).
• Acceleration of recruitment and training of Local Defence Units (LDUs) so
that local people can defend their own property against rustlers and anti­
social behaviour (this mainly related to the Karamojong rustling).
• Reinstatement of former security personnel (after screening), or
alternatively resettlement of former rebels.
In order to encourage the rebels to desert from the bush, the Teso 
Commission set up a series of seminars in villages and trading centres
81 Grace Akello, for instance, was taken to meet the Rebel High Command by a catholic 
reverent Father Pius Okiria. Interview with Pius Okiria.
82 Financial Times, 20.12.1990, page 1.
83 Interview with George Oguli, Soroti 24.2.2000.
84 PCT (1991a): Rehabilitation and Development Plan for Teso Region 1991/2-2000/1. Vol. 
1: Guidelines/Strategies. Kampala: Ministry for Planning and Economic Development, 
Republic of Uganda, p. 48.
85 PCT (1991a): 48-9.
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where they targeted particular groups of the population. Apart from 
economic development, women, youth and leaders from various levels were 
given special consideration. The rationale of focusing on women was to 
reach their husbands or sons. The Teso Commission was very well aware 
that the people at large supported the 'boys', spiritually as well as 
practically, and that the women were in frequent contact with their male 
family members. Through appealing to their sense of family, development 
and health for their children, the Teso Commission encouraged the women 
to influence their husbands and sons at any given opportunity. I will 
address the role of women in a separate section below.
In order to enable the people of Teso to state their distress and to 
vent their anger, the Teso Commission always started their seminars by 
dedicating the first day to asking people what was most important to 
them.86 The main complaints of the Iteso and Kumam were related to 
rustling, poverty and general lack of support. Political reasons were hardly 
ever voiced. This strong emphasis on economic development was however 
only on the surface and served as a metaphor for the general sensation of 
not being welcome in Museveni's new Uganda.
The Teso Commission responded to this problem by addressing the 
pronounced allegations, and by implication the underlying subtext. The 
complaints raised by the Kumam and Iteso were immediately responded to. 
I f  they demanded development aid, the Teso Commission provided it. I f  
they asked for oxen, the Teso Commission delivered the animals. I f  they 
demanded ploughs, the Teso Commission organised the supply. I f  they 
complained about misbehaviour of NRA soldiers, the Teso Commission 
guaranteed that the army took care of their prosecution. For the people in 
Teso this experience of asking the representatives of the President for 
assistance, and receiving it with little delay, very much contradicted with 
their perception of the government being hostile to them as a people. As a 
consequence, they reconsidered their allegations against Museveni, for the 
notion that he intentionally excluded them from the new Uganda no longer 
held true.
86 Interview with James Eceret.
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What the Teso Commission achieved was therefore to undermine the 
support of the insurgency in the non-combatant community. According to 
Mzee Oguli a conversation would run as follows:
Every tim e there was a concentration of rebels we held meetings 
surrounding their place. The idea was that this people would send some 
people to ask them  to listen to us. Or some rebels came and listen to us.
The m ajority o f the people who came to our m eetings were wom en, men 
were not there. One day when we w ent to Gweri. There were many  
wom en, men were also there. A woman sat in front with a baby of about 
4 months. And as I  was speaking I  picked on her and I  said: 'W here is 
your husband?'
And she said: 'My husband went to the bush two years ago.'
I  said 'Is  that your baby?'
'Yes!'
'But how old is your baby?'
'3 -4  m onths.'
'But how did you get that baby when your husband is not there? Or he 
sneaks in? Do you usually have th at child sick?'
'O h, m any tim es!'
'Do you have a problem of food?'
'Oh yes!'
So we started to have a conversation there. 'W hy don't you tell him 
th at 'it  is peaceful now? Why can't you come back and help me?' Go and 
cry! When he sneaks in you cry and say: 'Please you come. Nobody will 
kill you.' And we have assured you th at w hoever gives in is not going to 
be killed. W hy don't you tell him to come?'
From there we were beginning to break through.87
In their seminars, the Teso Commission succeeded in shifting the 
intentions of the women and elderly, who stayed at home, from 
strengthening 'the boys' to appealing to the rebels' reason and responsibility 
to care for the well-being of their families.
This achievement is of major importance. For what is significant 
about the Teso case is that the civil and combatant community over time 
withdrew the support for the fighting. The strategy of the Teso Commission 
was to influence exactly on this level, and they were very successful in 
convincing people that a peaceful way of dealing with their worries was 
much more beneficial for them as individuals and the region as a whole.
87 Interview with George Oguli.
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Taking care of reporters was another major task of the PCT. As soon 
as a rebel came out of the bush, the Teso Commission would take him to a 
place outside of Teso for 5-6 months in order to prevent his return. The 
reporter would thereafter attend the PCT seminars in his home area to 
assure his family, but more importantly other potential reporters, that he 
was safe and taken care of. This again established confidence among the 
rebels who wanted to surrender.
As mentioned above, the Teso Commissioners were all indigenous 
mediators with strong social and family bonds linked to Teso. Whenever 
they came to a new area they met with friends or family members, sat 
down with them over supper and discussed the political situation in Teso. 
The low-key consultation, familiarity and the subsequent influence they had 
was what contributed to their initial success.
However, today many people suggest that the Teso Commission was 
only successful because it entered the process of reconciliation when the 
violent conflict was already resolved. In fact, due to frustration and 
destitution, many rebels had already surrendered before the PCT came into 
action. Nevertheless, the role of immediate post-conflict reconstruction was 
significant for the maintenance of the cease-fire. Reconciliation and peace 
are always reversible and many peace initiatives reach the stage of 
apparent breakthrough only to collapse. Frustrated people are easily 
encouraged to re-start an insurgency. In Teso, the Commission was seen as 
a guarantor for the government's commitment to the people. Through the 
Teso Commission, the government promised that the Teso economy would 
start prospering again and that they would compensate for the loss of 
cattle. The task of the Teso Commission was to rehabilitate the Iteso's mind 
through restocking.88 Trust in the NRM government was of salient 
importance.
At the time, it seems, only a few people were critical of the 
Commission. Today, there are accusations of arrogance, and the fact that in
88 Interview with Peter Kalagala.
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some areas the meetings were compulsory and kept people from working in 
their gardens was also not appreciated. In general, however, the initiative 
was very weil received at the time.
The success of the PCT was built on various aspects. Thanks to the 
indigenous nature of the Commissioners the PCT rapidly gained the trust 
and confidence of civilians and insurgents alike. The workshops and 
seminars the Commission organised were informative and well attended -  
they allowed for a close proximity between Commissioners and people so 
that individual matters could be raised and personal problems solved. Due 
to the immediate response of the Commissioners to challenges raised,the 
people felt their views mattered and were taken care of.
The discourse the PCT fostered in its seminars was entirely focused 
on economic and security issues such as the lack of food or atrocities 
committed by the NRA or Karamojong -  political questions were not 
considered.89 Through resolving physical and material security concerns the 
Commission undermined the prevailing motivation for the insurgency being 
fought, that is, economic deprivation by the Museveni government. They 
simply deprived people of their preferred motive for combat.
As a consequence, due to being commissioned by central 
government, the PCT changed the narrative about the opponent from 
'Museveni being the enemy' to 'Museveni being the care-taker and 
provider'. Through avoiding political confrontation in the PCT seminars, the 
discourse about the insurgency was turned into a struggle for material 
commodities, which were entirely unrelated to national politics. And through 
providing the commodities which had come to occupy a central place in the 
discourse of the insurgency, the PCT resolved the conflict.
What the Teso Commission thus achieved was to transform the 
reality of the opposing, irreconcilable binary, of us/them into a more blurred 
distinction. The sharp boundaries were eroded and therefore the structural 
exclusion transformed. With reference to Jabri's requirement of reducing the
89 Interview with George Oguli.
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prevailing structural properties of exclusion, the Teso Commission can 
hence be considered a success.
In addition, the economic support the Teso Commission provided for 
ex-rebels assisted their re-integration into society.90 This is especially 
important in light of poverty and the economic rewards hoped for when 
joining an insurgency war, which drives many young men 'into the bush', as 
we have seen in Chapter 5. Through offering 'starter packs' for returnees 
the PCT successfully convinced the ex-combatants that there is hope in 
future farming, business and employment.
Against the backdrop of the tendency in Teso around the time of the 
insurgency to resort to violence as a mode of conflict management, the re­
integration of reporters is a very significant aspect. To them, it offered a 
future beyond combat as an economic strategy, and thus led to a de­
militarisation of the society -  with the result of rendering violence less 
legitimate.
Today, unfortunately, the opinions have changed considerably, and 
the Teso Commission, which still functions, is no longer thought of so 
highly. This will be discussed in the following chapter.
Churches
Parallel to the PCT, the Teso churches had a major impact on the 
resolution of the insurgency. More generally, in Africa, churches play a very 
significant role in the social and political sector. This situation dates back to 
the late nineteenth century, when most missionary organisations 
established mission schools, hospitals and dispensaries.91 To date, churches 
in Africa gain an ever more prominent role as advocates for human rights, 
social injustice and poverty, and some would even suggest that it is their 
obligation to "struggle for societal transformation in the effort to build an
90 DANIDA (1994): Teso Resettlement Programme 1994/5. Kampala: DANIDA report, p. 3.
91 Deborah Ajulu/Sara Gibbs (1999): The Role of the Church in Advocacy: Case Studies from 
Southern and Eastern Africa. Oxford: INTRAC, p. 4.
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equitable society where no one is oppressed."92 Most prominently with the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, churches increasingly 
recognise their potential to act as mediators between parties to a conflict, 
and to set into practice Christian notions of peace and reconciliation. Trying 
to create harmony by mending the conflicts that separate individuals from 
God is core to the Bible, and can also be applied to communities in 
conflict.93
What is unique about the position of the church, or mosque, is that it 
simultaneously reaches the grass-roots of a society and the political elites of 
a country. Churches are thus in a very prominent position to mediate local 
needs and national politics.
In order to understand the role Christian churches play in Uganda it is 
important for the western reader to remember the difference between, for 
instance, British and Ugandan attitudes to Christianity as suggested in 
Chapter 4.94 Whereas in many 'modern' central and north European 
countries Christianity has become an independent 'luxury', a selected 
addition to our autonomous lives, in the Teso, religion or more generally 
religious belief, is a substantial and tangible part of everyday life. In 
countries where resources are scarce and conditions of life harsh, belief 
becomes almost a necessity for it is through praying, and thus trusting, that 
God, Allah or spirits will alleviate the believer's suffering and provide food, 
or health, or shelter. In saturated societies, like many in the North, there is 
little necessity to ask for earthly goods.95
While churches have an important role to play as mediators and 
peace-builders, Christianity also bears counter-productive traces. The 
Christian discourse is founded on clear-cut notions of good and evil, heaven 
and hell, right and wrong. I t  thus establishes insurmountable binary
92 Chukwudum B. Okolo (1991): The Liberating Role of the Church in Africa Today. Eldoret: 
AMECEA Gaba Publishers, p. 64.
93 Hizkias Assefa (1996): Peace and Reconciliation as a Paradigm. A Philosophy of Peace and 
Its Impact for Conflict, Governance and Economic Growth in Africa, in: Assefa, 
Hizkias/Wachira, George (eds.): Peacemaking and Democratisation in Africa. Nairobi: East 
African Educational Press, p. 47. Nevertheless, the genocide in Rwanda shows that churches 
can also have a very strong impact in inciting violence and killings.
94 When referring to Britain and Uganda, I of course do not want to suggest that all people in 
these countries experience Christianity in the same way.
951 am very grateful to Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem for this comment.
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oppositions which are fundamental to 'believing', and inform the 
congregation's perception of the world in a way that leaves little space for 
negotiation. For instance, while conducting research in Teso, I had the 
privilege of being invited to a very remote village on the Teso-Karamoja 
boarder. The small village had been established as a Karamojong-Iteso 
reconciliation project by a UK based NGO called CHIPS (Christian 
International Peace Services) in an attempt to encourage pastoral 
Karamojong to settle and work with the Iteso on farms and in gardens. 
During my stay a Pentecostal priest addressed the small congregation of 
Iteso villagers and a few present Karamojong warriors in his morning 
prayers. The subtext of his ceremony was that Christians are good people, 
while non-Christians 'have a pact with the devil'. Considering that the 
reconciliation village has attracted a group of about 50 Karamojong who are 
settling in the immediate neighbourhood, and that it has a rationale of 
bridging the gap between Iteso and Karamojong, the problematic of the 
Pentecostal Christian discourse becomes apparent: Karamojong are mostly 
non-believers, and thus, in the priest rhetoric, they have a 'pact with the 
devil'. For a project which aims at bringing together culturally very different 
communities this form of religious discourse, which relies heavily on notions 
of Christianity, is most likely counter-productive.96
Churches and the Teso Insurgency
The largest Christian churches in Uganda are the Anglican Church of 
Uganda, the Catholic Church, the Uganda Orthodox church, the Pentecostal 
churches and the Seventh Day Adventist church. The country also has a 
large proportion of Muslims. However, ever since the dictatorship of Idi 
Amin, the Islamic communities have suffered badly in reputation. The 
internal conflicts prior to Museveni's victory in 1986 had been largely fought
96 In general, it has been suggested that the disappointment with the Ugandan government 
has led many citizens to find support in religion. See for instance "Govt failed, so radical 
religion is taking over”. The Monitor: Kampala, 02.03.2000, 8; Odoobo C. Bichachi (2000): 
"Cleaning Up Sects Must Start With Sate House. Why Did Kanungu Happen?". The Monitor: 
Kampala, 22.03.2000, 26; Peter G. Mwesige (2000): "Poverty and Illiteracy Has Led People 
into Cults". New Vision: Kampala, 25.03.2000, 25.
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in religious terms, as discussed in Chapter 5, so that to this day churches in 
Uganda are highly politicised.97
I t  has been argued that in the 1990s the churches played an 
important role in the national reconstruction: their views were considered 
while drafting the national constitution, and they carried out civic education 
programmes prior to the Constituent Assembly as well as Presidential and 
Parliamentarian elections, which they also monitored.98 Although this 
political impact cannot be disputed it does not hold true for all churches. 
Due to their political role churches themselves often become involved in 
national conflicts and thus turn into the government's adversaries. Such 
was the case in Teso. In the beginning in 1987, particularly the Anglican 
Church of Uganda was very supportive of the insurgency. The Christian 
churches in Teso, like everywhere else in Uganda, play a very prominent 
role in day-to-day politics. Priests, and especially bishops, are leading 
figures in the public discourse - they are very powerful opinion leaders. In 
Teso, the political position they took was anti-Museveni. The political power 
of, for instance, the now retired Anglican Bishop Illukor is not dissimilar to 
that of a regional king -  a parallel often made in Uganda.99
Many of the rebels as well as rebel leaders were faithful Christians 
and thus receptive to the discourse encouraged by the churches.100
The rebels were very religious. They would come to churches, and sing 
in the choirs. On Sundays. And then the other days they were killing.101
And yet, over the course of time, and with the increasing suffering in 
Teso, the churches changed their opinion and started "preaching the 
message of peace and reconciliation".102 Their efforts benefited from the
97 Gifford (1998): 133.
98 Wilson M. Mande (1997): The Role of the Churches in the Political Reconstruction of 
Uganda in the 1990s. in: Mugambi, J.N.K. (ed.): The Church and Reconstruction of Africa. 
Nairobi: All African Council of Churches, p. 180.
99 This comment was made by Prof. Opio-Epelu, Vice-President of Makerere University and 
former head of the PCT at Bishop Illukor's retirement service at the bishop's home in Kumi 
district, 08.04.2000.
100 Interview with Musa Echweru.
101 Interview with Pius Okiria.
102 Speech by Bishop Illukor, Church of Uganda at a Seminar of Bukedia Devilment Trust on 
Peace and Development, Feb 1991, E. A. Brett's private notes.
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very close ties between Bishop Illukor, Grace Akello and the UK based Teso 
Relief Committee which financially supported the Anglican Church and its 
relief assistance.
Two priests were particularly engaged in the process of reconciliation: 
Father Michael Corcoran and Father Pius Okiria initiated a major mediation 
effort. At the beginning, in 1991, Father Pius, in his function as a priest in 
one of the Teso satellite parishes, in which the High Command was based, 
made contact with the rebels in order to help the local civilians who were 
innocently persecuted by them.103 Similarly Father Michael Corcoran had 
frequent contact with the rebels, and together they convinced the Catholic 
and the Anglican Bishops of Teso to offer to intercede between the parties. 
The churches treated everybody equally, although the army complained 
about the contacts with the rebels. And yet, whenever rebels asked the 
church for medical or other support the church declined.104
After long negotiations in 1991/2 the churches convinced Hitler 
Eregu, 1st Rebel Commander, to accept their offer to mediate between the 
High Command and Museveni. The rebels appreciated the recognition they 
received from the churches, especially when they invited international 
journalists to cover the insurgency.105 However, it took more time to finally 
persuade the government to join the talks.
In the end, the peace talks did not take place. And yet, due to the 
interaction between the churches and 'the boys' a number of high-ranking 
rebels like Sam Otai, 2nd Rebel Commander, deserted with large groups. 
Others used the churches as places to surrender, or find refuge from their 
former fellow rebels as well as NRA soldiers.106 Through maintaining close 
links with the rebels, the churches provided the necessary assurance and 
trust to become sites for soldiers to report, and thus contributed 
significantly to the resolution of the violent conflict.
Today, the contributions of the churches in Teso are rated highly. 
Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that, in the late 1980s, particularly
103 Interview with Pius Okiria.
104 Conversation between E. A. Brett and Father Michael, E. A. Brett's private notes.
105 Pius Okiria (2000): Personal Experience, in: CECORE: Experiences and Best Practices of 
Peace-Builders. Kampala: CECORE, p. 4.
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the Anglican Church had a large impact on the anti-Museveni sentiments in 
Teso. When the churches then turned around to preach the message of 
non-violence and reconciliation it earned them a reputation as political 
agents with the best interests of Teso closest to their hearts.
The role the churches played was less to advocate collaboration with 
Museveni, and thus to alter the structural properties of friend/enemy, but 
rather to appeal to the Iteso and Kumam to recognise the futility of the 
killing and suffering. In doing so, the churches had an impact on the 
reduction of violence and aggression, yet not so much on the reconciliation 
between the former enemies. Even today, the relationship remains 
antagonistic.107 As Illukor stated in 1991 in reference to development and 
peace:
Some people first need food, then peace. W hat is needed though is 
reconciliation and forgiveness. The job of the PTC is to listen to the  
voices of Teso and to carry them  back to Kam pala. People in Teso are 
waiting for an apology for cattle raiding. Then bitterness would 
dissipate.108
Women
Despite an apparent increase in the number of female combatants 
world-wide, the most prominent role for women in war remains that of the 
victim .109 I t  has become increasingly popular to argue that women suffer 
most from violent conflict,110 an argument which is difficult to maintain in 
light of the direct exposure to fighting and death faced by combatants: in 
Burundi for instance, it has been estimated that boys were 2-4 times more 
likely to be killed then girls.111 Nevertheless, to acknowledge women's plight 
in times of insecurity is essential, for rape and violation, assault and attack 
are not merely 'side effects' of conflicts but also increasingly strategic tools
106 Interview with George Oguli.
107 With reference to the renewed cattle raiding in spring 2000, Illukor was quoted saying: 
"The Iteso went to the bush because of their cows and they were accused of being misled to 
the bush. The Iteso should, therefore, not continue to suffer without effective government 
intervention. "Illukor Advises Teso". New Vision: Kampala, 10.04.2000.
108 Illukor (1991).
109 Elisabeth G. Ferris (1996): Women as Peace Makers, in: Gnanadason, Aruna/Kanyoro, 
Musimbi/McSpadden, Lucia Ann (eds.): Women, Violence and Non-Violent Change, p. 8.
110 Murithi (1999): 37.
111 World Vision quoted in Luckham/Ahmed/Muggah/White (2001): 44.
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of warfare.112 This does not only hold true for female combatants but also 
for civilians, and in the light of HIV/AIDS (systematic) rape by both rebels 
as well as soldiers has become a lethal weapon.113 In addition, women suffer 
strongly from the absence of men in households and farms, as well as from 
the economic deprivation that accompanies violent conflict -  especially in 
cases of the central government practising a 'scorched earth' policy or 
introducing sanctioning mechanisms. In many African cultures, widowed 
women have no right to land and property which leads to an inescapable 
spiral of poverty, displacement and dislocation as well as the permanent 
disruption of family bonds.
The heightened awareness of the suffering of women in wartime has 
led to an increasing focus on women as peace-builders. In recognition of 
women as key stakeholders, various actors in the international community, 
in collaboration with indigenous NGOs, are trying to promote women's 
influence 'from the village council to the negotiating table'.114
So are women good agents for peace? As the 'gentle sex', women are 
often ascribed peaceful attitudes of non-violence and co-operation, rather 
than aggression. By way of justification, biological arguments are frequently 
rehearsed, 'fo r no mother would want her children to be killed in combat'. 
Nevertheless, across different cultures some mothers seem less anxious 
about their children when they encourage violent conflict, like for example 
the wives of Karamojong warriors, who, rightly or wrongly, have a 
reputation of inciting their husbands to cattle ra id;115 the former British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher showed no hesitation in entering a war
112 ISIS (1998): Women's Experience in Armed Conflict. Situations in Uganda 1980-86: 
Luwero District. A Research Report. Kampala: ISIS - International Cross Cultural Exchange.
113 In countries like Rwanda, for instance, where rape was a common instrument of 
degradation during the 1994 genocide, the HIV/AIDS prevalence amongst the survivors is 
shockingly high. Before the war, 45-60%  of Rwandan soldiers and army officers were 
infected with HIV, and, allegedly, they violated Rwandan women in full knowledge of their 
infection, (see Clotilde Twagiramariya/Meredeth Turshen (1998): ’Favours’ to Give and 
’Consenting' Victims: The Sexual Politics of Survival in Rwanda, in: Twagiramariya, 
Clotilde/Turshen, Meredeth (eds.): What Women Do in Wartime. Gender and Conflict in 
Africa. London/New York: Zed Books, p. 110.)
114 For instance, the London based conflict resolution NGO International Alert is currently 
working on a global advocacy project with the title: 'Women Building Peace: From the Village 
Council to the Negotiating Table', (www.international-alert.org)
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between Britain and Argentina in 1982; and some women in Rwanda during 
the Genocide in 1994 committed the most atrocious crimes.116 The simple 
stereotype of women being peaceful and men being aggressive does not 
hold if tested against history.
Yet, in Uganda, the significance of women in peace movements is 
often described along the lines of the 'gentle sex'. And indeed, at first sight, 
women seem gentler by far then men. Nevertheless, if one looks at the 
social constitution of women in Uganda it becomes apparent that many 
characteristics are deeply enshrined in traditional role-plays and forms of up 
bringing. Anthropological studies about women and war therefore argue 
that if there is in fact an apparent difference between men's and women's 
predisposition to violence, this is very likely founded less in fixed drives and 
material determinants of behaviour, but rather in culture and ideology, as 
well as social values and socialisation.117
In Teso, cultural expressions of gender roles in peace and warfare 
include aspects of men-only warrior cultures; a tendency to rate war and 
men as powerful and active, and peace and female as inactive, almost 
domestic features; an equation of women as mothers and care-takers, that 
is as reproductive as opposed to destructive parts of the society; as well as 
a degree of ingenuousness, warmth and naivete said to be intrinsic to 
women.118 Whether one agrees with the prevailing gender role play in Teso 
or not, the way women have been socialised provides them with 
characteristics valuable for the promotion of peace, and renders them 
important agents for change in the process of reconciliation.
In  traditional Africa, a woman played a vital role in her society. By 
nature she is described as a pacifist, to lerant, compassionate, patient, 
modest and soft spoken. Self-control, and m aintaining silence or 
speaking at opportune times are some of her other winning
115 Interview with Terence Achia and Thomas Okoth, Moroto 14.04.2000.
116 African Rights (1995): Rwanda: Not So Innocent. When Women Become Killers. London: 
African Rights.
117 Sharon MacDonald (1991): Gender, Peace and War: Anthropological Perspectives. 
Oxford: Oxford Project for Peace Studies, p. 5.
118 This is similar to the experience illustrated in MacDonald (1991): 12.
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characteristics. These qualities made the wom an well qualified for the  
task of conflict resolution and reconciliation.119
Self-control and self-censorship are common features amongst 
African women, and so is their strong dependence on either father or 
husband.120 On a general level, the role of women in Teso, like in other 
parts of Uganda, is characterised by inferiority to their male counterparts.121 
In many cases
[t]h e  African woman lives in a state of abject poverty, social status and 
means of livelihood. The condition which determ ine the African woman's  
state are imposed on her by a society which maintains rigid socio­
cultural values and practices against her.122
Socio-cultural values and practises define women's potential for peace­
building, too. Often, their impact can only be very local and individual.
Women and the Teso Insurgency
In Teso, the influence women had on their husbands and sons was 
thus only informal -  yet nevertheless very effective. During the insurgency, 
in most villages, only women remained. Their husbands and sons joined the 
rebels, either voluntarily or were recruited forcefully, or left for safer regions 
of Uganda. Men in Teso at the time had no choice but to either partake in 
the insurgency or to abandon their families, while women, left to their own 
devices, had to accomplish all tasks of every day life.123 In addition to this 
burden, they faced poverty and famine; their children suffered from 
diseases and lack of medical care. Many women lost their sons and 
husbands in the insurgency, and they themselves became targets of NRA 
offensives. Rape and abuse by soldiers was frequent, sometimes with the
119 Murithi (1999): 34.
120 Ruth Besha (1996): A Life of Endless Struggle: The Position of Women in Africa, in: 
Gnanadason, Aruna/Kanyoro, Musimbi/McSappen, Lucia Ann (eds.): Women, Violence and 
Non-Violent Change. Geneva: WCC, p. 57.
121 Nevertheless, women in Uganda have benefited from Museveni's national policy of 
promoting gender issues. Compared with many other African societies, women in Uganda 
have made some progress in the past decade. See for instance Arthur Bainomugisha, 
(1999): The Empowerment of Women in Uganda, in: Mugaju, Justus (ed.): Uganda's Age of 
Reforms. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 89-103.
122 Victoria Sekitoleka (1996): The African Woman on the Continent: Her Present State, 
Prospects and Strategies, in: Abdul-Raheem, Tajudeen (ed.): Pan Africanism. Politics, 
Economy and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century. London: Pluto, p. 67.
123 Interview with Alfred Aruo.
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rationale of punishing their rebel husbands in the bush. Yet the Teso women 
also became victims of their own 'boys'.
Since the insurgency in Teso was mainly fought on grounds of 
economic deprivation and a policy of neglect by the new government, which 
manifested itself in extreme poverty and famine, the women realised that 
the violent conflict in Teso only deteriorated their situation. Instead of 
improving the circumstances, the fighting made them worse. Through 
informal and casual meetings while collecting water from the wells, 
mourning about lost family members or similar shared day to day practices, 
the women exchanged their worries and fears and collaborated in passing 
on messages to related rebels in the bush to encourage their return. They 
used emotional pressure to appeal to their husbands' and sons' 
responsibility to care for them and their small children, as opposed to 
making their conditions even more difficult.124 Some women even went as 
far as refusing their partners their 'marital duties' in order to exercise 
pressure on them. 125 The informal role women played is apparent in the 
words of an ex-rebel
Women played a very big role. I  must say, in any conflict zone you 
women have a lot of power. Amongst other things the problem is that 
you have not realised your power and sometimes the people who deal in 
conflict resolution have not realised it and addressed it seriously.
Especially here in Teso, the women helped us so much. The morale they  
give to you. You can be in the bush for as long as 7 days, th at means 
you have not taken care of yourself, and she still hugs you and tells 
you: 'You are nice.' So you can see w hat it means. Then in term s of 
pacification they can say: 'H ere, the children, they need you! So I think  
the best is w hatever happens out there - lets go. You m ay lose what 
happens out there, but you save your life for m y sake and for the  
ch ild ren /126
However what, in Echweru's words, appears to be a collaborative 
effort amongst the Teso women was, according to most of my interviewees, 
merely the deployment of their pitiful situation.127 Women used sympathy to
124 Interview with Mary Epechu and Pius Okiria.
125 Interview with Stella Sabiiti, Kampala 9.2.2000.
126 Interview with Musa Echweru.
127 My experience runs counter the attempt of using the Teso women as role-models for 
women's impact on peace-building as promoted by CECORE, Kampala. Interview with Stella 
Sabiiti.
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emotionally appeal to their husbands and sons. Although this belief is not 
generally shared/28 according to my experience, women in Teso have very 
little influence on political decision-making. Due to their poor education 
paired with the traditionally patriarchal culture, women were not able to 
organise themselves formally and to exercise resistance against their 
fighting men.
The domestic appeal of the Teso women to their husbands and sons 
worked mainly because it revealed a paradox in the struggle. Since one of 
the rebels' motives was to alleviate poverty and economic exclusion, they 
had to acknowledge that the insurgency was counter-productive. I f  the 
rebels had been stronger it is likely they would not have listened too much 
to their women, yet maybe the women would not have seen any reason to 
influence their husbands anyway.129 In Teso, however, the women rather 
preferred their men to look defeated than to be killed.130
On a general level, the limited role of organised women's initiatives to 
the resolution of the Teso insurgency raises significant questions about the 
empowerment of women. "Empowerment is associated with the positive 
transformation of individuals, groups, and structures,"131 and is thus vital for 
every peace-process. Women, like all other social groups, are stakeholders 
in peace (and war) and should therefore be able to participate in political 
decision making. In addition, as stated in Chapter 7 with reference to 
Murray Last, violent conflict does not know of boundaries, it is not restricted 
to frontlines but stretches into the domestic realm predominately occupied 
by women. Violent conflict happens on different levels and appears in 
different forms, and the abuse of women is a major feature. By 
consequence, it is suggested that the road from war to peace should 
therefore also include the transformation of the role of women from victims 
to empowered agents.
128 Sabiiti refers to a proverb saying that 'decisions are made in the bedroom'.
129 A very different role of domestic persuasion seems to occur amongst the families of 
Karamojong warriors were women allegedly encourage their husbands to be brave and to 
raid cattle.
130 Interview with Musa Echweru.
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And yet, the project of 'women building peace' relies heavily on 
paradoxes. As pointed out by Donna Pankhurst and Jenny Pearce, the 
promotion of women as peace agents depends on their cultural 'gentleness' 
- like 'pacifist, tolerant, compassionate, patient, modest and soft spoken' as 
quoted above - that is on terms "which restrict their ability to challenge 
those gender relations which inhibit their empowerment".132 Instead of 
challenging structures of exclusion and inclusion, here between women and 
men, the promotion of women as peace-builders produces and re-produces 
relations of inequality and subjugation. Once women have been liberated 
from their inferior role they become as outspoken and controversial as their 
husbands and sons. In Teso, the most powerful women were strong 
advocates of the insurgency and continue to remain hostile to Museveni.133
In Teso, the women were however successful in reducing the use of 
violence through emphasising their suffering to their husbands and sons, 
and thus rendering them conscious of the traumatising implications of 
fighting. Albeit based on a notion of compassion and pity, their strategy 
proved successful and reduced the level of violence.
Elders
Traditionally, elders are the most highly respected mediators in 
African culture. Their social status as eminent persons provides them with 
both the necessary trust and respect to act as facilitators as well as judges. 
Most African societies are based on a hierarchical system which provides 
elders with a reputation of wisdom and ultimately social and political power. 
Respect is key and decisions made by (mostly male) elders are commonly 
adhered to. Although the increase of western influence and its egalitarian 
culture of 'modernity' undermines this tradition, even today the role of a 
Mzee, the Swahili world for elder, is of major significance. Nevertheless, as 
a consequence of western cultural influence such as notions of
131 Edward W. Schwerin (1995): Mediation, Citizen Empowerment and Transformational 
Politics. Westport/London: Praeger, p. 6.
132 Donna Pankhurst/Jenny Pearce (1998): Engendering the Analysis of Conflict: Perspectives 
from the South, in: Afshar, Haleh (ed.): Women and Empowerment. London: Macmillian, p. 
162.
133 Interview with Frieda Ediamo.
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independence, equality and liberation, the significant role of elders has 
begun to crumble.
Elders and the Teso Insurgency
In Teso, many elders did not like the insurgency for they realised that 
it would bring suffering to Teso. Although they consented that the fighting 
was justified, they nevertheless emphasised that the rebels had no chance, 
and that it would hinder progress in the region. Most of them advised 
against fighting, yet the rebels were not receptive. Often, when an elder 
spoke out he would be killed.134
One of the casualties of the insurgency was therefore the authority 
that elders traditionally had over the youth. The power of the gun disrupted 
the hierarchies and led the youth to disrespect their parents and 
grandparents. As a result, elders had less impact on the reconciliation then 
one would assume in the Ugandan context.
And yet, one major initiative was undertaken by Haji Okodel from 
Kumi district in 1992. He chaired a meeting between a selected team of 
Iteso elders and the Brigadier Command in Mbale in which both military 
personnel and elders encouraged a reconciliation strategy of persuasion 
rather then force.135
On a local and family level elders consulted and advised their rebel 
sons and called for reason and the end of fighting. Similar to the women 
they thus had an informal impact on the promotion of peace in Teso. 
However, according to my information, public clan meetings and long 
debates facilitated by elders never occurred.
Due to the small role elders played in the resolution of the insurgency 
it is difficult to assess their impact on changing the prevailing power 
asymmetries of inclusion and exclusion. In the public domain, their efforts 
proved to have little success. In the private realm, however, through
134 Interview with Pius Okiria.
135 NV 24.4.1992
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appealing to their sons' consciousness, they might have had an impact on 
the reduction of violence.
Nevertheless, in light of the present fashion of promoting elders' 
participation in conflict resolution it has to be acknowledged that elders 
have the potential to influence communities. However, and Teso is a very 
good example here, elders can also encourage violence. Similar to clerics 
and women, and possibly all other agents in a process of mediation, they do 
not have an intrinsic agenda of peace and reconciliation. What they do have 
is social and political power -  and this can work in favour or against violent 
conflicts. The present promotion of community elders, or a council of elders, 
as agents of peace is therefore a delicate enterprise.
Mediation and the End of the Insurgency
The insurgency in Teso never had a formal ending. 'H itler' Eregu, the 
1st Commander of the Rebel High Command and one of the last boys 
remaining in the bush, left Uganda in May 1992. For most people today this 
constituted the end.136 However, smaller groups of insurgents continued 
fighting until 1994 when they either surrendered or where captured by the 
NRA.137
One important lesson learned from investigating the different actors 
that contributed to the end of the insurgency is that third party intervention 
has to happen on different levels and at different stages of the conflict.138 
The various actors influenced the constituency from different angles, leading 
to greater impact. The Teso Commission and the churches, for instance, 
addressed a similar group of people: the local population, on one hand, and 
the Rebel High Command, on the other. They communicated about their 
ventures, and supported each other on a small scale. Father Pius, for 
instance, enabled Grace Akello to meet with the 2nd Commander Sam Otai,
136 NV 19.9.1993
137 "Rebel Leader Surrenders". Radio Uganda: Kampala, 2 February 1993; "Ugandan Minister 
Says for Rebel Army to Dissolve, Calls for Exiles to Return". Radio Uganda: Kampala, 6 July 
1992.
138 This point is also central to traditional approaches to mediation. See for instance Keith 
Webb (1995): "Third Party Intervention and the Ending of Wars ."Paradigms 9 (2 ), p. 28.
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Bishop Illukor participated in seminars and conferences organised by the 
Teso Commission. Together they were successful in convincing the 
remaining rebels to come out of the bush and to surrender their guns.
Evaluation o f the Mediation Process
By way of conclusion it has to be admitted that the issue of 
evaluating mediation efforts is a problematic one. How can we possibly 
measure success?139 And "what does it mean to settle or resolve, or manage 
an ethnic conflict successfully?"140 Most obviously, the cessation of hostilities 
is a reliable indicator, but many mediation attempts contribute valuable 
small pieces to a larger whole which might result in some form of peace. 
Yet, how can one determine which initiatives contributed in what way?
At the outset of this chapter, with the aid of Jabri, we established 
that a discourse on peace requires the challenging of the structural 
exclusion that has given rise to the conflict, as well as the reduction of the 
culture of violence which renders violence a legitimate way of solving 
disputes. In Chapter 2 and 3 it has been argued that this discourse cannot 
be placed in an environment of undistorted communication, as suggested by 
Habermas' discourse ethics, but rather that it resembles what Gadamer 
calls a fusion o f horizons in which both parties no longer remain who they 
were. By way of conclusion I would like to return to Jabri's requirements, 
link them to the process of hermeneutics and evaluate whether the 
mediation in Teso has indeed led to changes.
Structural Exclusion
The accumulation of various different mediation efforts, from various 
different agents, did indeed lead to a change in Teso. Couched in a 
framework of analysis based on Giddens' structuration theory, it is fair to 
argue that the mediation efforts served as the agency that ultimately
139 See for example Hoffman (1995).
140 Mark Howard Ross/Jay Rothman (1999): Issues of Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict 
Resolution, in: Ross, Mark Howard/Roth man, Jay (eds.): Theory and Practice in Ethnic 
Conflict Resolution. Theorizing Success and Failure. Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, p. 
5.
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changed the structural properties prevailing in Teso at the time of the 
insurgency. At the outset, from the Iteso and Kumam perspective, people 
felt marginalised in Museveni's Uganda. Economically, politically and 
culturally they believed to be unappreciated and excluded. As a result, their 
perception was very much characterised by an us/them dichotomy. Through 
the agency of the various mediators, and first and foremost the Teso 
Commission, this strict binary was challenged and changed. Especially the 
promise of development, at a time where famine was looming in Teso, 
assured people that the central government would care for them. Their 
image of Museveni changed from that of a dictator to a patron.
In this sense the political objective of the insurgency, to challenge 
the exclusive boundaries, proved successful to a degree. As argued in 
Chapter 1, the rationale behind the dissent in Teso was to challenge the 
prevailing structural properties of exclusion. And yet, in light of the suffering 
experienced during the years of bush war especially the civilian population, 
which had supported the insurgency so strongly, moderated their political 
objectives in favour of simple personal and economic security. Here, again, 
the structural dispositions, which prevailed at the outset of the insurgency, 
changed and as a consequence enabled the agency of the mediators. Giving 
up ambitious political aims led to Museveni's promise of economic 
development to be a sufficient incentive to cease the struggle.
The Promise o f Development
As mentioned above, the language used in the process of mediation 
by the government was mainly with reference to food security. And yet, as 
shown in Chapters 6 and 7, in Teso, the insurgency did not arise simply due 
to the lack of development. Rather, the relationship between the Kumam 
and Iteso on the one hand, and the Museveni government on the other, was 
characterised by mutual mistrust and led to the interpretation of each 
other's actions through a perspective in which the other was rendered a 
threat. Yet, once this picture of the enemy was created it was legitimised in 
terms of the lack of development. The violent conflict was justified, and 
thus maintained, with development becoming the symbol for struggle. 
Social, political and economic progress was what the Iteso and Kumam
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were fighting for. The gesture of the NRM government through the Teso 
Commission, in which it offered development if the rebels surrendered, was 
therefore successful in appeasing the people of Teso. In the words of the 
PCT Commissioner Akello
Then PCT realised that there were some people who wanted to listen to 
w hat we wanted to say, that was to support them  economically. Some 
kind of hope that they have to start all over again. ... We wanted them  
to feel th a t they had a stake in the economical future o f Teso. Instead of 
fighting they now concentrated on developm ent.141
Therefore, although development was not the cause it was 
nevertheless a part of the solution to the violent conflict. In Teso, 
'development' changed from being the 'symbol for struggle' to being the 
'symbol for trust' in the new government. In this sense the future 
anticipation of wealth and prosperity functioned as 'the image', as 
introduced with reference to Galtung in Chapter 3. The promise of 
development served as an incentive to reinterpret the past which allowed 
for this image potentially to be realised, paving the way for peace and 
reconciliation in the future.
Fused Horizons
Regarding Gadamer's notion of fusing horizons we can therefore ask 
whether in Teso, in the early 1990s, a process of fusion did indeed take 
place.
As argued in Chapter 3, in order to conceive of and appreciate the 
Other, Gadamer argues, we refer to our own preconceptions and prejudices 
which result from our own historical situatedness. Only through them are 
we able to understand the issue at stake; they are the basic requirements 
of hermeneutics. In the process of hermeneutics we question our historical 
situatedness, that is our Vor-urteile (prejudices and prejudgement) which 
leads to potentially amending or even discarding them.
In particular, the work of the Teso Commission led the civilian 
population to challenge their prejudices and prejudgements about the 
Museveni government. Since development had turned into the central issue,
141 Interview with Grace Akello.
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they re-evaluated their critique of the NRM and changed the prevailing 
narrative of Museveni being their enemy to him being their provider. In 
doing so, the people of Teso altered the past they retrieved and recalled, 
and which defined their present. In their recollection, the motivation which 
drove the insurgency was no longer defined in political terms, but on the 
basis of struggling for development. Changing the past, however, was only 
possible in light of anticipating 'the image' of a particular future, the future 
of prosperity and peace in a wider Uganda, so that the promise of 
development through the PCT facilitated the resolution. This entailed an 
identity shift as the people no longer conceived of themselves as 
marginalised and thus no longer made their true identity reliant upon the 
scapegoating false difference.142 Both, the NRM government and the Teso 
community, through a process of dialogue, entered into a communion in 
which they remained not who they were. Their identity changed from 
aggressor to patron, in the case of Museveni, and from excluded to 
stakeholder, in the case of the people of Teso.
Only through casting themselves into a future horizon of prosperity 
and security safeguarded by the government were the Iteso and Kumam 
able to amend their Vor-urteile about Museveni, manifested in the stories 
they told about him, and thus open their horizon for reconciliation — the 
fusion of horizons. The backwards and forwards movement hermeneutics 
was successfully at play.
Culture of Violence
The question remains whether the mediation process in Teso was 
successful in reducing the culture of violence. As discussed in Chapter 7 the 
application of violence at the beginning of the insurgency was, to an extent, 
legitimate and widely accepted.
Regarding the introduction of non-violent means of social interaction, 
the mediation process was in this respect rather a failure. Towards the end 
of the insurgency, due to the individual experience of combat, the use of
142 Connolly (1991): 67.
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violence had even increased. As Nordstrom suggests, people had 'learned 
violence'.143 The prevalence of force and firearms lingered over Teso for 
some time and manifested itself in aggression and crime in the public and 
private realm. To this day people in Teso suggest that they live in a rather 
aggressive environment and that workshops to promote non-violent conflict 
resolution or peace clubs in schools should be encouraged in order to give 
people the opportunity to 'unlearn' violence.144
However, despite the initial success of the mediation efforts in Teso, 
the atmosphere today is rather negative. The following chapter shall explore 
the process of post-conflict reconstruction and its failure to consolidate the 
initial success of the mediation and to turn it into a process of reconciliation.
143 Nordstrom (1997): 217.
144 TIP (2000): Activities and Strategies. Soroti: TIP.
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chapter ix
Po s t -C o n  f l ic t  R e c o n s t r u c t io n  
a n d  R e c o n c il ia t io n
"Ever since the insurgency" people say, "Teso has changed." Despite 
the difficulties of identifying change in hindsight, the present chapter shall 
attempt to sketch how the way of life for the Kumam and Iteso has been 
affected, and changed, as a result of the insurgency. Or, to put this into the 
language of hermeneutics: how has the flux been arrested?
In Teso, nine years after the end of the insurgency, resentment is 
again very high. A general feeling of betrayal by the Museveni government 
prevails - the promise of development, which encouraged the end of the 
violent conflict, was never fulfilled. Post-conflict reconstruction was absent 
in Teso. As a result, there is peace in Teso now, but it remains very shallow.
Beginning by painting a picture of the status quo in Teso today this 
chapter will investigate the long-term success of the mediation initiative and 
the process of reconciliation. Since development has played such a 
significant role in the mediation process I shall start with showing how little 
it has improved in the region, and how poor the people still are. Following 
this, I shall provide an account of two different ways of responding to the 
past of the insurgency.1 In order to understand the ontology of the actual, I 
shall firstly sketch ways of remembering with reference to the only war 
memorial to commemorate the insurgency, a mausoleum close to the 
trading centre of Mukura, Kumi district, and secondly I shall describe the 
invention of the new cultural leader of the Iteso, Papa Emorimor, in order to 
highlight an innovative way of changing the role of the Iteso in the wider 
Uganda. Being central to the hermeneutic process of retrieving the past and 
casting oneself forward into the future, both examples, albeit different in 
scope, shall provide insights into how the people of Teso are dealing with
1 Unfortunately, due to space constraints, what cannot be discussed in this section are issues 
related to social healing, justice and forgiving.
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their past today, and how this shapes their prospects for the future. The 
examples chosen are of vastly different character, which reflects the 
plurality of perspectives and opinions in communities per se.
The Failure o f Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Teso
Poverty in Teso
Today, Teso is one of the poorest regions in Uganda. Since the end of 
the insurgency the districts have endured two famines.2 According to the 
1998 UNDP Development Report, the degree of development in Uganda is 
still very low. At first sight, there has been some general improvement; and 
in reference to the eastern regions of Uganda the UNDP report states that 
this economic rebound is
largely a product of relative peace and security in that part of the  
country a fter years of conflict. The restoration of peace has been ensued 
by re-stocking of cattle and modest revival in other forms of private  
investm ent.3
However, the figures for Teso provided in the report contradict this 
argument.4 According to a graphic in the text, based on figures from 1995, 
16 of the 39 districts of Uganda recorded a decline in the Human 
Development Index (HDI).5 Of these 16 districts the (then only) two 
districts of Teso (Soroti and Kumi) came third and fourth last. Soroti has 
lost 0.016, Kumi 0.017 HDI points. Pallisa, an area closely related to Teso 
and also affected by the insurgency lost the most (0.019 HDI points), and 
the two districts of Karamoja, Kotido and Moroto, came 15th and 2nd last, 
with a decrease of 0.003 and 0.018 HDI points. In the overall HDI ranking
2 "17 Die of Hunger in Eastern Uganda". Xinhua News Agency: Kampala, 24 January 1994; 
"Famine Threatening Eastern Uganda". Xinhua News Agency: Kampala, 14 March 1995.
3 UNDP (1998): Uganda Development Report. New York: UNDP, p. 11.
4 Please refer to the appendix for graphics.
5 "The human development index (HDI) measures human progress on the basis of human 
achievement in three broad indicators namely: longevity, educational attainment, and 
standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth, educational attainment 
by a combination of adult literacy and school enrolment ratio, and standard of living by real 
GDP per capita. The HDI is an aggregation of these key indicators of human progress. In 
numerical terms, the index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 indicates total absence of human 
development and 1 indicates the highest level of human development." (UNDP (1998): 21.)
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by district for 1996, Kotido and Moroto were on the bottom of the graph, 
Kumi was position five and Soroti ten.6 As for the 1996 Human Poverty 
Index (HPI),7 again Kotido and Moroto ranked lowest, Soroti was ninth, and 
Kumi eleventh worst.
Poverty is a highly contested concept and different definitions are on 
offer. UNDP suggests an inclusive notion, which not only focuses on 
material well being, an economic perspective, but also on personal 
development:
[P joverty  involves the lack, deficiency and loss of social, economic, 
cultural, political and other entitlem ents that individuals, households and 
communities should enjoy in order to exist and survive in well-being and 
with dignity.8
Taking this definition as a guideline, Teso is considered very poor. Especially 
in rural areas many people are without access to water and sanitation, 
health care or sufficient nutrition. They lack in self-esteem and prospects for 
the future.9
6 Unfortunately more up-to-date figures are not available. See appendix for graphics.
7 'The [HPI] index is based on the proportion of a population that is deprived in three 
respects, namely: longevity, knowledge, and decent standard of living. These are the same 
factors on which the computation of the human development index is based. While the HDI 
places emphasis on achievement, the HPI concentrates on deprivation or exclusion in these 
three broad areas of human life." (UNDP (1998): 24.)
8 UNDP (1998): 27.
9 This impression based on a series of interviews with rural peasants in Kamuda, as well as 
group discussions with LC3 chairpeople during a consultation organised by NURP (Northern 
Uganda Reconstruction Project, Office of the Prime Minister) in conjunction with the Swedish 
Government: Peace, Conflict Resolution and Development, Soroti 21.-26.03.2000.
One reason for the poor standard of living is the failure of the World Bank's Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP, 1987-1992) from which only a particular section of Uganda's 
rural and urban population benefited. In a liberal market economy, as promoted by SAP, the 
main links between the macro-economy of a state and the individual households are 
markets, as well as economic and social infrastructures. Liberal Structural Adjustment 
Programmes tend to favour those market participants who have access to capital, who can 
respond to market changes by adjusting production, create operating efficiencies and/or 
implement flexible work practices (i.e. change staff numbers, conditions, wages or move 
production elsewhere). Small participants are often unable to adjust in this way leading to a 
reduction in their incomes. In Teso, the small-scale producers do not have the resource 
capacity to expand their production and to compete successfully in a free market structure. 
Especially Katakwi district, but also Soroti and Kumi, are physically far away from marketing 
infrastructures so that local farmers and entrepreneurs are unable to fully benefit from price 
liberalisation. (CDRN (1996): A Study of Poverty in Selected Districts of Uganda: Apac, 
Kampala, Kapchorwa, Kibaale, Kisoro, Kumi and Nebbi. Kampala: CDRN Report, March 1996, 
p.4. For a critical self-evaluation see Alcira Kreimer/John Eriksson et. al. (1998): The World 
Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Washington: World Bank report, p. 65.)
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As discussed in the previous chapter, towards the end of the 
insurgency the hopes and aspirations for development in Teso were high. 
Yet over the course of time the momentum was lost and gave way to 
disillusion and apathy in the community. What were the reasons for this 
reversion of sentiment?
In itia l Success? Presidential Elections in 1996
Only 4 years after the end of the insurgency Presidential Elections 
were held in Uganda. In Teso, Museveni received about 60% of the votes.10 
Considering recent history in the region the result seems surprising. How 
can people, who had risked their lives in a violent struggle, turn around in 
such a short space of time and show their appreciation for the President so 
overwhelmingly?
The impression drawn while conducting fieldwork was that Museveni 
and his entourage were successful in buying votes. Shortly before the 
election, former rebels, still well respected in their home region but 
meanwhile part of the Movement system, distributed bags with sugar and 
salt to the Iteso and Kumam. In the words of a journalist:
The catchphrase is "eat widely, vote wisely." That means th at voters in 
Thursday's election for Uganda's new parliam ent should take all the  
beer, m eat, money, salt and other inducements being offered by the
809 contestants, but vote their conscience.
The bribery is indiscriminate and open, but analysts believe it will have 
little effect on the voting, which will seal Uganda's return to democracy 
after a succession of coups and dictatorships since independence from  
Britain in 1 9 6 2 .11
However, from my experience in Teso, the bribery had a positive 
outcome on Museveni's election success. Considering the poverty in Teso,
but also more importantly the system of patronage that is in place in
Uganda, buying votes is not a difficult endeavour. This is however not to 
suggest that handing out food to a constituency renders the electorate 
genuinely supportive. Rather, patronage establishes a system of reciprocity
10 "Museveni Wins Presidential Elections with 74.2 Per Cent of Vote". Radio Uganda: 
Kampala, 11 May 1996.
11 Hugh Nevill (1996): "Eat Widely, Vote Wisely". Agence France Press: Paris, 25 June 1996.
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in which certain demands have to be fulfilled. Taking food in an election 
campaign subjects, in its literal sense, the Iteso and Kumam to the 
President. Whether they agree with his politics or not, they commit 
themselves to supporting him.
In June 2000, a referendum on the future of the political system of 
Uganda was held. The electorate was given the opportunity to vote for 
either the continuation of the non-party system in form of the National 
Resistance Movement, or to change to a multiparty system of 
representative democracy. In the course of the campaign the people in Teso 
increasingly interpreted the referendum to be less about political systems 
and more about the degree of support for Museveni. The Chairman of the 
National Movement Conference, who led the campaign for the Movement 
system, was Museveni himself. In June 2000 the Kumam and Iteso thus 
'voted with their feet': in Soroti district municipality merely 28% 
participated in the Referendum out of which 4,333 voted for the Movement 
system and 1,354 for the Multipartists.12 This suggests a low degree of 
support for Museveni at the time.
Not Keeping the Promise of Development
A number of different factors contributed to the peace in Teso 
remaining shallow. The Teso Commission, as well as the Museveni 
government, had the potential to provide the people of Teso with confidence 
and trust, and yet they failed.
The Presidential Commission for Teso
As explained above the mandate of the PCT was to encourage 
economic and social development in Teso. One major task was the 
restocking of cattle lost during the insurgency. In the formerly cattle 
herding culture, only 7% of the previous cattle herd remained.13 In a society 
were cattle means not only food but also political power and social welfare, 
this was a considerable shock. The degree of frustration is apparent in this 
remark by an informant:
12 New Vision 8.7.2000.
13 Interview with James Eceret.
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Akello delivered Teso to NRM, and NRM to Teso. The NRM has gained 
more then the Iteso: the conflict ended but there were few economic 
im provem ents.14
I t  is impossible to evaluate in detail how much money was spent on 
restocking cattle in Teso. The Commission received very generous funds 
from DANIDA15 as well as from other international donors. Simultaneously, 
a number of international NGOs financed the reconstruction process outside 
of the PCT framework. Yet, as in other areas of Uganda, corruption reduced 
the budget drastically,16 and difficult demands and monitoring systems 
established by international donors proved to further consume large 
amounts of funding.17
All in all, the restocking of cattle in Teso was of little success, and has 
left the population, once more, with the bitter feeling of neglect. As a result, 
the good reputation of the Teso Commission has suffered significantly, and 
individual members are sometimes accused of'eating money', or at least of 
using their positions as Commissioners as spring-boards for their personal 
career development. The former chairman Epelu-Opio is now Deputy Vice- 
Chancellor of Makerere University, while the former Commission Secretary 
Grace Akello is now Minister of State for Entandikwa.
Today, when asked about the Teso Commission the response of most 
Kumam and Iteso is immediately negative. Only when questioned about its 
role in the period from 1991 to 1992 do people begin to acknowledge the 
positive impact the Commission had.
Museveni's Government
In a post-conflict environment, according to E. A. Brett, national 
integration depends on
14 Conversation with Iteso at Cafe Amigos, Soroti town 29.04.2000.
15 Interview with John Olweny, Kampala 08.02.2000.
16 On 18.1.2000, the MP for Kabremaido (Soroti district), former Attorney General and 
Minister of Justice Joseph Ekemu was convicted to a prison sentence of 2 years for 
embezzling 113 Million Ush. meant for restocking. The Monitor 17.6.2000.
17 Interview with Moses Omiat, Soroti 21.03.2000.
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the existence of an institutional system which protects the civil rights of 
all the m ajor civil groups and ensures that their claims on resources will 
not be excluded through the arbitrary exercise of the monopoly of 
power. ... Civil wars are best ended through a process of reconciliation 
and reconstruction designed to restore faith in the representativeness  
and equity of the political and economic system . Several countries are 
now attem pting to do this in Africa, but there is little doubt th at Uganda 
has now produced the most successful record of sustained progress.18
The background to Uganda's success-story, Brett argues, is based on 
Museveni systematically attempting to overcome jealousy and mistrust 
through incorporating opponents into a 'broad-based' government, 
constitutional and administrative reform, and a programme of economic 
liberalisation and reconstruction which aims at addressing the needs of 
marginalised regions of the country.19
From my personal experience in Teso, none of the three strategies 
mentioned by Brett can be verified. Firstly the Kumam and Iteso feel that 
there is little space for them in the 'broad-based' government. Although the 
Iteso provide two ministers, Akello and Omeda, people argue that they are 
merely ministers of state, and not cabinet ministers, and that their influence 
is very limited. Furthermore, it is argued frequently that the present Iteso 
NRA Major General, Jeje Odongo is only a placeholder. The real decisions, 
people say, are made by the army personnel close to Museveni.
As for Brett's second point, constitutional and administrative reform, 
the process of decentralisation introduced to Uganda by Museveni is difficult 
to assess without a detailed economic and social study.20 Subjectively, 
however, many people in Teso lament the disappearance of state organised 
market structures and guaranteed crop prices, such as those in place during 
the Obote government. Many farmers in Teso cannot afford to transport 
their goods to the large markets of Kampala where they could achieve 
higher prices so that farming has become less lucrative.
18 E. A. Brett (1996): Rebuilding War Damaged Communities in Uganda. Allen, Tim (ed.): In 
Search of Cool Ground. War, Flight and Homecoming in Northeast Africa. London/Trenton: 
James Curry/Africa World Press, p. 205.
19 Brett (1996): 209
20 For a critical assessment see Fumihiko Saito (2001/forthcoming): "Decentralisation 
Theories Revisited: Lessons from Uganda." Ryukoku RISS Bulletin(31).
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One of the major concerns in Teso today is that the government's 
district support is allocated on a per capita basis. 21 Yet, when the last 
census was held in 1991 Teso found itself in the middle of an insurgency 
war so that many people did not register for fear of being arrested. As a 
result, people argue that today they receive disproportionally little support 
from central government so that the three Teso districts incur very high 
budget deficits.
Thirdly, people in Teso argue that the economic changes introduced 
by Museveni's government have been beneficial for some areas of the 
country, yet not for Teso or Karamoja. According to the UNDP figures 
provided above, in both regions development actually declined in recent 
years. Already marginalised regions, the people contest they have become 
even more marginalised.
Uganda's decentralisation was encouraged by the World Banks liberal 
market politics through its Structural Adjustment Programme, which had 
devastating effects on many African communities, including Teso, to the 
point that even the World Bank today recognises its mistakes.22 The major 
points of self-criticism are
• poor performance in social sector, esp. health and education: too much 
dependency placed on existing democracies, not enough on use of 
NGOs.
• project design did not adequately reflect Uganda's need for a flexible, 
process oriented project design, which is particularly evident in the social 
sector where ministries where too weak to accommodate spending.
• Bank staff were not familiar with working in conflict areas.
• staff resources and time were mainly concentrated on Kampala, which 
led to little understanding of the concerns of local and international 
NGOs.
• insufficient attention was paid to consensus building. There was an 
excessive use of conditionalities; dysfunctional emphasis on raising 
taxation.
21 Interview with demographer Stephen Esunget, Soroti 21.02.2000.
22 Kreimer/Eriksson et. al. (1998): 65.
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I t  is in response to these mistakes that the World Bank is currently revising 
its post-conflict reconstruction policies as referred to above.
The Impact o f the International Community
The reference to the World Bank shows that despite the local 
approach taken in the present thesis, Uganda in general, and Teso in 
particular, do not exist in isolation from the rest of the world. This is also 
manifested in the negative impact the international development 
community has on the imbalance of prosperity in the country. I f  one was to 
assume that the central government supports all the districts in Uganda 
equally one cannot but focus on other, additional sources of funds and 
development. The most resourceful groups, in this respect, are international 
organisations. Looking at a map of Uganda it is obvious that the vast 
majority of these organisations offer their services in western Uganda, as 
well as in the greater Kampala region. There is a very strong imbalance 
between the amount of foreign investment that flows into central and west 
Uganda on one side, and eastern and northern on the other. In a country 
where, for instance, 50% of the health sector is funded by international 
donors,23 as well as 80% of the total government development budget,24 
this asymmetry accounts for an extremely uneven distribution of practical, 
technical and financial assistance. When asked why they favour the central 
and western areas international organisations commonly refer to the 
already existing network of donor organisations which facilitates logistical 
support, as well as the proximity to the capital and the level of security.
Security, in particular, proves to be paradoxical. Insecurity arises in 
regions where people harbour resentment against the authorities. The 
subjective feeling of neglect and exclusion might lead to drastic actions like 
terrorist or rebel attacks. Yet neglect, or privileging, is not only provoked by 
central authorities. In areas such as Teso people do not differentiate if the 
funds flowing into west and central Uganda are provided by the government
23 Nicolas de Torrente/Frederick Mwesigye (1999): The Evolving Roles of the State, Donors, 
and NGOs Providing Health Services in a Liberal Environment: Some Insights form Uganda. 
Kampala: CBR report.
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or by external donors. They only focus on the disparity of money available, 
and blame the government. In addition, there is a general understanding 
that the government is responsible for the distribution of international 
assistance; that the donors themselves have preferences is not considered.
Consequently, considering the security risk deriving from the 
asymmetric distribution of international funds, one has to attribute a degree 
of responsibility to donors. As evident in Teso, the unequal distribution of 
assistance creates a sense of injustice amongst the affected people. This 
may potentially lead to strong resentment against the government. In an 
already fragile political situation, the widening of the gap between rich and 
poor by international donors potentially enhances the antagonism towards 
the government and increases the security risk. Paradoxically, the resulting 
insecurity would further prevent international donors from becoming active 
in a particular region, and set a spiral process in motion in which the fear of 
violent conflict enhances the possibility of its occurrence.
The Relation Between the People o f Teso and the Wider Uganda Today
Nevertheless, experiences of exclusion are potentially subjective. In 
Teso, it is difficult to draw a line between the personal feeling (or rather 
collective, for it is true for the vast majority of the population) of being 
disfavoured by the government, and the actual neglect based on a 
deliberate, unequal distribution of government resources. However, the 
number of Iteso and Kumam in public offices and private enterprises 
suggests that there is no general, national policy of discrimination against 
people from Teso. Yet some people are concerned, as expressed by Father 
Pius:
The people think that the present governm ent is mainly pro west and 
that we have been economically discriminated. Could it [the insurgency] 
happen again? I  am w orried.25
Therefore, in the present study I would like to suggest that it does 
not matter what the 'reality' is, that is whether Teso is treated unjustly by
24 Private conversation with Nicolas de Torrente, Kampala 11.02.2000.
25 Interview with Pius Okiria.
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the Ugandan government, but merely how the people Interpret the 
situation. I f  they subjectively feel deprived of what they think is their right 
as a people of Uganda, then efforts should be made to gain their trust and 
confidence, and convince them of the opposite.
Transforming Identities  -  Between Past and Future
Considering the degree of exclusion and the lack of development in 
Teso today the question is whether the Kumam and Iteso have to some 
extent managed to dissent from the hierarchical relations that tied them to 
the Museveni government, and which they sought to challenge through the 
insurgency. Has challenging led to changing? Changing, or transforming, 
identities is central to the hermeneutic process of evaluating past, future, 
and the Other. In Chapter 3 we discussed that the way we conceive of our 
past is determined by the way we anticipate the future, and vice versa, and 
that present identities are determined by this circular movement. The 
following two examples shall therefore illustrate if and how the relationship 
to the Museveni government has changed.
Remembering the Past: The Mukura Memorial
Bernard Lewis suggests differentiating three types of history: 
remembered, recovered and invented.26 Here, 'remembered' refers to the 
collective memory of a community, 'recovered' to the reconstruction of past 
events after they had sunk into oblivion, whereas 'invention' designates a 
new interpretation of the past, either as derivative or fabrication. In 
particular, the categories of recovering and inventing draw attention to the 
potential for manipulation inherent in the process of remembering.
This section takes issue with remembered history, specifically the 
way people in Mukura remember a particular event, and it will thus focus on 
collective memory and its impact on the present Teso identity. Identity, self, 
and personhood are strategic targets in violent conflicts.27 This does not
26 Bernard Lewis (1975): History. Remembered, Recovered, Invented. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 11-12.
27 Nordstrom (1997): 178.
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only relate to the individual but also to the society as a whole. Deprived of 
material goods and belongings, casualties of assaults and attacks, people 
suffer hardship and pain. The argument that runs through this thesis 
suggests that in the aftermath of a violent conflict what has to be 
(re)created are thus individual as well as social bodies. Identities have to be 
newly considered -  on the basis of their reflection of past events.
Mukura
On 11 June 1989, 47 people suffocated in a railway wagon in Mukura, 
Kumi district. In the preceding days, about 300 Kumam and Iteso civilians 
were rounded up by NRA soldiers on the suspicion of being rebels.28 After 
being kept under very poor conditions, tortured and abused, they were 
incarcerated in the railway wagon where most of them died from the lack of 
oxygen. According to an eyewitness:
That was Tuesday, the 11th. These people were locked up there [in the  
railway wagon]. Over 100 according to my estim ate, they were over 
100. Commotion broke out, inside the coach. They stayed there for 
alm ost one and a half hours. Then commotion was fading, fading, 
fading, fading, till eventually everything cooled down. Then I  was again  
picked, that "okay, you come". They were by then making porridge. The  
soldiers were making porridge. They told me to come out. They opened 
the coach and I  found bodies doing what?, lying there ... inside the  
coach.
Then they asked me to go and pick ... to pick some more people to 
come and carry out the what?, carry outside the bodies. Some had not 
died in fact. Some were apparently dead. Those who were found 
apparently dead ... as they were trying to recover they could be 
tram pled upon, a t the necks here. They just step on you [m aking a snap 
with the fingers].
And they died. More than half. Only some few , I  don't know how lucky 
they were, I  picked some and helped them  to enter the what?, the 
goods shed now. Very late ... it was already dark now even, I  am sure 
th a t some recovered during the night, but then they were finished by 
the soldiers.
...those who were apparently dead, when they recovered they were  
finished.29
Amongst the abuses committed by the NRA during the insurgency the 
Mukura railway incident stands out not only as a manifestation of brutal 
violence against a group of potentially innocent civilians, but also as the
28 Conversation with three young men, Mukura, 10.4.2000.
29 Testimony of survivor recorded by Heriques (2000): 245-6.
216
only case where the Ugandan government took responsibility for what 
happened and apologised to the people.30 Yet, the government and army 
maintain that the incident was not a planed assault but rather an accident, 
a misjudgement, by the local NRA officers.31 Nevertheless, in order to 
compensate for the loss of human life and suffering endured, Museveni 
promised the people of Mukura financial support and free education for the 
orphans of the dead, as well as a memorial for the victims.
Reparations, as offered by the Museveni government, are potentially 
strong symbolic acts for they recognise individual and collective suffering.32 
From the viewpoint of restorative justice, restitution payment by the 
perpetrator can also symbolise the perpetrator's commitment to apologising 
and taking responsibility. Due to the strong symbolic value, disputes over 
reparations are therefore particularly revealing of the social and political 
current, as well as the attitudes the former parties to the conflict have 
towards one another at present. The Mukura memorial thus provides 
valuable insights into how the people from Mukura relate to the Museveni 
government.
In Mukura today, local people believe that much of the financial 
compensation promised as reparation was 'eaten' by politicians.33 The 
promise of free education, which eventually turned into the promise to build 
a secondary school, was not fulfilled when I visited the site in April 2000, 11 
years after the incident. The resentment of the people in Mukura was high 
and led to the threat of local politicians not to support the Referendum 2000
30 "Uganda: Museveni Promise Compensation for Mukura Deaths." Kampala: Radio Uganda, 
25 August 1989.
31 The explanation commonly referred to is that the local NRA officers misjudged the danger 
of suffocation in the wagon, they were simply unaware of the implications of locking a large 
group of people into a railway wagon. As such the incident becomes an accident which 
disperses responsibility. "Uganda: 47 Dead Due to 'Gross Negligence' After Rebel Round-up". 
BBC Summary of World Broadcast: London, 24 July 1989.
32 Brandon Hamber (1998a): Repairing the Irreparable: Dealing with Double-binds of Making 
Reparations for Crimes of the Past Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation Report, p. 4.
33 Conversation with three young men, Mukura 10.4.2000.
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about the future of the no-party (or Movement) system.34 Meanwhile, 
Museveni has reasserted his promise.35
The memorial, nevertheless, was built. I t  has the shape of a small 
house with windows on each side. Inside, a plaque is inscribed with the 47 
names of the people who suffocated in the wagon. Surprisingly though, the 
list is incorrect. Some of the people are still alive and live in Mukura trading 
centre, only a few yards away.36
Today, people in Mukura interpret the installation of the memorial as 
a sign of the government feeling ashamed of its actions, as well as an 
attempt to give a decent burial to the victims.37 And yet, the memorial has 
provoked strong, albeit subdued, controversy. Although, in a highly 
Christianised society like Teso, mourning and commemoration is practised 
over graves, to have relatives and family members buried in a public mass 
grave offends many cultural traditions. In Teso, as well as in most of 
Uganda, family members are buried at home in the homestead. Although 
not physically present the deceased remain a substantial part of the family 
and are thus placed among their loved-ones. Their souls, and by proxy their 
family, does not find rest until they have returned home to their ancestors' 
ground where they can be commemorated and mourned over. The dead 
remain alive by continued participation in the social structure of the home.38 
As for the casualties of the Mukura incident, people told me that "their 
grave was missing"; they wanted to take their loved-ones home yet "they 
were not allowed".39
34 Rodger Mulindwa (2000): "Kumi to Deny Movt Votes Over Schools". The Monitor: 
Kampala, 9 January 2000.
35 "Museveni Commissions Schools". New Vision: Kampala, 26 February 2001.
36 Conversation with three young men, Mukura, 10.4.2000.
37 The points raised in this section derive from the impressions I gained when spending an 
afternoon at the memorial. I had the chance to talk to a number of different people including 
former rebels and former NRA soldiers who are now again integrated into their communities.
38 I had the privilege of attending the memorial service of the anniversary of the death of 
Father Pius' mother and his brother in his homestead in Kumi district in May 2000. The 
brother had been assassinated during the insurgency. It  was very apparent that the 
commemoration of the deceased, who were buried in the centre of the homestead, was an 
opportunity for family members to gather, to solve family matters as well as to eat, drink 
and dance together.
39 Conversation with people in Mukura.
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Barbara Harell-Bond refers to similar comments made by Ugandan 
refugees based in Sudan.40 According to the custom of some people, the 
failure to perform burial rites is subject to supernatural sanctions.
A proper burial is the most im portant act of respect which can be paid to 
the deceased. There is probably no greater disgrace to a fam ily than to 
have failed to observe funeral customs.41
This lack of respect and the humiliation was also expressed by my 
contacts in Mukura. In addition, although in Uganda relatives are 
accustomed to preparing dead bodies of deceased family members, as well 
as conducting funerals without the aid of a commercial burial services (such 
as e.g. in Europe), seeing and dealing with the bones of family members is 
highly offensive. Bones are interpreted as signs of abuse, as testimonies 
that 'something went wrong'. The knowledge that only bones remain of 
their loved ones, buried in the Mukura mass grave, leaves the remaining 
families ill at ease. They miss the reconciling experience of bringing the 
dead home, of making the physical and communal bodies whole again.
Memorials
I f  one walks from Mukura trading centre towards the site of the 
incident one first sees two abandoned railway wagons, and one immediately 
assumes that this is the scene of crime.42 Emotional reactions are stirred; 
the massacre is pictured in the mind of the onlooker. Only when coming 
closer one detects the new, white mausoleum -  the true memorial.
Asked what a memorial signifies, as a symbol, people I interviewed 
replied that it testifies to the atrocities committed, and even if people start 
forgetting, the memorial will remind them of the incident -  memorials mark 
the 'presence of the absent'.43 As for the Mukura memorial, local people
40 Barbara Harell-Bond (1986): Imposing Aid. Emergency Assistance to Refugees. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 293.
41 Harell-Bond (1986): 293.
42 The wagons are not the remainders of the Mukura incident, they have been left behind 
much later. And yet their representation is much more powerful than that of the white house 
with the list of (incorrect) names.
43 Richard P. Werbner (1998): Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Postwars of the Dead, 
Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe, in: Werbner, Richard P. (ed.): Memory and the
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therefore wish the mausoleum would not have the shape of a house, but 
that of the actual railway wagon that has been left behind. What the Iteso 
and Kumam want to be reminded of is not the private pain of losing a 
loved-one, but rather the public crime of the killings committed by the NRA 
officers and soldiers. My contacts told me that the place was not frequently 
visited by relatives.
It  has been argued that "[cjommemoration silences the contrary 
interpretations of the past."44 I t  introduces a sense of closure which does 
not allow for re-interpreting an event. In Teso, however, the past of the 
insurgency is still very alive and vibrant for it is subject to constant debates 
over interpretations of events as well as their representation in form of 
memorials.45 The tension between constant contestation and closure is well 
expressed in a contradictory comment by one informant that people resent 
the memorial yet do appreciate it, but only because they have learned to 
appreciate.
On a more general note, it is important to recognise that the use and 
style of memorials is not beyond cultural contestation.46 Many cultures, and 
I would like to suggest that this is also true for the Iteso and Kumam, have 
no tradition of erecting and visiting sites of remembrance and 
commemoration. And yet, in the specific case of Teso, a highly Christianised 
society, the dead are mourned over at graves. A culture of using graves as 
symbols for loss, and bridges to the hereafter, is practised. The mausoleum, 
erected by the Museveni government, resembles a grave and as such has 
some legitimacy as a symbol. The railway wagon, however, as wished by 
the people of Mukura, encourages a very different form of remembrance.
Postcolonial. African Anthropology and the Critique of Power. London/New York: Zed 
Publications, p. 78.
44 David Middleton/Derek Edwards (1990): Introduction, in: Middleton, David/Edwards, 
Derek (eds.): Collective Remembering. London/Newbury Park/New Delhi: Sage, p. 8.
45 Leo SSebwezze (2001): "Uganda Still Lives With Museveni's 12 Crimes". The Monitor: 
Kampala, 3 January 2001; Odiya L'Pajule (2000): "What Are These People Apologising 
About?". The Monitor: Kampala, 21 January 2000; Obalell Omoding (1999): "Mukura: 
Lessons after 10 Years". The Monitor: Kampala, 11 July 2000; Obalell Omoding (1999): 
"Uganda Dead Remembered in Canada, UK". The Monitor: Kampala, 15 July 1999.
46 Susanne Kuechler (1999): The Place o f Memory, in: Forty, Adrian/Kuechler, Susanne 
(eds.): The Art of Forgetting. Oxford/New York: Berg, p.55.; Rowlands, M. (1999): 
Remembering to Forget: Sublimation as Sacrifice in War Memorials, in: Forty, 
Adrian/Kuechler, Susanne (eds.): The Art of Forgetting. Oxford/New York: Berg, p. 130
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People say it would provoke emotions and pain, which, in the local context, 
is rather unconventional in style and use. Nevertheless, in neighbouring 
countries, most notably post-genocide Rwanda, sites with similar 
connotations are maintained. For instance, in Rwanda, the ruins of a 
Catholic church are kept as the site where 5,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu 
were massacred by Hutu genocidaires. The remains of their bodies, clothes 
and belongings still cover the church floor. With the intention that the Tutsi 
have not died in vain, the sensation of 'never-again' is invoked. The 
meaning of the message is mediated to all visitors, Africans and Europeans 
alike.47
Remembering and Identity
Despite the government and the people of Mukura having different 
intentions regarding the memory of the mass killings, as manifested in the 
disagreement over how to symbolise the incident in form of a memorial, it 
can be argued that
[s]ym bols [here: memorials as symbols for the past] are effective less 
because they com m unicate meaning (though this is also im portant) than  
because, through performance, meanings are form ulated in a social 
rather than cognitive space, and the participants are engaged with the 
symbols in the interactional creation of a perform ance reality, rather 
than m erely being informed by them  as knowers.48
As suggested by Halbwachs in Chapter 3, memory depends on social 
environments and is thus collective.49 The way the Kumam and Iteso 
remember their past is produced by, and productive of, their collective 
identity. What is significant in the case of Mukura, however, is that 
collective identity arises in opposition to the memorial. The interpretation of 
the mausoleum does not lead to shared commemoration for the deceased,
47 I am here drawing on my experience when visiting the site in October 1999. I was 
accompanied by a group of people from Africa and Europe. The point here is, however, not to 
suggest that a form of universal consent existed amongst us spectators, i.e. that we all read 
the same meaning into the site, but rather that we all appreciated the presence of the 
memorial, regardless whether we came from a memorial-practising culture or not.
48 Nicolas Argenti (1999): Ephemeral Monuments, Memory and Royal Sempiternity in a 
Grassfield Kingdom, in: Forty, Adrian/Kuechler, Susanne (eds.): The Art of Forgetting. 
Oxford/New York: Berg, p. 23.
49 Halbwachs (1992): 43.
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as envisaged by the Museveni government, but rather to shared anger 
against the perpetrators of the crime. People define themselves in 
opposition, yet nevertheless in relation, to the memorial, and in doing so 
they produce and reproduce their identity in opposition to the government.
Hermeneutic Interpretation
At this point I would like to suggest a hermeneutic reading of the 
Mukura memorial in order to establish what it can tell us about the present 
and future of the Iteso and Kumam.
As for the notion of interpretation in general, it is important to 
recognise that despite potentially different interpretations, events are not 
entirely free of meaning and thus cannot lead to any interpretation.50 Not 
'anything goes' in the act of remembrance, for actual events frame what is 
possible.51 Biographic experience confines the scope of remembrance.
What is true for the interpretation of events is equally true for their 
representation in form of monuments. As for the mausoleum in Mukura, 
both parties understand it as a place to commemorate the victims. 
However, they differ widely in their opinion whether it is an adequate 
representation of the massacre, or whether leaving the actual railway 
wagons behind would have been more appropriate.
In their selective interpretation of the past, the people of Mukura and 
the Museveni government chose to remember some things yet to forget 
others. The Mukura example thus illustrates what has been argued in 
Chapter 3: with reference to collective memory the process of forgetting is 
not to sink into oblivion but rather 'to  remember differently'. In the process 
of remembering, communities are re-membered, are re-shaped, according 
to the preferred interpretation of the past.
The Mukura insidence is interpreted differently by different 
communities. As discussed previously, interpreting the past takes place in
50 Kuechler (1999): 55
51 Iona Irwin-Zarecka (1994): Frames of Remembrance. The Dynamics of Collective
Memory. London/New Brunswick: Transaction Publisher, p. 5.
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anticipation of a particular future. Past, present and future are not linear 
sequences, rather the present is determined by both the way we 
understand our past as well as how we cast ourselves forward into the 
future. In Gadamer's words: "Zukunft ist Herkunft" (Future is origin.)52
For the Museveni government the future aspired to is that of keeping 
Teso calm. With an insurgency war in Acholi in north Uganda, as well as 
sporadic fighting by the ADF in the west of the country, keeping the Iteso 
and Kumam inactive seems like a good policy. Of course, one could 
question the benign intention of appeasing the region.
For the Iteso and Kumam, on the other hand, peaceful co-existence 
is much more contested. Their interpretation of the past, like the Mukura 
killings, does not allow much room for envisaging a positive future. As 
shown in Chapter 6, they very much see themselves as innocent victims 
who were violated by Museveni. The memorial in Mukura, instead of leading 
to social healing through commemoration, produces and reproduces anger 
and resentment against the government.
The memorial gives testimony of how much both the Museveni 
government and the Iteso are still debilitated by the different positions they 
occupy in an asymmetric relationship which bears strong traces of inequality 
and domination. The way the Iteso remember the Mukura killings prohibits 
them from dissenting from the power asymmetries which gave rise to the 
violent conflict in the first place. Through the performance of memory 
people produce and reproduce their position of feeling neglected, victimised, 
and at the mercy of Museveni's politics.
The Museveni government, to some extent, altered its position 
through the gesture of retributive justice. I t  established the monument and 
promised financial assistance. Yet since the pledged funds have not been 
allocated the government's action lost momentum and credibility.
In conclusion, the memorial in Mukura is today interpreted in a 
fashion which is indicative of the Iteso and Kumam attitude to the central 
government. Despite the intention of the Museveni government to
52 Present author's translation. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1997): Zukunft ist Herkunft. Jena: 
Universitaet Jena, p. 55.
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contribute to social healing and reconciliation between the former parties to 
the conflict, albeit not necessarily in a genuine way, the memorial produces 
and re-produces antagonistic feelings amongst the people of the region and 
as such keeps the binary between us/them in place. It  has failed to re­
member the local community and kept the structural properties of inclusion 
and exclusion between Teso and the wider Uganda alive.
Perspectives for the Future -  Papa Emorimor
While the discussion of the Mukura memorial was in the light of 
remembered history the following section will focus on an example of 
invented history. In 2000, the first cultural leader of the Iteso, Papa 
Emorimor, was inaugurated.
In what follows below, I shall first introduce the institution and 
discuss it against the backdrop of Hobsbawm and Ranger's concept of 
invented traditions in order to then question whether the invention of Papa 
Emorimor is a sign of a changing Teso identity.
Questions could be raised as to why it took the Iteso eight years 
following the insurgency to elect their Papa Emorimor. The delay between a 
traumatic event and the response to it is however rather common. Three 
reasons can be identified: firstly, a traumatic event requires temporal 
distanciation for the victims to be able to address it; secondly, accumulation 
of resources to commemorate an event requires time, particularly after an 
economically devastating experience like losing an insurgency war; and 
lastly, the socio-political repression that led to the event only loosens up 
over time so that the victims are able to act without being prosecuted.53 All 
three reasons are applicable in the Teso context.
53 Junanjo Igartua/Dario Paez (1998): Art and Remembering Traumatic Collective Events: 
The Case of the Spanish Civil War. in: Pennebaker, James W./Paez, Dario/Rime, Bernard 
(eds.): Collective Memory of Political Events. Social Psychological Perspectives. New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlabum Ass., p. 84.
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Papa Emorimor
On 30 April 2000, the cultural leader for Teso, Papa Emorimor, was 
inaugurated in Soroti town. The idea of having an equivalent to the other 
kings of Uganda had been circulating for decades yet only materialised after 
the experience of the insurgency. The Emorimor is the figurehead of the 
Iteso Cultural Union (ICU), a democratic body which elects an individual as 
its representative. The ICU consists of two branches: the Council and the 
Executive.54 The ICU Council sits four times per year to review the activities 
of the Executive. At present, the Council is headed by chairman Mzee Y.Y. 
Ocuuka, and the deputy chairman Brigadier Sam Opolot, who was Uganda's 
1st army commander after Independence in 1962. The over all authority of 
ICU lies with the Council whose members are drawn from sub-counties and 
selected according to the different clans.
The Executive constitutes the administrative body of ICU. I t  is divided 
into 15 departments called Ministries, covering areas such as health, 
gender, research and documentation. I t  is headed by its Prime Minister, 
Prof. Geffro Ariko Opolot, yet each Ministry has its own secretaries who are 
responsible for the operation and performance.
Papa Emorimor acts as a consultant to all of the Ministries. He/she is 
elected for five years, with a maximum of two terms in succession. The first 
ever Papa Emorimor, Augustin Osuban Lemukol, was a civil servant under 
Obote and a commissioner of agriculture under Museveni. He received his 
university education in agriculture in the UK and is now retired. Considering 
the poverty and poor development in Teso, his expertise in agriculture and 
development can be of significant benefit to the region.
The Emorimor's raison d'etre is to fill the void of non-representation 
in the wider Uganda. To this end the duty and mandate of the Emorimor is 
to :55
54 Interview with Alfred Aruo, Soroti 01.06.2000.
55 The mandate coincides with the stated aims and objectives of the ICU Steering Committee 
of the Iteso Cultural Union in ICU (1997): Iteso Cultural Union. A Cultural Union 
Development. Soroti: ICU.
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• promote the unity of Teso.
• preserve and promote culture, music, dance and poetry of the Iteso.
• promote and develop the Ateso language.
• promote and research into the history of the Iteso and to publish the 
findings of any such research.
• set up or support cultural centres or museums for the promotion and 
preservation of Iteso culture and history.
• encourage the Iteso clans to organise themselves and to appoint or elect 
their clan leaders.
• establish and support the office of the Emorimor, as a symbol of Unity in 
Teso.
• encourage and promote socio-economic development in Teso.
The present Emorimor plans to establish a forum for all cultural 
leaders of Uganda to discuss current issues of development. In addition, he 
will hold meetings with Karamojong elders and leaders to find solutions for 
the seasonal cattle rustling. Informal contacts with the government will be 
kept and the Iteso culture promoted.
Many people agree that the Iteso need a strong figurehead to 
culturally represent and unite them. Especially after the insurgency, 
confidence and self-esteem are low, cultural values are slowly fading and 
people are disunited. Some supporters of the Emorimor even go as far as 
suggesting that if he had already been in place in 1986/7 he would have 
prevented the insurgency through disciplining the youth and communicating 
the plight of the Iteso people to the President.
And yet, the Iteso are not the only residents in Soroti, Kumi and 
Katakwi district. Apart from ethnic groups from other areas of Uganda, the 
indigenous Kumam form a considerably large group. There have always 
been tensions between the Kumam and the Iteso, which were enforced by 
the insurgency where inter-ethnic assaults were frequent. With the Iteso 
having a cultural leader, and thus gaining strength inside and outside of 
Teso, the potential for conflict with the Kumam is increasing.
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Invention of Tradition
Invented traditions are occasions which allow for analysing wider 
social currents, and especially social engineering. The basic concept of an 
Emorimor is inherent in the Iteso clan system. Traditionally, every individual 
clan appoints a representative who reconciles internal conflicts and holds his 
people together. However, especially due to the insurgency, Iteso cultural 
attributes are steadily declining. In recognition of the fading cultural 
practices the tradition was altered from one Emorimor per clan to one 
Emorimor for all clans. The new, elected Emorimor has become a modern 
super-Emorimor for all Iteso in Uganda and abroad. As such he embodies a 
tension between modernity, for he is democratically elected, and the 
conservatism of returning to traditional customs. His main function is to 
unite the Iteso, his title  translates as 'Father of Unity', and to represent the 
people towards the outside world.
Historically, in contrast to the southern and western kingdoms of 
Uganda, Teso has always been proud of its egalitarian social structure. No 
super-leader governed the Iteso, no royal elite held exclusive rights. 
Nevertheless, on economic grounds, prior to the insurgency, the people 
were divided along class lines: land and large herds of cattle were in the 
hands of a few who rented out their oxen to their neighbours for ploughing. 
Training and education in Europe, business connections and trade 
throughout the whole country as well as strong political influence was 
existent amongst a small community of Iteso only.56
With respect to egalitarianism the insurgency was a leveller. In the 
post-conflict days everybody was equally poor and deprived. So even if the 
Teso society was previously marked by class differences, after the 
insurgency most people were of equal status. And yet, regardless of 
whether it is accurate or not, in the past the Iteso and Kumam were proud 
of their spirit of egalitarianism. The establishment of Papa Emorimor thus 
constitutes a rupture in this self-perception.
In order to be truthful to their culture of egalitarianism, the Iteso 
Cultural Union therefore invented a sophisticated election process for their
56 Conversation with Joanna de Berry, London 9.8.2000.
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cultural leader, which marries modern notions of democracy with traditions 
of kingships. As such it provides an adequate example for Eric Hobsbawm's 
term of
[ijnvented  traditions' [which] is taken to mean a set of practices, 
normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or 
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behaviour by repetition, which autom atically implies continuity with the 
past. In  fact, where possible, they norm ally a ttem pt to establish 
continuity with a suitable historic past.57
In many aspects, in particular regarding the egalitarian spirit in Teso, 
the invention of Papa Emorimor provides a break with the past. 
Nevertheless, since on a much more local clan level the concept of 
Emorimor has a longstanding tradition the elevation of this tradition to a 
super level can be interpreted as a historical continuation. Thus
insofar as there is such reference to a historic past, the peculiarity of 
'invented traditions' is th at the continuity with it is largely factious. ... 
[T ]hey are responses to novel situations which take the form of 
references to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi- 
obligatory repetition.58
In Hobsbawm's application, traditions, and in particular invented 
traditions, are dissimilar to custom. Invented or not, traditions, he 
suggests, are invariant, they require repetition by fixed and formalised 
practise. Inventing traditions is thus an act of imposing repetition.59 
Customs, on the other hand, are much more fluid in their being. Although 
being perpetuated over space and time through repetition they are 
nevertheless susceptible to change. Customs are what Giddens would refer 
to as social continuities in which agency and structure mutually enable and 
constrain each other, they constitute the routinised practise that prevails in 
a particular social environment.
When invented traditions become realities they distort the past 
through making reference and harking back to what was not there.60 Once
57 Eric Hobsbawm (2000): Inventing Traditions, in: Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds.): 
The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1.
58 Hobsbawm (2000): 2.
59 Hobsbawm (2000): 4.
60 Ranger (2000): 213.
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taken for granted, their existence is legitimated through narratives about an 
immemorial time. As such they constitute a part of the present identity.
The invention of a tradition is indicative of the spatio-temporal 
predicament of a society, which spurs the necessity to fill a void. In post­
insurgency Teso, there was a strong call for unity and representation 
towards the rest of Uganda. The Iteso felt intimidated and excluded by the 
national discourse and thus longed for a figurehead to speak on their 
behalf.61 As such, it could be argued that the community of the Iteso, as 
promoted by the institution of Papa Emorimor, is imagined in the sense 
Anderson explains when he writes that regardless of actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail the community is conceived as a horizontal, 
deep fraternity.62
Despite the explicit obligation of the institution of the Emorimor being 
merely traditional, it nevertheless serves the political function of promoting 
the needs and aspiration of the Iteso in the wider Uganda. As apparent in 
the following extract from a newspaper article:
The Iteso cultural leader, Emorimor Augustin Lemukol Osuban, has 
urged the Iteso to uphold their culture and language. He said some 
Iteso had abandoned their m other tongue.
"We have reached a point, whereby if you find two or three people in 
Teso speaking in English, then you know th at they are Iteso, " he said.
Speaking after his installation on Sunday, Osuban said the human and 
m aterial resources the Iteso have been blessed with could m ake them  
realise trem endous developm ent.
"I am sure that if the over 2 .5  million Iteso within Uganda and outside 
come together, we would do something rem arkable," he said.63
The return to history, albeit partly invented, is immediately 
interlocked with ambitions for the future. This continuity between past, 
present and future is however not a necessity for forging the identity of a 
community. Mamdani, for instance, refers to the identity formation amongst 
Rwandan immigrants and the NRA in western Uganda during the early days
61 Bishop Illukor had been playing this role informally for decades, yet he retired from all
public functions in 2000.
62 Anderson (1991): 7.
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of Museveni's insurgency against Obote II, and argues that the people 
coalesced into a community in full awareness of their different histories, and 
even ethnicities and nationalities. Mamadani argues that the effect was to 
distinguish political community from cultural community, and the future 
from the past. " I f  the cultural community was an outcome of historical 
processes, the political community was defined more with an eye to the 
future."64 The future was forged based on the recognition that people had 
the same political interests, that is removing Obote from power.65
What is significant if compared with the Kumam and Iteso is that, 
despite having similar desires and aspirations for the future, the institution 
of the Emorimor does not unite the different ethnic groups living in Teso. 
The ICU is for the Iteso, and everybody who is willing to adapt their life 
style, language and traditions. Yet the collective aspirations for the future, 
shared by the Kumam, are not sufficient to forge a collective Teso identity. 
On the contrary, the institution of the Emorimor has the potential to widen 
the gap between Iteso and Kumam.
It  will take some time for the Papa Emorimor institution to be 
'naturalised' in Teso. To date, the invention is still too new and somewhat 
awkward, and many Iteso have difficulties in identifying themselves with 
the concept. Criticism of the Emorimor institution also comes from inside 
the Teso community. Some Iteso suggest that the artificial installation of a 
super-Emorimor is redundant and that people should return to the cultural 
traits that are already inherent in the traditions -  a case of recovered 
tradition in the above sense. Moreover, the rural youth in particular are 
resentful towards the institution for they feel excluded from the election 
process and not represented by the 'old, traditional men who want to drink 
blood and wear hides.'66 They have little sympathy with what they see as
63 "Promote Iteso Culture - Emorimor". New Vision: Kampala, 2 May 2000.
64 Mahmood Mamdani (2001): When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda. Kampala/Oxford: Fountain/James Curry, p. 170.
65 The shared identity between Rwandan immigrants and the NRA did however not survive 
beyond the seizure of power by Museveni. Devoid of the shared motive of struggle, it seems, 
the awareness of the different histories and tradition was too strong. Mamdani (2001): p. 
172.
66 As stated during a workshop with rural youth in Serere district, 8.5.2000.
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anachronism and conservatism - they are much more interested in crops 
and seeds and new developments in agriculture.
Papa Emorimor faces many challenges, not least because so far the 
financial backing is not guaranteed. In contrast to the other kings of Uganda 
the Emorimor has no assets. In future, the institution will rely on income- 
generating projects, fundraising and membership subscription. As an 
artificially invented attribute of Iteso culture it will take some time for the 
Emorimor to become widely accepted, and to gain the support of his people. 
Only then will his primary role, to be the Father of Unity, be feasible.
Kingdoms in Uganda
Despite Papa Emorimor being a very recent invention other regions of 
Uganda look back at a substantial history and culture of kingship. All five 
existing Ugandan monarchies are located in the Bantu regions of Buganda, 
Bunyoro, Ankoie, Toro and Busoga. Based on a social hierarchical system of 
superordination and subordination, the aba/angira (royals) and bakopi 
(peasants), the kingdoms are again of significance in today's Uganda.67 As 
described in Chapter 5, in 1966, as a result of political turmoil and power 
struggles during the Obote I regime, the kingdoms were dissolved. Almost 
two decades later, while fighting against the Obote II  government in the 
Luwero Triangle Museveni, in order to increase his support amongst the 
people, promised that he would reinstall the kingdoms when he became 
President of Uganda. In 1993, seven years after his victory, he eventually 
kept his promise and passed a law to annul Obote's enactment that 
abrogated the kingdoms. He reinstalled kings as cultural representatives -  
albeit without any political power. The Traditional Rulers Statute of 1993 
included the return of 14 items to the Buganda kingdom, including assets 
and properties.68 Whilst the reinstalled king of Buganda, Kabaka Mutebi,
67 Spectrum (1998): Guide to Uganda. Nairobi: Camperapix, p. 294.
68 Apolo Nsibambi (1995): The Restoration of Traditional Rulers, in: Hansen, Holger 
Berndt/Twaddle, Michael (eds.): From Chaos to Order. The Politics of Constitution Making in 
Uganda. Kampala/London: Fountain/James Curry, p. 47.
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allegedly has political ambitions beyond his present role, the king of Ankole, 
Toro and Bunyoro do not challenge the present state system.69
Even though Museveni reinstated the Ugandan kings he did not 
welcome the Iteso initiative at first. In 1999, after a series of controversies 
a meeting of the Iteso Cultural Union was disbanded by the police.70 The 
meeting was held to appoint the candidate for the Emorimor election, and 
since the Iteso were prevented from conducting their meeting, they went to 
the public Independence Square in Soroti and spontaneously chose one 
person out of their midst, lifted him up and called him 'Emorimor'. They 
hence resisted Museveni's constraints successfully. The random nomination 
was later withdrawn and the initially selected person appointed.
Inauguration
Museveni was the guest of honour at the inauguration in Soroti on 30 
April 2000.71 In the course of the ceremony, Museveni donated a car (in his 
own words: "My office is very poor at the moment but in three or four 
months' time, it will be rich. I will then avail the Emorimor the shoes which 
fits modern times so that he can tour his kingdom"72), and even danced 
with the people of the ICU and the traditional dancers.73 And yet, the 
celebration ceremony ultimately turned into a campaign for the June 2000 
Referendum about the future of the political system of Uganda. Speakers 
like the Hon. Min. Grace Akello (the former Teso Commission secretary) 
seized the occasion to promote the Movement system.
In his speech, Museveni drew on the existence of the different ethnic 
groups in Russia and the importance of a superior person to hold them 
together. He accounted for the necessity to have a strong leader to guide 
the country out of underdevelopment and 'backwardness'.74 Implicit in his 
analogy was a clear warning towards the Iteso not to separate themselves
69 Doornbos, Martin/Mwesigye, Frederick (1995): The New Politics of Kingmaking. in: 
Hansen, Holger Berndt/Twaddle, Michael (eds.): From Order to Chaos. The Politics of 
Constitution-Making in Uganda. Kampala/London: Fountain/James Curry, p. 64.
70 Interview with Alfred Aruo, Soroti 7.5.2000.
711 had the pleasure and honour to personally attend the ceremony.
72 "Teso Crowns Emorimor". New Vision: Kampala, 1 May 2000,
73 In this period Museveni danced repeatedly all over Uganda. His public appearances were 
mostly related to his Movement referendum campaign.
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from the nation at large, and him as the President. As quoted in a 
newspaper
"Women who carry babies on their backs should not engage in throwing 
stones. I f  you do so, you risk your child being hit with a stone."
He [Museveni] said he had given the message in a joking way but was 
serious.
"For me I have already placed my baby down, so if you are interested, 
let us start throwing stones," Museveni said.75
From my experience during fieldwork, people in Teso will not engage in 
throwing stones again. For them, the inauguration of the Emorimor does not 
signify an act of aggression but the opening of possibilities to have their 
identity represented, guarded and asserted in the wider Uganda.
The Future?
To return to the question set out at the beginning of this chapter, it 
remains to be seen whether the institution of the Emorimor has the 
potential to challenge the structural continuities of domination and exclusion 
between the people of Teso (specifically the Iteso) and the Museveni 
government. Will it change the way central government and Teso relate to 
each other?
Despite the difficulties of foreseeing the future I would like to suggest 
that the Emorimor does indeed hold the possibility of transforming the way 
the people from Teso relate to the Museveni government. In line with 
Giddens' structuration theory, it seems fair to argue that the agency of the 
institution potentially challenges and changes the prevailing structural 
continuities of inclusion and exclusion. This, however, will require time and 
patience. Nevertheless, the invention marks a proactive step towards future 
transformations and the enlargement of the space for the Iteso to act.
The Odd Time In-Between
The Iteso are looking forward to the future. W e tried to m ake the Iteso  
see life as ju s t a m atter of changes and seasons. One o f the favourite  
quotes th a t they now use is that you should go with the wind, you
74 Museveni's speech, Soroti 30 June 2000.
75 'Teso Crowns Emorimor". New Vision: Kampala, 1 May 2000.
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should blow as the wind blows. Have you ever seen grass in the storm.
When there is a really, really heavy storm with huge winds the grass 
blows on one side and it falls downs. You see it alm ost completely down.
I t  ju s t lies peacefully on itself. When the storm goes, one or two or three  
days later it stands up again. But look a t the trees, some of the big, 
great trees. Because they are out there they are standing in the storm  
and they think they are big and strong and so on. Many of them , when 
the storm comes, you find them  down on the ground. So why don't you 
go as the grass and come up again.
O ther people say this is an im agery of cowardliness.76
Nine years after the end of the end of the insurgency, Teso still has 
not reconciled with the Museveni government. Teso has a 'peace without 
reconciliation'.77
In the discussion above, I have tried to illustrate two different ways 
of coming to terms with the past. Whilst the first example, the collective 
memory of the Mukura killings, seems to produce and reproduce the 
antagonism between the Iteso and the government, and thus to maintain 
the prevailing relations, the second example bears the promise of 
transforming the structural proclivities that gave rise to the violence in 
1986. Only time will tell whether it is successful.
Despite the current discontent in Teso people generally agree that 
they will not 'go back to the bush.' After having endured widespread 
suffering and distress, a new insurgency war seems to offer no solution. 
Moreover, the Museveni government might be arrogant and ignorant 
towards the Kumam and Iteso, yet there are no apparent traces of explicit 
policies of exclusion, discrimination and prosecution. On the bases of rather 
vague and ambiguous reasons to take up arms, as illustrated in Chapter 6, 
the costs of fighting are too high compared with the feeling of being 
unappreciated. Peace in Teso might be shallow but it will remain peace -  
and this is a great achievement considering the violence in many regions in 
Africa.
While the previous chapter closed with a rather positive outlook on 
the future of Teso, in a wider Uganda the above analysis of the post-conflict
76 Interview with Grace Akello.
77 Heriques (2000).
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scenario is less encouraging. From what can be interpreted in hindsight, 
people at the end of the insurgency had high hopes that they would start 
living in prosperity and security again. And yet, the developments in the 
past nine years since the cessation of fighting strongly contradict these 
aspirations.
So why did the reconciliation process fail? I will turn to this and other 
issues in the following, concluding chapter.
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Co n c l u s io n s
The fusion of horizons, it has been argued in this thesis, produces 
shared meaning amongst parties to a conflict and opens the path for 
peaceful coexistence. Different perspectives are mediated and exclusive 
identities transformed into less antagonistic relationships. In this 
hermeneutic process, former parties reconcile their disputes.
So what went wrong on Teso? By way of conclusion I shall now turn 
to highlighting the weakness in both the mediation of the Teso insurgency 
and the use of hermeneutics.
Power in Mediation
Coercion or Cohesion?
The reason for the failure of the reconciliation process lies in the 
asymmetric power relations which were worked in the process of the Teso 
mediation. On a general note, mediation as dispute resolution has been 
fiercely criticised by Joseph Folgner and Robert Bush:
[W ]hen conflicts are m ediated, social justice issues can be suppressed, 
power imbalances can be ignored and out-comes can be determ ined by 
covertly imposed th ird-party values.1
In Teso, the mediation process was marked by stark power-asymmetries 
between the people of Teso and the Ugandan government. Due to their 
weak military position, coupled with the erosion of support amongst the 
population, the insurgents had little bargaining power. Although there was 
never a formal process of mediation, but merely workshops, meetings and 
conferences organised by the PCT and predominantly addressed to civilians, 
as well as informal talks with rebels, the imbalance of power relations 
manifested itself in the outcome of the process. This chapter shall discuss
1 Joseph P. Folgner/Robert A. Baruch Bush (1994): Ideology, Orientations, and Discourse. 
Folgner, Joseph P./Jones, Tricia S. (eds.): New Directions in Mediation. Communication 
Research and Perspectives. Thousenoaks/London/New Delhi: Sage, p. 5.
the notion of power and its impact on how understanding is brought about 
in the hermeneutic encounter of a mediation process.
The role of power and coercion in mediation is a widely studied 
subject.2 In order to escape the grip of power asymmetries, according to 
Joseph A. Folgner and Robert Bush, the objectives of 'transformative 
mediation', that is mediation that challenges the prevailing structural 
continuities, requires the empowerment of the parties in conflict. Since their 
notion of transformation seems very similar to the project of this thesis it is 
worth investigating their argument more closely. Folgner and Bush suggest 
that a party is empowered when3
• it reaches a clear realisation of what issues matter and why, coupled
with a realisation that their importance is legitimate;
• it realises more clearly what goals and interests are aspired to, why
they are pursued, and that they are important and in need of 
consideration;
• it becomes aware of the range of options available to secure these
goals;
• it realises that it can choose as to how to pursue these goals;
• it acquires skills in conflict resolution;
• it has a mandate to make conscious decisions about what actions to
take.
All these points taken together, Folgner and Bush argue, provide the 
party with a greater sense of self-worth, security, self-determination and
2 Anne Griffiths (1998): "Mediation, Gender and Justice in Botswana." Mediation Quarterly 
15(4): 335-44; Heinz Waelchli/Dhavan Shah (1994): "Crisis Negotiation Between Unequals: 
Lessons from a Classic Dialogue." Negotiation Journal 10(2): 129-41; Nadim N.
Rouhana/Susan H. Korper (1996): "Dealing with the Dilemmas Posed by Power Asymmetry 
in Intergroup Conflict." Negotiation Journal 12(4): 353-66; Lloyed Jensen (1997): 
"Negotiations and Power Asymmetries: The Case of Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka." 
International Negotiation 2(2): 21-41; Michael Roloff/Gaylen Paulson/Jennifer Vollbrecht 
(1998): "The Interpretation of Coercive Communication: The Effects of Mode of Influence, 
Powerful Speech and Speaker Authority." International Journal of Conflict Management 9(2): 
139-61; Margaret Wetherell (1998): "Positioning and Interpretative Repertoires:
Conversation Analysis and Post-Structuralism in Dialogue." Discourse & Society 9(3): 387- 
415; Vivienne Jabri (1995): "Agency, Structure and the Question of Power in Conflict 
Resolution." Paradigms 9(2): 53-71.
3 Bush/Folgner (1994): 84-6.
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autonomy necessary to finding an equitable, long-term resolution to the 
conflict.4
At first sight, if we look at the situation of the Iteso and Kumam in 
1991-2 we see that, according to Bush and Folgner's requirements, people 
were indeed empowered. In light of the workshops and seminars organised 
by the Teso Commission they had the opportunity to reflect upon their goals 
and interests, why they were important and how they could be pursued: the 
people of Teso opted for economic and personal security as their priorities, 
and for the government of Uganda, through the Teso Commission, to attend 
to their demands. According to Folgner and Bush's categories this should 
have had positive implications for the peace-building process and on the 
transformation of the prevailing structural properties of inclusion and 
exclusion. In reality, however, the reconciliation process was dissatisfying 
and, as the figures in the previous chapter indicate, economically Teso 
remained on the margin of the wider Uganda. Asymmetrical power 
structures led to a shallow peace.
A Hermeneutic Critique
A hermeneutic analysis of power asymmetries in mediation or 
dialogue reveals that to transcend inequality requires more then merely 
empowering the weaker party. The following shall therefore challenge the 
notion of power underlying Folgner's and Bush's argument.
I f  one looks at the outcome of the Teso mediation process, one has 
to acknowledge the clear wish of the Kumam and Iteso for a return to 
security and stability in the region. I t  was this immediate demand that 
people were pursuing; it informed how they framed their arguments and 
articulated their aspirations. Yet, how has their perception of the situation 
come about?
The Kumam and Iteso interpretation of their situation was very much 
informed by the mediators. The workshops of the Teso Commission are a
4 Bush/Folgner (1994): 87.
very good example of how discourses order realities.5 Through their 
constant reference to the development of Teso, the PCT workshops were 
instrumental in shaping people's view of the insurgency. I t  has been 
suggested that the use of a particular language to represent 'reality' 
influences the meaning and interpretation of a situation "in order to impose 
a particular perspective from which events are expected to be perceived by 
the targeted audience."6 As a result, some perceptions of reality are 
organised into discourse and practice, whilst others are organised out -  
"discourse ... simultaneously negates and affirms different conceptual ... 
possibilities."7 In the workshops and conferences organised by the PCT, to 
discuss the appeasement merely in terms of economic and personal security 
created a particular discourse according to which the Teso struggle was 
mainly fought along these lines. In consequence it allowed the promise of 
development to be the bargaining chip in the course of the mediation 
process.
The acceptance by the people of Teso to discuss and solve the 
insurgency to be cast in terms of 'development' and 'security' allows for 
valuable insights into identity formation. Although, as we have seen in 
Chapter 6 on the causes of conflict, it is futile to establish why the Kumam 
and Iteso 'really' went into the bush; the reasons were more complex than 
a mere lack of food and fear for their lives. During the course of the 
mediation process as a hermeneutic encounter the people from Teso came 
to see themselves in a different light. In line with the notion of temporality, 
as discussed previously, people had a particular 'image' of the future, that 
is, the cessation of fighting and the emergence of peace and prosperity. 
Thus, by consequence, they adapted their past in the process of aspiring to 
their outlook for the future. By way of a simultaneous (hermeneutic) 
movement, the anticipation of a particular future led the people to re­
interpret their past, and thus to modify their identity in the present. The 
sessions conducted as part of the mediation process were a profound
5 The ordering of discourses is central to the work of Foucault. See for instance Michel 
Foucault (1994b): Die Ordnung des Diskurses. Frankfurt: Fisher.
6 Hie (1998): 76.
7 Dennis Mumby/Cynthia Stohl (1991): "Power and Discourse in Organization Studies: 
Absence and the Dialectic of Control." Discourse & Society 2 (3 ), p. 319.
ontological experience for the participants which changed their identity in 
relation to the government.
Structural Asymmetries
To return to Folgner and Bush, their quest for empowerment only 
takes issue with apparent forms of power exercised in the process of 
mediation. What they leave unchallenged, despite their emphasis on 
'transformation', are the structural asymmetries that enable one party to 
define 'reality' at the expenses of the other. Because
....the experience of powerlessness does not necessarily disappear with 
the introduction of consensus-based informally constituted dispute 
m anagem ent programs .. [In d iv id u a ls  operate as social actors who 
form parts of networks that shape their identity in a multiplicity of ways 
that impinge on their ability to negotiate with others in both social and 
legal arenas.8
I t  has been demanded that scholarship should "make explicit the ways in 
which apparently egalitarian decision-making processes persistently reflect 
and recreate inequalities among constituents."9 Without critical 
engagement, power cannot be challenged and thus emancipation and 
dissent cannot be achieved.
As we have seen in Chapter 2, in order to discuss the impact of 
power, critical approaches to conflict studies have recently introduced the 
writing of Jurgen Habermas to IR.10 His notion of critique and emancipation 
suggests a theoretical framework to challenge authority and domination 
with the aim of changing the structural properties of inclusion and 
exclusion.
As explained in Chapter 2, Habermas' writing originally developed out 
of Gadamer's hermeneutics. However, his suspicion of the negative impact 
of power in the process of fusing horizons, as illustrated by the outcomes of 
the PCT mediation, and Gadamer's reluctance to acknowledge the potential
8 Griffiths (1998): 340.
9 Griffiths (1998); see also: John Winslade/Gerald Monk/Alison Cotter (1998): "A Narrative 
Approach to the Practice of Mediation." Negotiation Journal 14(1): 21-41.
10 Teun A. van Dijk (1989): Structures of Discourse and Structures of Power, in: Anderson, 
James A. (ed.): Communication Yearbook 12. London/Delhi: Sage, 18-59; Dennis
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danger it entails, led him to a critical response to Truth and Method. To 
illustrate his main objections against mediating horizons in communication 
it is worth citing Habermas at length:
I t  makes good sense to conceive of language as a kind of 
metainstitution on which all social institutions depend: for social action 
is constituted only in ordinary language communication. But his 
[Gadam er's] metainstitution of language as tradition is evidently  
dependent on social processes that are not reducible to norm ative  
relationships. Language is also a medium of domination and social 
power: it serves to legitim ate relations of organised force. Insofar as the 
legitimations do not articulate the power relations whose 
institutionalisation they make possible, insofar as these relations m erely  
m anifest themselves in the legitimating, language is also ideological.
Here it is a question not of deceptions within a language but of 
deceptions of language as such. Herm eneutic experience that 
encounters this dependency of the symbolic fram ework on actual 
conditions changes into critique of ideology.11
The system of language, labour and domination, Habermas continues, 
constitutes the objective framework through which social action becomes 
unintelligible.12 Differential access to various genres, contents, and styles of 
discourse manifest themselves in material (re)production, articulation, 
distribution, and influence.13 Certain forms of discourses are sanctioned by 
hidden forms of power, they run silently through discursive and institutional 
practices.14
Therefore, according to Habermas, the authority of the superior party 
to the conflict cannot be acknowledged through critical reflection in post­
conflict mediation, for any dominant and superior position influences the 
understanding of the inferior party to the extent that the outcome of a 
dialogue, or mediation, will be distorted and manipulated. The resolution of 
the conflict might simply reflect the superiority of one narrative which stifles
Mumby/Cynthia Stohl (1991): "Power and Discourse in Organization Studies: Absence and 
the Dialectic of Control." Discourse & Society 2(3): 313-32.
11 Jurgen Habermas (1977): A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method, in: Dallmayr, 
Fred/McCarthy, Thomas A. (eds.): Understanding and Social Inquiry. Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, p. 360.
12 Jurgen Habermas (1978): Knowledge and Human Interest. London: Heinemann, p. 361. It  
is important to note that Habermas' current focus is no longer on the mode of production and 
class struggle in Western societies, but that he recognises that an evolution has taken place 
and that Marxism provides insufficient potential for explaining exclusionist continuities in 
today's societies. For a discussion see Love (1996).
13 Van Dijk (1989): 22.
14 Jabri (1995): 61.
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the telling of the other. The structural properties of inclusion and exclusion 
that run trough a conflict ridden society might even prevent the excluded 
from realising the scope of their marginality, for them it would be a feature 
of their day-to-day lives. The problem with authority for Habermas is not 
only that it could be unjustifiably authoritarian, but rather that it holds a 
monopoly of power which influences discourses to an extent that the 
outcome of this discourse always only reflects the authorities interests - 
they remain the sole authors of the peace to come. Authority, be it true or 
false, prevents Ideologienkritik.
In Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologienkritik, a piece written in 
response to Habermas' critique, Gadamer admits that authority has the 
potential to exercise dogmatic power.15 Yet he emphasises that a notion of 
authority which relies on blind obedience is very different to his notion 
which relies on acknowledgement. In drawing on the loss and the decline of 
authority he suggests that what reveals the actual content of true authority 
is not dogmatic force but acknowledgement, that is, free acceptance of the 
superiority of the other. This however, is not to suggest that 
acknowledgement cannot be refused or withdrawn as the result of critical 
reflection, in the same way Habermas suggests. The point of dispute with 
Habermas is, however, whether reflection always leads to refusal, or if it 
can also lead to acceptance.16
In Teso, and in line with Gadamer's argument, the mediation efforts 
led people to accept the authority of the Museveni government. In the years 
to come the acceptance of authority was infringed by the critical evaluation 
of the government's failure to keep their promise of development.
Acceptance o f Domination
An alternative account of domination, which addresses the tension 
between Habermas and Gadamer, is offered by Michel Foucault whose 
interest in dialogue is not based on mediation and understanding, but rather 
on the power practices amongst the participants it reveals. Foucault's
15 Gadamer (1993g): 268.
16 Gadamer (1993a): 243-5.
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interpretation of being-together, and thus of understanding, is based on his 
is notion of episteme:
By epistem e, we mean ... the total set of relations th at unite, a t a given 
period, the discursive practises that give rise to epistemological figures, 
sciences, and possibly formalized systems ... The episteme is not a form  
of knowledge ( connaissance)  or type of rationality which, crossing the  
boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of 
a subject, or a period; it is the totality of relations th at can be 
discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses 
them  at the level of discursive regularities.17
In line with Wittgenstein's language games and hermeneutics, 
Foucault's emphasis is on the systematic relationship, the network, between 
different elements of a discourse which allow for meaningful 
communication.18 Foucault calls these networks 'discursive practises':
When one speaks of a system of form ation, one does not mean the  
juxtaposition, coexistence, or interaction of heterogeneous elem ents  
(institutions, techniques, social groups, perceptual organisations, 
relations between various discourses), but also the relation that is 
established between them  -  and in a well determ ined form -  by 
discursive practice.19
Foucault argues that one cannot study individual statements in 
isolation from each other -  that they are only meaningful in the context of a 
structure produced by social co-existence. However, Foucault stresses that 
the systems that enable the making of statements, or communication, can 
be studied in isolation or absence of a background practice which is 
common to all discourses and whose true and universal meaning can be 
discovered through investigation. For Foucault, communication is located in 
a particular context which in itself does not require a prediscursive, 
universal foundation. Rather, communication is situated in a network o f 
discursive practises, as opposed to a background o f intelligibility, and it is 
here were systems of cohabitation are formed.20
Episteme are hence the structures along which the social world is 
ordered, and which decide what statements are possible and which ones are
17 Foucault (1972): 191.
18 Dreyfus/Rabinow (1982): 57-8.
19 Foucault (1972) 72.
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excluded from conversation. As argued in Chapter 8, this was apparent in 
the PCT workshops in which notions of development were included in the 
discussion, yet controversial political debates were absent. Statements, 
however, are here not simply understood in terms of utterance but rather in 
a much wider sense which includes perceptions and opinions. "The episteme 
represent the symbolic horizon within which a certain statement is first 
formed and subsequently is able to be classified and evaluated as true or 
false."21 In other words, certain ontological premises function as rules for 
what is right and what is wrong.
I f  Foucault's episteme, or the way a discourse is ordered, determines 
what is right or wrong it follows that they are the true locus of power. For 
him power
is never localised here or there, never in any body's hands, never 
appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is embodied and 
exercised through a netlike organisation.22
As a consequence Foucault's power relations can never be "above" a 
society, they never provide a separate or supplementary structure, and can 
thus never be dissolved.
[P]ower is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the 'privilege', 
acquired or preserved, of a dom inant class, but the over all effect of its 
strategic position - an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended  
by those who are dom inated.23
Foucault suggests an alternative to analysing power in a negative way, in 
the forms of exclusion, repression, obstruction (in the way Habermas and 
Gadamer do), and acknowledges that power produces.24 Power is productive 
of our coexistence.
20 Dreyfus/Rabinow (1982): 57-8. Dreyfus and Rabinow however emphasise that Foucault 
takes this position in the Archaeology of Knowledge, yet that he later moves away from this 
rather structuralist view-point in which 'truth' is only a matter of systems and networks.
21 Koehler (1999): 95.
22 Foucault (1994a): 36.
23 Foucault (1991a): 26.
24 Foucault (1991a): 194; see also Tarja Vayrynen (1998): "Ethnic Community and Conflict 
Resolution." Nordic Journal of International Studies 33 (1): 67.
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Politics, for Foucault, is the continuation of war by other means,25 and 
he suggests that domination can be understood as a long-term strategic 
situation.26 This implies that there is somehow a consensus between 
dominating and dominated parties to a conflict which allows for the 
consolidation of their relationship. However, this form of consensus is far 
from Gadamer's notion of consensus through conscious, voluntary 
acknowledgement; for Foucault's consensus is the effect of a sequence of 
successfully exercised local struggles between the opponents. Through the 
repetition of this event the result becomes consolidated so that at a 
particular point in time the leadership of the stronger party is accepted; the 
structural properties of inclusion and exclusion become solidified. The 
importance of Foucault is thus to understand that both oppressor and 
oppressed are entangled in a structure which allows for domination: the 
'consent' of the dominated is as important as that of the dominating.
In the case of Teso, Foucault allows us to interpret the relationship 
between the Museveni government and the people from Teso as a 
consolidation of previous struggles, and the time after the insurgency as a 
continuation o f'w a r by other means' in which the conditions of the struggle 
are maintained, albeit without the violence. In addition, if one agrees with 
Foucault, in post-war Teso the relationship is maintained not only by the 
force and power of the government but also by the Kumam and Iteso who 
continue playing the submissive and inferior role. Power relations exist 
between people, and they require both parties to comply.
How to dissent?
At this stage I would like to return to the question of dissent 
introduced in Chapter 1. To accept Foucault's understanding of power 
relations seems to lead to a significant insight in relation to the hermeneutic 
encounter: if both parties are entangled in power relations neither of them 
is able to step out of this network, to critically reflect upon domination, and 
to dissent from the given structures. How, then, can a party to the conflict,
25 Foucault (1994a): 28.
like the Kumam and Iteso, challenge and change their position in the 
process of mediation?
Essential to realising one's entanglement in power relations is to be a 
free agent. What seems to contradict Foucault's notion of power relations at 
first is, however, merely a part of his argument. For only a free agent can 
become the object of the exercise of power. I f  the agent had no (potential) 
freedom of choice, power could not be effective.27
The agent's potential to be critical is then based on Foucault's 
account of freedom. In an attempt to answer the question 'why fight' David 
Campbell argues that it is "[bjecause relations of power are possible only in 
the context of freedom, because they are inescapable, and because they 
will inescapably impinge on the autonomy of the free subject, the practices 
of the self that bring the subject into being must involve resistance."28 He 
follows Paul Patton when he suggests that, for Foucault, resistance is 
integral to 'life'. Identities are shaped over space and time through the 
constant resisting and dissenting from prevailing structural continuities. 
Returning to Deleuze (as discussed in Chapter 8) mediation is everywhere, 
as is resistance. As the 'flip-side' of mediation, resistance always disrupts 
harmony and continuity, opens up new possibilities and creates new 
alliances.
Thus, in order to break out of power relations that are suppressive in 
character, Foucault encourages resistance. Resistance, however, must not 
be equated with revolution. For Foucault, revolution, understood in its literal 
sense of turning over, is merely a different codification of the same power 
relations, an inversion of the present reality.29 The overthrow of the 
dominating party would not dissolve domination but only shift it in favour of 
those who had been inferior before. In order to bring about change, 
Foucault argues, the very nature of power relations has to be transformed.
26 Michel Foucault (1982): The Subject of Power, in: Dreyfus, Hubert/Rabinow, Paul (eds.): 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. New York/London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, p. 266.
27 David Couzens Hoy (1986): Power; Repression and Progress: Foucault, Lukes and the 
Frankfurt School, in: Hoy, David Couzens: Foucault. A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 
138.
28 Campbell (1998c): 513.
29 Foucault (1980): 122-3.
Therefore, for Foucault, resistance is not the mirror image of power but 
rather a force that is equally inventive and productive.30
As already suggested in Chapter 1, the insurgency in Teso, had it 
been successful, would have been exactly this: an inversion of the power 
dynamics that could potentially have changed the whole power asymmetry 
of Uganda. One outcome of this inversion may have returned Uganda to the 
status quo before Museveni's seizure of power in 1986. Undoubtedly, this 
would have put the people from Teso in a stronger position, and yet it 
would not have resolved the conflict.
I f  we follow the Foucault's argument that power relations are the 
result of long-term strategic relationships, based on an implicit consent 
between the parties (about who plays what role), dissent has to start with 
questioning these roles. This requires the agency of at least one party, most 
likely the inferior one, and its determination to undo the prevailing 
structures. Revolutionary fighting, or an insurgency war, has been 
dismissed in the above, and in the reality of Teso it did not produce any 
lasting advantages. Yet many other options remain open. In our case it is 
therefore important to wonder how the power relations between the 
Museveni government and the Kumam and Iteso could be transformed to 
remove Teso from its marginal position in Uganda, and to contribute to the 
development of social, cultural and economic prosperity.
Lack o f Repetition
One way of transforming structural properties is through repetition, 
that is repeated agency. Chapter 8 concluded with the question of how to 
measure success in the process of mediation. Based on Gadamer's 'fusion of 
horizons' it has been argued that in Teso, during 1992, the insurgents 
indeed altered their view of the NRM government, and changed their 
perception of Museveni from enemy to patron. They changed their 
motivation for 'going into the bush' as discussed in Chapter 6, that is the 
past they recalled, into a struggle for development -  which could then be
30 Campbell (1998c): 502.
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resolved through development promised by the government and the Teso 
Commission.
In Chapter 3, we saw that the backward and forwards movement of 
remembering the past and aspiring to a particular future has at its core the 
constitution of the present identity. In the Teso case, the mediation process 
was successful for it led the Iteso and Kumam to see themselves in a 
different light in relation to the wider Uganda. However, identity shifts, 
based on routinised practice which render them 'normal', as we have seen 
in Chapter 3, require consolidation through repetition. Only through 
repeating what constitutes the shift does this new 'reality' become 
routinised and normalised, and a permanent feature.
The NRM government's promise of development and care for the 
people of Teso, despite being convincing during the mediation process, 
failed eventually to consolidate the amicable relationship because it was not 
repeated, and thus consolidated, according to the hopes of the people from 
Teso. As shown in the previous chapter, the government has failed to 
deliver its promise. For the people in Teso this meant a return to 'old' 
interpretations of themselves and the NRM government -  and thus a return 
to the pre-conflict resentment.
The Need for Poetic Imagination in Post-Confiict Reconstruction
According to John Paul Lederach, the cessation of fighting is often 
considered to be the cumulating point of a peace process, although this 
event marks nothing more then the beginning. "In reality ... [the endings of 
violent conflicts] are nothing more than opening a door into a whole 
labyrinth of rooms that invite us to continue in the process of redefining our 
relationships."31 In Chapter 6 we saw that, after being exposed to a violent 
conflict, the social structures that had previously made up the world and 
provided meaning to its inhabitants, lay in shambles. Nordstrom argues that 
worlds cannot be simply recreated, they have to be created anew, for 
recreation would simply reproduce the tensions that led to the violent
31 John Paul Lederach (1999): Just Peace - The Challenge of the 21st Century, in: European 
Platform for Conflict Prevention: People Building Peace. Utrecht: European Platform for 
Conflict Prevention, p. 33.
conflict.32 Between the old and the new worlds, she contends, lies an abyss, 
a discontinuity, or what Arendt calls 'the gap' which calls for bridging. A 
major point raised in this thesis is precisely the missed opportunity for Teso 
at the juncture between fighting and reconciling -  the time in-between.
So what Teso has missed in the aftermath of the insurgency is to 
successfully introduce positive changes into its society. In the 'time-in- 
between', or the gap, in which the future is established, the Iteso and the 
Kumam, as well as the central authorities and the international community, 
missed the chance of establishing channels through which to facilitate 
communication between the former protagonists, to promote non-violent 
conflict resolution or to foster understanding between communities.
The exercise of providing for a peaceful future in the odd-time in- 
between requires an act of creative imagination,33 a poetic process as I 
suggested in Chapter 8. The post-conflict society, together with the former 
enemy, has to establish new ways of communicating with each other, ways 
that do not re-create the tensions of the past. In the case of Teso one could 
think of Papa Emorimor, but also the Teso Commission, as being institutions 
which provide new channels for Iteso (and Kumam?) representation 
towards the Ugandan government. In addition, civil society institutions like 
peace initiatives, churches and youth clubs among others, could provide 
frameworks through which not only the relation to the former enemy could 
be redefined, but also the social continuities inside the own community such 
as a culture of violence. Non-violent means of conflict resolution could be 
promoted, which would gradually and over time impact on the ways people 
relate to each other.
A Critical Process of Hermeneutics?
Drawn together, the strands of argument through this thesis suggest 
that mediation processes are heavily influenced by power asymmetries 
which determine the outcome of the process. However, it is helpful to
32 Nordstrom (1997): 190.
33 Nordstrom (1997): 190.
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understand power not as a commodity that can be possessed and applied, 
but rather in terms of power relations between agents that produce the way 
people relate to each other. The existing freedom, which is a condition of 
the existence of power relations, always keeps a door open for the 
possibility of dissent. And yet, since power relations do not merely reside 
with one party, but are based on a consensus between the stronger and the 
weaker party, it is also in the hands of the weaker party to opt out of the 
relation. Dissent begins with recognising one's own impact in the 
asymmetry, and with inventing alternative ways of being which allow for the 
transformation of the structural properties of domination.
At this point I would therefore like to turn to the poem by Rainer 
Maria Rilke that provides the exergue at the outset of this thesis. Rilke 
beautifully expresses the possibility of the Self to undo the antagonistic 
relationship with the Other. The enemy, the phenomenon, only exists 
because we allow it to, because we respond to it in a way which enables 
her/him to play this role. Our recognition of an enemy creates the space for 
something or somebody to become our enemy. And yet, if we 'starve it with 
not knowing7 we deprive it of the power to hold us inside of what Foucault 
calls power relations. It  is here where the poetic imagination allows us to 
dissolve the binary opposition between friend/enemy, where it enables us to 
dissent and for the enemy to 'whither way7.
Admittedly, this is a rather ambitious proposition, which attributes a 
great potential, and responsibility, to agency. Within the constraints of 
particular structures, however, it might encourage people concerned with 
reducing the occurrence of violent conflicts to think of new avenues to bring 
about peace. How can parties to a conflict be encouraged to think their 
relationship to their enemy in less exclusive terms?
Significantly, the 'starving with not knowing7 does not address 
questions of justice and revenge, which might be the primary concern of 
people who have suffered at the hands of others. Rather, it seeks to reduce 
the antagonisms inside of a community towards an external Other. As a first 
step, this demands to abandon the dichotomy between victims and 
perpetrator. Instead, questions about the own role and responsibility have 
to be asked, and hence one's own exclusive identity redefined. I t  is here
where poetic imagination 'matters'. Since we cannot step out of power 
relations, how can we change them from within?
The process of poetic imagination, of course, is heavily dependent on 
the attitude and actions of the particular Other, in our case the Museveni 
government, to which this study has paid only limited attention. Further 
research should thus be encouraged which evaluates the possible interplay 
of redefining selves.
Closure
The shared meaning accomplished in the process of mediation in 
Teso found a solution to the antagonism between the Museveni government 
and the Iteso and Kumam but, and here lies the problem, it remained 
static. Despite the fusion of horizons in the hermeneutic encounter during 
the PCT session, horizons were not progressively opened up towards a 
'better' future, but rather they introduced a sense of closure amongst the 
parties involved. For instance, agreement on terms like restocking had been 
achieved, yet they have not been open to a public debate ever since. The 
hermeneutic encounter has therefore kept its promise of bringing about 
understanding, and yet it at the same time obstructed future negotiations 
about the issue at stake. Here, then, we can return to the discussion of the 
different interpretations of hermeneutics in Chapter 3. I t  becomes apparent 
that in Teso, the hermeneutic process led to a degree of closure and 
authenticity. In Chapter 3 we suggested that in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
authenticity, hermeneutics has to be understood as both -  the finding of 
shared meaning and the opening of this meaning. This, we argued, makes 
hermeneutics critical. In Teso, the challenging of power asymmetries did 
not lead to their changing.
The Project of Critical Hermeneutics
Critical hermeneutics, it has been argued in the present study, is a 
valuable framework through which to analyse the transition from conflict to 
peace. Through combining contingency with identity formation it presents a 
new perspective to post-structuralist IR theory, adding important insights to 
the analysis of the causes of conflict and peace. The recognition of the 
backwards and forwards movement in the encounter with the Other, the
enemy, enables us to understand how shared meaning is produced, or 
obstructed. In the case of Teso, due to prevailing asymmetric power 
relations, which manifested themselves in the mediation process, the peace 
achieved remained shallow, leaving the people of Teso with resentment and 
bitterness towards the Museveni government. Today, through drawing on a 
particular interpretation of the past, which narrates the Museveni 
government as perpetrator and the people of Teso as victims, the Teso 
horizon is interpreted in a way which obstructs reconciliation. The 
hermeneutic process of retrieving the past in light of an anticipated future 
has led to a writing of local Teso history which stands as a solid monument, 
to return to Foucault's term. Today, this obstructs attempts to establish a 
more rewarding relationship with the government. A sense of closure limits 
what is possible in the future.
This is a thesis about challenging and changing the structures that 
give way to violent conflicts. I t  is a first attempt to link hermeneutics and 
peace and conflict studies, marking the beginning of a wider research 
agenda. As such it responds to recent, post-positivist contributions to 
conflict analysis which —amongst other objectives—use deconstruction as a 
framework to draw attention to excluded voices. Despite being in broad 
agreement with these approaches this thesis argues, nevertheless, that the 
challenging of boundaries as suggested by scholars such as Ashley, Walker 
and Campbell is not sufficient to interpret the time after a violent conflict in 
which peace is invented. In order to push current debates forward it 
therefore moves from the discursive analysis of conflict to the discursive 
analysis of the peace-building process. The dynamics involved in the 
transition from conflict to peace are the ontological processes of changing 
identities in the fusion of horizons with the Other. The significance for peace 
analysis is that in the process of building peace identities need to be defined 
in less exclusive terms to difference. While the work of scholars such as 
Campbell discusses how enemies are constructed in discourse and practice 
this thesis has turned the argument around to analyse how peace is 
invented in discourse. This is given expression through the framework of 
hermeneutics which, through its notion of fusing horizons, at the same time 
provides a metaphor for the ontology of peace. Importantly, however,
peace in this study is not understood as a telos but as an interactive 
process of fusing horizons—a fusion which is, and should be, challenged in 
the very moment of its accomplishment.
The approach taken in this thesis is to focus on the local level. I t  does 
not seek to make wider empirical claims which reach beyond the Teso 
boundaries. The Teso insurgency, like any other case, has particular 
characteristics which prevent generalised findings. This includes the fact 
that the Teso insurgency was never very strong and did not have an explicit 
political agenda. In addition, despite the claims made by the people of Teso, 
it is hard to establish a strong, discriminatory policy by the Museveni 
government or a strong degree of repression or persecution. A case for 
structural and institutional exclusion can however be made to an extent. As 
a consequence, the mediation process, or the fusion of horizons, was 
facilitated by a relatively low level of domination from the government 
which enabled the application of the metaphor of fusing horizons. Had the 
frontiers between the Museveni government and Teso been fiercer, the 
outcome of this study might have been different.
So, is the introduction of hermeneutics into peace and conflict 
analysis only valuable if domination is limited? Or can it be applied more 
widely? As stated above, this thesis is intended to lay the foundations for a 
wider research agenda. A possible follow-on project could be to compare a 
number of peace-building and reconciliation projects in a war-torn society to 
understand how different agents contribute to either maintaining conflict or 
inventing peace. For instance, post-genocide Rwanda would lend itself to 
such a project. In Rwanda, a number of organisations seek to contribute to 
the process of reconciliation. They include the Government of Rwanda's 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, numerous churches and 
indigenous organisation as well as peace-building projects by the 
international community. Through analysing the work of these different 
agents, and the impact they have on the prevailing structures of inclusion 
and exclusion, the process of reconciliation in Rwanda could be assessed. 
Here, the analysis through the framework of hermeneutics would turn into a 
critical project in which various mediation efforts are compared and
evaluated. This could reveal that some agents (possibly the Government of 
Rwanda) perpetuate discord rather then trying to reconcile it, standing in 
the way of peace-building in Rwanda. As an extension to the case study on 
Teso this would then specifically address notions of domination and 
exclusion.
This thesis seeks to contribute three aspects to the prevailing body of 
IR literature.
Firstly, it provides the only political analysis of the Teso insurgency 
and thus records a piece of Ugandan history. Generally, there has been very 
little academic interest in the region. In 2000, two anthropological doctoral 
theses were published on the process of social healing, yet neither 
addresses the political background of the insurgency.34 The mediation 
process marks an exception in the way the Ugandan government, in 
particular, and many governments in Africa more widely respond to 
insurgents. Since conflict prevention is high on the agenda of many western 
donors and NGOs documenting a rare, relatively successful case was 
important.35
Secondly, as laid out above, the thesis seeks to push the current, 
post-positivist contributions to peace and conflict studies one step further 
beyond mere deconstruction to incorporate peace-building into the research 
agenda. It  hence contributes to the development of a particular trajectory in 
the discipline of International Relations.
And thirdly, this thesis offers a case study analysed through a post­
positivist framework. This is significant since, so far, IR scholars working on 
post-positivist peace and conflict studies have been occupied with making 
(relevant) philosophical and theoretical claims, but the illustration and 
application though fieldwork has been limited.36 In order to make these 
approaches more applicable for policy analysis, and hence to convince more 
people of their relevance, post-positivist research should not be confined to
34 De Berry (2000) and Heriques (2 0 0 0 ).
35 See also Susanne Zistel (2000): Successful Mediation in Armed Conflict. Learning Lessons 
from a Case Study in Teso, Uganda. Kampala: GTZ report.
36 With the exception of scholar such as David Campbell.
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the ivory towers of academies alone, it should also demonstrate its practical 
use and potential. This thesis is a step in this direction.
The Ethics o f Hermeneutics
Famously it has been argued that theory is always for somebody and 
for some purpose,37 and the promotion of critical hermeneutics over, for 
instance, Derridian deconstruction cannot be free from this allegation either. 
Hermeneutics promotes a particular ethical attitude towards otherness, 
which has not been discussed in the present study.38 In contrast to 
deconstruction, which seeks to liberate difference, hermeneutics (especially 
in Gadamer's tradition) calls for an engagement with difference. Gadamer 
contends that the Other is most appreciated when engaged with in 
conversation (in the widest sense). In other words, for Gadamer's 
hermeneutics it is a sign of respect for otherness to expose oneself to the 
new and unfamiliar, and to learn to understand her/him in all her/his 
manifold difference. However, similar to deconstruction, this call for 
engagement is not derived from a normative framework but rather from the 
recognition of an always already present process which occurs when people 
engage with each other. However, different from deconstruction, 
hermeneutics emphasises not what is unrepresented, that is what is 'other' 
and in need of liberating, but rather it recognises the Other yet stresses the 
process of the production of shared meaning. In Gadamer's words: 
"Whoever wants me to take deconstruction to heart and insists on 
difference stands at the beginning of a conversation, not its end."39 
Gadamer thus sees hermeneutics as being complementary to 
deconstruction. The important difference is the spin, or perspective, which 
ultimately leads to different ethical attitudes: liberating difference or
37 Robert Cox/Timothy Sinclair (1996): Approaches to World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 67.
38 Despite recognising the relevance of ethics for IR in this thesis I have consciously decided 
to concentrate on other issues which I consider equally important like linking post-positivist 
approaches to conflict studies to field research. As a result, out of respect for the people this 
project is about, I have tried not to discuss any theoretical aspects which exceed the scope 
of the case study in order to make sure that the people of Teso always remain present. On 
the level of ownership, after all, it is their conflict and their peace, and not simply an 
intellectual exercise for the advancement of a PhD degree in the UK.
39 Hans-Georg Gadamer (1993h): Destruktion und Dekonstruktion. in: Wahrheit und 
Methode II. Ergaenzungen. Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, p. 372. (translated in Gadamer, Hans-
engaging with it. The significance for this thesis is that hermeneutics allows 
for conceptualising peace, as in the end of conversation, and not simply the 
opening up of space for the Other, as I have tried to illustrate in the 
chapters 1-3.
And yet, it is important to remember that introducing critical 
hermeneutics to conflict studies does not create a new 'method' to bring 
about peace and co-existence. Hermeneutics is simply a way of seeing and 
interpreting the world, not an action-plan to change it. All attempts to 
reduce hermeneutics to a praxeological impulse would run the risk of 
turning it into a method, which would destroy its openness and emphasis on 
contingency. Again, the parallels with the ethics of Derridian deconstruction 
are apparent: in both cases ethics does not lead to a clearly defined set of 
politics.40 However, the insights gleaned through hermeneutic interpretation 
might allow for discussing politics in a particular light. With reference to 
efforts to reduce the occurrence of violent conflicts these politics would 
include a participatory approach (based on the notion of conversation and 
dialogue), a respect for difference (based on the acknowledgement that 
meaning is produced in the evaluation of the own as well as the Other's 
horizon), an open, process orientated structure (based on the fusion of 
horizons being a process), as well as an appreciation of, and a willingness 
to, change. Political decisions taken against the backdrop of hermeneutics 
would not rely on a foundation - but also not be arbitrary. Rather they 
would derive out of consultation and consensus amongst the parties 
involved.
Georg (1989): Destruction and Deconstruction, in: Michelfelder, Diane P./Palmer, Richard E. 
(eds.): Dialogue and Deconstruction. Albany: State University of New York, p. 113.)
40 For a discussion of the politics in Derrida's deconstruction see for instance Simon Critchley 
(2000): "An Agenda for Discussion." Constellations 7(4): 455-65.
Hence, finally, in analogy to critical hermeneutics, this thesis does not 
attempt to provide definite answers but encourages the constant 
contestation of its arguments. Arresting the flux is all it can do.
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Amudo Areni 24.03.2000 Kamuda, Soroti district
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Georg W illiam  Ayora 24.03.2000 Kamuda, Soroti district
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London School of Economics 
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Government of Uganda
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Pentecostal Church
Teso Initiative for Peace 
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Former PhD candidate 
Former PhD candidate 
Economist
RDC Nebbi district; former youth 
organiser in Teso insurgency and 
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supply of arms.
Elder; former UPC politician
Deputy co-ordinator
Chairman; former Minister of State for 
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Minister under Museveni; former UN 
delegate; Minister under Obote I I  and 
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Retired civil servant, father to Kenneth 
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CBS Social worker, youth officer
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Peter Kalagala 
Ia n  Legett 
Teko Lokeris
10.04.2000
08.04.2000
23.02.2000
11.01.2000 
14.04.2000
David Mafabi 05.04.2000
John Maitland 15.01.2000 +
20.05.2000
Andy Morton 13.01.2000
Moses Mudong 13.04.2000
Issah Musulo 17.04.2000
Edith Naser 01.05.2000
Michael Obwaatum  28.03.2000
Kumi
Kumi
Soroti
Oxford
Moroto
Kampala
London + Kampala 
London
Moroto
Soroti
Soroti
Kumi town, Teso
Patrick Oguang 28.03.2000 Kumi town, Teso
George Oguli 24.02.2000 Soroti
George Ojam unge 28.03.2000 Kumi town, Teso
Elder, former teacher
Church of Uganda 
Government of Uganda 
Oxfam
Karamoja Projects Implementation Unit
Pan African Movement/ Pan African 
Development, Education and Advocacy 
Programme (PADEAP)
Uganda Development Trust 
Christian Aid
KISP (Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable 
Peace)
World Vision
GTZ/PCY
Government of Uganda
Red Cross 
PCT
Retired Bishop of Teso
RDC Soroti district
Emergency programme officer
Conflict resolution programme officer; 
son of present Minister for Karamoja 
Peter Lokeris
Policy advisor; former rebel SPLA 
commander, Sudan; former 
communication officer under Obote II
Co-Director; former Teso Relief 
Committee; former director of Ngora 
hospital, Kumi district, Teso.
Researcher; Amnesty International 
Uganda researcher during Teso 
insurgency
Elder; father of former Minister for 
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Deputy RDC, Kumi; former Head of 
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Field officer
Commissioner, Soroti district
Red Barnet Kumi Children's Project
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Francis Okello  
Pius Richard Okiria
Thomas Okoth  
Peter Okwi
Kenneth Olumia
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John O lweny  
Omeda Omax
Moses Om iat 
Fidel Omunyokol 
John Oryokot 
Sam Otai
20.03.2000 Soroti
02.05.2000 Serere, Soroti district
17.04.2000 Soroti
24.02.2000 + Soroti
15.03.2000
14.04.2000 Moroto
22.03.2000 Arapai, Soroti district
24.02.2000 Soroti
01.05.2000 Kumi town, Teso
08.02.2000 Soroti
13.03.2000 Kampala
21.03.2000 Soroti
20.03.2000 Soroti
16.03.2000 Soroti
27.03.2000 Soroti
John Emilly Oteka 24.02.2000 Soroti
Peter Otim 14.03.2000 Kampala
Owm ony O w jok 20.03.2000 Arapai, Soroti district
Teso College, Aloet
Local Council, Soroti district
Teso Initiative for Peace
Teso Initiative for Peace + Catholic 
Dioceses, Teso
Government of Uganda
Local Council (LC3) forTuburu, Soroti 
district sub-county
ETOP (Teso Weekly Newspaper)
CARE
DAN I DA
Government of Uganda 
SODANN
Parliament of Uganda 
UPDF
Soroti District Local Council (LC5) 
Centre for Basic Research 
Government of Uganda
Teacher
Youth Counsellor
Project manager, retired teacher
Director of TIP + priest
RDC Moroto district 
Chairman
Editor-in-Chief
Security guard, former rebel and 
amongst the last four to continue the 
struggle until 1994
PCT programme officer
Minister of State for Transport, Labour 
and Environment; former rebel 
commander Serere district, Teso.
Programme manager
journalist
MP for Kaplebyong, Katakwi district
Military officer; former 2nd Commander 
in Rebel High Command
Chairman
PhD student
Minister of State for Northern Uganda 
Reconstruction Programme (NURP)
Moses Owor 28.03.2000 Kumi
Dennis Pain 
O kw ir Rabwoni
13.01.2000 London
04.05.2000 + Kampala + London
16.05.2001
Stella Sabiiti 09.02.2000 Kampala
Care International Monitoring and evaluation specialist
Department for International 
Development
Pan African Movement/ Pan African 
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